Joint Publication 3-07.1

Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Foreign Internal Defense (FID)

30 April 2004

Report Documentation Page

Form Approved
OMB No. 0704-0188

Public reporting burden for the collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to a penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number.

1. REPORT DATE **30 APR 2004**	2. REPORT TYPE **N/A**	3. DATES COVERED **-**
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE **Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Foreign Internal Defense (FID)**		5a. CONTRACT NUMBER 5b. GRANT NUMBER 5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER
6. AUTHOR(S)		5d. PROJECT NUMBER 5e. TASK NUMBER 5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) **Joint Chiefs of Staff Washington, DC**		8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER
9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)		10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S) 11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)
12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT **Approved for public release, distribution unlimited**		
13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES **The original document contains color images.**		
14. ABSTRACT		
15. SUBJECT TERMS		

16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:			17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT	18. NUMBER OF PAGES	19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON
a. REPORT **unclassified**	b. ABSTRACT **unclassified**	c. THIS PAGE **unclassified**	**UU**	**167**	

Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8-98)
Prescribed by ANSI Std Z39-18

PREFACE

1. Scope

This publication establishes joint tactics, techniques, and procedures (JTTP) for the Armed Forces of the United States involved in or supporting foreign internal defense operations. It discusses how joint operations, involving the application of all instruments of national power, support host nation efforts to combat subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency.

2. Purpose

This publication has been prepared under the direction of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It sets forth doctrine and selected JTTP to govern the joint activities and performance of the Armed Forces of the United States in joint operations and provides the doctrinal basis for interagency coordination and US military involvement in multinational operations. It provides military guidance for the exercise of authority by combatant commanders and other joint force commanders (JFCs) and prescribes doctrine and selected tactics, techniques, and procedures for joint operations and training. It provides military guidance for use by the Armed Forces in preparing their appropriate plans. It is not the intent of this publication to restrict the authority of the JFC from organizing the force and executing the mission in a manner the JFC deems most appropriate to ensure unity of effort in the accomplishment of the overall mission.

3. Application

a. Doctrine and selected tactics, techniques, and procedures and guidance established in this publication apply to the commanders of combatant commands, subunified commands, joint task forces, and subordinate components of these commands. These principles and guidance also may apply when significant forces of one Service are attached to forces of another Service or when significant forces of one Service support forces of another Service.

b. The guidance in this publication is authoritative; as such, this doctrine (or JTTP) will be followed except when, in the judgment of the commander, exceptional circumstances dictate otherwise. If conflicts arise between the contents of this publication and the contents of Service publications, this publication will take precedence for the activities of joint forces unless the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, normally in coordination with the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has provided more current and specific guidance. Commanders of forces operating as part of a multinational (alliance or coalition) military command should follow multinational doctrine and procedures ratified by the United States. For doctrine and procedures

not ratified by the United States, commanders should evaluate and follow the multinational command's doctrine and procedures, where applicable and consistent with US law, regulations, and doctrine.

For the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

T. J. KEATING
Vice Admiral, USN
Director, Joint Staff

SUMMARY OF CHANGES

REVISION OF JOINT PUBLICATION 3-07.1, DATED 26 JUNE 1996

- **Adds the area of security cooperation to the indirect support category of foreign internal defense (FID)**
- **Adds the area of military training support to the direct support (not involving combat operations) category of FID**
- **Includes a discussion of National Security Presidential Directive 1 and its impact on political-military plans**
- **Revises discussion of FID advisory committee to FID interagency working group**
- **Updates the discussion of the DOD organization and representation within the diplomatic mission and country team**
- **Revises the discussion of FID planning imperatives**
- **Adds a discussion of theater security cooperation planning and FID**
- **Revises the FID guidelines to consider when developing courses of action**
- **Discusses the impact of the areas of information operations, conventional forces and the Global War on Terrorism in employment of forces in FID operations**
- **Add a discussion of psychological operations reachback capabilities**
- **Deleted the appendix on the authorities and responsibilities of chiefs of missions**
- **Provides an example of a interagency political-military plan for FID**

Intentionally Blank

TABLE OF CONTENTS

PAGE

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ix

CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

- General I-1
- Background I-1
- Relationship of Foreign Internal Defense to Internal Defense and Development I-2
- The Foreign Internal Defense Operational Framework I-3
- Department of Defense Foreign Internal Defense Tools I-5

CHAPTER II
ORGANIZATION AND RESPONSIBILITIES FOR
FOREIGN INTERNAL DEFENSE

- General II-1
- National-Level Organizations II-3
- Combatant Command Organization II-6
- Subordinate Unified Commands II-8
- Joint Task Forces II-10
- The United States Diplomatic Mission and Country Team II-10
- The Supported Host Nation II-14
- Multinational Foreign Internal Defense Force II-16

CHAPTER III
PLANNING FOR FOREIGN INTERNAL DEFENSE

- General III-1
- Planning Imperatives III-1
- Department of Defense Guidance III-2
- General Theater Planning Requirements III-3
- Foreign Internal Defense Planning Procedures and Considerations III-5
- Planning for Force Protection III-11
- Summary III-12

CHAPTER IV
TRAINING

- General IV-1
- Responsibilities for Foreign Internal Defense Training IV-1
- Training and Skills Needed for Success in Foreign Internal Defense IV-2

- Foreign Internal Defense Training Strategy IV-3
- Conclusion IV-4

CHAPTER V
FOREIGN INTERNAL DEFENSE OPERATIONS

SECTION A. EMPLOYMENT CONSIDERATIONS V-1
- General V-1
- Employment Factors V-1
- Department of Defense Foreign Internal Defense Tools V-7

SECTION B. INDIRECT SUPPORT V-8
- Security Assistance V-8
- Joint and Multinational Exercises V-12
- Exchange Programs V-13

SECTION C. DIRECT SUPPORT (NOT INVOLVING COMBAT OPERATIONS) V-13
- General V-13
- Civil-Military Operations V-14
- Military Training to Host Nation Forces V-26
- Logistic Support V-26
- Intelligence and Communications Sharing V-27

SECTION D. COMBAT OPERATIONS V-28
- General V-28
- Considerations for United States Combat Operations V-29
- Command and Control V-31
- Sustainment V-31

APPENDIX

A Commander's Legal Considerations A-1
B Internal Defense and Development Strategy B-1
C Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace to Support Foreign Internal Defense C-1
D Illustrative Interagency Political-Military Plan for Foreign Internal Defense D-1
E Civil Affairs Estimate of the Situation E-1
F Psychological Operations Estimate of the Situation F-1
G Health Service Support G-1
H References H-1
J Administrative Instructions J-1

GLOSSARY

Part I Abbreviations and Acronyms GL-1
Part II Terms and Definitions GL-5

FIGURE

I-1 Characteristics of Foreign Internal Defense I-4
I-2 The Foreign Internal Defense Framework I-5
I-3 Foreign Internal Defense: An Integrated Program I-6
I-4 The Relationship of Security Cooperation, Security Assistance, and Foreign Internal Defense I-7
I-5 United States Security Assistance I-8
I-6 Direct Support (Not Involving Combat Operations) I-11
II-1 Foreign Internal Defense Coordination II-2
II-2 Participation in National Security Council System Activities II-4
II-3 Notional Foreign Internal Defense Interagency Working Group II-9
II-4 The Country Team Concept II-11
II-5 Security Assistance Organization (Departmental Alignment) II-14
II-6 Security Assistance Organization (Functional Alignment) II-14
II-7 Embassy and Security Assistance Organization Working Relationships II-15
III-1 Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan Supplemental Instructions that Impact Foreign Internal Defense Operations III-4
III-2 Joint Operation Planning and Execution System Deliberate Planning Process Phases III-6
III-3 Concept Development III-7
V-1 Force Employment Factors in Foreign Internal Defense Operations V-2
V-2 Indirect Support in Foreign Internal Defense V-8
V-3 General Objectives of Training Programs Under Security Assistance V-10
V-4 Direct Support (Not Involving Combat Operations) V-14
V-5 Foreign Humanitarian Assistance Employment Considerations V-23
A-1 The Commander's Statutory Authority and Funding for Foreign Internal Defense A-4
B-1 Internal Defense and Development Strategy Model B-2
B-2 Counterinsurgency Planning and Coordination Organization B-6

Intentionally Blank

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
COMMANDER'S OVERVIEW

- **Covers the Fundamentals of Foreign Internal Defense (FID)**
- **Discusses Organization and Responsibilities for FID**
- **Provides FID Planning Considerations**
- **Discusses FID Training Responsibilities and Options**
- **Covers FID Operations Considerations**

Introduction

Foreign internal defense (FID) is the participation by civilian and military agencies of a government in any of the action programs taken by another government or other designated organization, to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency.

Commensurate with US policy goals, **the focus of all US foreign internal defense (FID) efforts is to support the host nation's (HN's) program of internal defense and development (IDAD).** These national programs are designed to free and protect a nation from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency by emphasizing the building of viable institutions that respond to the needs of society. The most significant manifestation of these needs is likely to be economic, social, informational, or political; therefore, these needs should prescribe the principal focus of US efforts. The United States will generally employ a mix of diplomatic, economic, informational, and military instruments of national power in support of these objectives. **Military assistance is often necessary in order to provide the secure environment for the above efforts to become effective.**

Foreign Internal Defense (FID) Operational Framework

Characteristics of FID involve all instruments of national power used together to support a host nation (HN) internal defense and development program.

Although this publication centers on the military instrument's contribution, it is also important to understand the overlying national strategy that directs FID activities and how all instruments of national power support the concept. FID makes extensive use of the **diplomatic instrument** of national power. A dysfunctional political system in a nation results in internal instability. The **informational instrument** involves effective use of public diplomacy, public affairs activities, and psychological operations. The **military instrument** plays an important supporting role in the overall FID program and this role cannot be conducted in isolation. The **economic instrument** influences every aspect of

FID support. Often, the internal strife a supported nation faces is brought on by unfavorable economic conditions within that nation.

Department of Defense FID Tools

The specific tools used in executing the Department of Defense portion of the FID program are indirect support, direct support (not involving combat operations), and US combat operations.

Indirect support operations emphasize the principle of HN self-sufficiency. Indirect support focuses on building strong national infrastructures through economic and military capabilities that contribute to self-sufficiency. The US military contribution to this type of support is derived from security cooperation guidance and provided primarily through security assistance (SA), supplemented by multinational exercises, exchange programs, and selected joint exercises. **Direct support (not involving combat operations)** involve the use of US forces providing direct assistance to the HN civilian populace or military. They differ from SA in that they are joint- or Service-funded, do not usually involve the transfer of arms and equipment, and do not usually but may include training local military forces. Direct support operations are normally conducted when the HN has not attained self-sufficiency and is faced with social, economic, or military threats beyond its capability to handle. Assistance will normally focus on civil-military operations (primarily, the provision of services to the local populace), psychological operations, communications and intelligence sharing, and logistic support. The decision to conduct **US combat operations** in FID operations is the President's and serves only as a temporary solution until HN forces are able to stabilize the situation and provide security for the populace. In all cases, US combat operations support the HN IDAD program and remain strategically defensive in nature.

Responsibilities for FID

For FID to be successful in meeting a HN's needs, the US Government must integrate efforts of multiple government agencies.

Interagency coordination during joint operations becomes extremely important. This is the best way to ensure that the efforts complement each other and that available resources are used effectively and efficiently. Effective integration is difficult and consists of much more than mere coordination. Ideally the FID program will incorporate all instruments in a coordinated and supporting manner that addresses HN requirements and US national policy and interests. Such integration and coordination are essentially vertical between levels of command and organization, and horizontal between United States Government (USG) agencies and HN military and civilian agencies. In addition, integration and coordination requirements may extend

to allied nations and coalition partners participating with the US in multinational FID efforts.

Management of the FID effort begins at the national level, with the selection of those nations the US will support through FID programs. This decision is made by the President with advice from the Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, and other officials. Funding for these programs is appropriated by Congress. **The United States will normally consider FID support only if the following three conditions exist: the existing or threatened internal disorder threatens US national strategic goals; the threatened nation is capable of effectively using US assistance; and, the threatened nation requests US assistance.** If the President or Secretary of Defense makes the decision to provide military support to a FID program, the level and type of assistance required must be determined. No two FID programs are exactly alike.

Planning Considerations

FID is designed to bolster the internal stability and security of the supported nation. Only a comprehensive planning process at both the national and regional level can provide the means to reach this goal.

The national FID effort should involve the integration of all instruments of national power including consideration of the conduct of military operations in support of the FID program. **National Security Council directives promulgate US FID policy.** Joint Strategic Planning System (JSPS) documents reflect the military responsibilities for carrying out this broad guidance. The entire focus of US assistance under FID is to assist a HN, if possible, in anticipating, precluding, and as a last resort, countering an internal threat. The type of planning necessary is obviously dictated by the type or types of support being provided. **Support in anticipating and precluding threats is preventive in nature and is likely to require a mix of indirect support and direct support not involving combat operations.** An existing threat is likely to require responses that span all categories of FID support, to include US combat operations.

Planning Imperatives

There are some basic imperatives that must be considered when integrating FID into strategies and plans.

FID has certain aspects that make planning for it complex. Some basic imperatives when integrating FID into strategies and plans are: maintain HN sovereignty and legitimacy; understand long-term or strategic implications and sustainability of all US assistance efforts before FID programs are implemented; tailor military support of FID programs to the environment and the

specific needs of the supported HN; ensure unity of effort; and, understand US foreign policy.

FID Planning Procedures and Considerations

Much of the military planning for FID is conducted at the combatant command level.

The combatant commander bases strategy and military planning to support FID on the broad guidance and missions provided in the JSPS. The theater strategies and plans that combatant commanders develop to support national strategic objectives are largely influenced by the National Military Strategy (NMS), but are tasked through the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP) process. **The NMS allows the combatant commanders to provide feedback about priorities and force structure requirements that may be significant in highlighting those FID areas of importance that the JSCP has not resourced** or recognized as specified or implied missions. The JSCP is the principal vehicle by which the combatant commanders are tasked to develop operation plans (OPLANs) and operation plans in concept format (CONPLANs) for regional contingencies. **Through the guidance and resources provided in the JSCP, the combatant commanders develop their OPLANs and CONPLANs to support FID programs.**

Geographic combatant commanders may develop theater strategies and/or campaign plans that support taskings by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the JSCP. Combatant commanders vary the planning instruments that they use to direct activities in their areas of responsibility (AORs). Regardless of how commanders may tailor the planning process, **military activities in support of FID requirements are integrated into concepts and plans from the strategic level down to the tactical level**. Theater strategy translates national and alliance strategic tasks and direction into long-term, regionally focused concepts to accomplish specific missions and objectives. **Peacetime goals will normally focus on deterring hostilities and enhancing stability in the theater. FID is an integral part of this strategy.**

Training

Training for operations to support a FID operation is a command responsibility.

Training requirements, which are command responsibilities, and skills needed for successful military operations in support of FID include: overall US and theater goals for FID; area and cultural orientation; language training; standards of conduct; relationships of FID programs to intelligence collection; coordinating relationships with other USG agencies; legal guidelines; rules of

engagement (ROE); and tactical force protection training. **Training to prepare for military operations to support FID requires that a broad range of areas be covered.** The training also must be designed to support a mix of personnel, ranging from language-trained and culturally focused special operations forces (SOF) to those totally untrained in the specific area where the FID program is located. A combination of institutional and unit-conducted individual and collective training will be required.

Employment Considerations

FID programs are part of the unified actions of the combatant command and are joint and multinational in nature.

Several areas deserve special attention when discussing employment of forces in FID operations including: information operations impact; psychological impact; intelligence support; SOF; conventional forces; public information programs; logistic support; counterdrug operations in FID; Global War on Terrorism and FID; operations security; and lessons learned.

Indirect Support

Indirect support requires that the military will primarily provide equipment, training, and services to the supported HN forces.

In the SA arena, geographic combatant commanders and subordinate joint force commanders do not have authority over the SA program, but have responsibility for planning and executing military activities to support FID within the SA process. Geographic combatant commanders are active in the SA process by advising ambassadors through the security assistance organization (SAO) and by coordinating and monitoring ongoing SA efforts in their AORs. In addition, through coordination with HN military forces and supporting SAOs, the combatant commander can assist in building credible military assistance packages that best support long-term goals and objectives of regional FID programs. **Joint and multinational exercises** can enhance a FID program. They offer the advantage of training US forces while simultaneously increasing interoperability with HN forces and offering limited HN training opportunities. **Exchange programs** foster greater mutual understanding and familiarize each force with the operations of the other. Exchange programs are another building block that can help a commander round out his FID plan. Some of these programs include reciprocal unit exchange programs, personnel exchange programs, individual exchange programs, and combination programs.

Direct Support (Not Involving Combat Operations)

Direct support (not involving combat operations) involves US forces actually conducting operations in support of the HN and provides immediate assistance, which is usually combined in a total FID program with indirect operations.

Several types of direct operations are important to supporting FID. **Civil-military operations (CMO)** span a very broad area in FID and include activities such as civil affairs activities, foreign humanitarian assistance, humanitarian and civic assistance, and military civic action across the range of military operations. Using CMO to support military activities in a FID program can enhance preventive measures, reconstruction efforts, and combat operations in support of a HN IDAD program. **Psychological operations (PSYOP)** supports the achievement of national objectives by creating desired emotions, attitudes, or behavior in select target foreign audiences. **Military training to HN forces** prepares the HN to deal with subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency problems. **Logistic support** operations are limited by US law and usually consist of transportation or limited maintenance support. Legal restrictions prohibit the transfer of equipment or supplies under these programs. Authorization for combatant commanders to provide logistic support to the HN military must be received from the President or Secretary of Defense. **Intelligence and communication sharing**, although two separate areas, are closely related and have many of the same employment considerations. Assistance may be provided in terms of evaluation, training, limited information exchange, and equipment support.

Combat Operations

US participation in combat operations as part of a FID effort requires Presidential authority.

Many considerations, including CMO and PSYOP, must be discussed and reviewed when employing combat forces in support of FID. They include: maintaining close coordination with the HN IDAD organization; tiering of forces; establishing transition points; maintaining a joint, interagency, and multinational focus; identifying and integrating logistics, intelligence, and other combat support means in US combat operations; conduct combat operations only when directed by legal authority to stabilize the situation and to give the local government and HN military forces time to regain the initiative; strict adherence to respect for human rights; following the ROE; preventing indiscriminate use of force; maintaining the US joint intelligence network; and integrating with other FID programs. **The command and control relationships will be modified based on the political, social, and military environment of the area.** The HN government and security forces must remain in the forefront. Finally, sustainment of US forces is essential to success. Political

sensitivities and concerns for HN legitimacy and minimum US presence does change the complexion of sustainment operations in FID.

CONCLUSION

This publication establishes joint tactics, techniques, and procedures for the Armed Forces of the United States involved in or supporting FID operations. It discusses how joint operations, involving the application of all instruments of national power, support HN efforts to combat subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency.

Intentionally Blank

CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

"We need a greater ability to deal with guerilla forces, insurrection, and subversion…We must be ready now to deal with any size force, including small externally supported bands of men; and we must help train local forces to be equally effective."

President John F. Kennedy, Message to Congress, 1961

1. General

a. Commensurate with US policy goals, **the focus of all US foreign internal defense (FID) efforts is to support the host nation's (HN's) program of internal defense and development (IDAD)**. These national programs are designed to free and protect a nation from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency by emphasizing the building of viable institutions that respond to the needs of society. The most significant manifestation of these needs is likely to be economic, social, informational, or political; therefore, these needs should prescribe the principal focus of US efforts. The United States seeks to promote the growth of freedom, democratic institutions, and fair and open international trade. We also support the security, stability, and well-being of our allies and other nations friendly to our interests. The United States will generally employ a mix of diplomatic, economic, informational, and military instruments of national power in support of these objectives. As part of this effort, friendly nations facing threats to their internal security may receive intelligence, materiel, and training assistance from the United States. It is through FID, as an important element of US foreign policy, that this needed assistance is provided. **FID is the participation by civilian and military agencies of a government in any of the action programs taken by another government or other designated organization, to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency.**

b. Military assistance is often necessary in order to provide the secure environment for the above efforts to become effective. For example, threats posed through illegal drug trafficking, terrorism, acquisition of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), and civil unrest affect all aspects of a nation's defense and development.

c. From the US perspective, FID has assumed many forms as support to foreign nations has evolved. In all cases, however, **FID refers to the US activities that support a HN IDAD strategy designed to protect against subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency, consistent with US National Security objectives and policies**.

2. Background

a. The United States has a long history of assisting the governments of friendly nations facing internal threats. In the chaos after World War II, the United States followed its massive wartime Lend Lease Program with postwar assistance by providing up to 90 percent of the support to the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration in support of war-stricken Europe and the Far East. New balances of power and the devastation of Europe had permanently

changed the strategic role and interests of the United States. This new role was vividly demonstrated by the economic, equipment, training, and advisory support provided to Greece and Turkey to stabilize their governments. This postwar US policy was reflected in the staunchly anticommunist Truman Doctrine that established US policy as that of "…supporting free peoples who are attempting to resist subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures."

b. Both the Truman Doctrine and Marshall Plan were US-designed and US-implemented programs concentrating on repelling the external threat of communist aggression as well as thwarting internal threats to supported nations. Although this concept of support differs significantly from today's FID concept, these programs set the precedent for US support and assistance to friendly nations facing threats to their national security. Early postwar arms transfers were carried out as grant aid (giveaway) under the Military Assistance Program. Later, as the economies of recipient nations regenerated, arms transfers, economic aid, and collective security began to merge under a program that was to be known under the Nixon administration as security assistance (SA).

c. The US policy of assisting friendly nations to develop stable governments and prevent the spread of communism, fueled by the fear of the domino effect, continued through the US experience with Cuba beginning in 1959. This policy reached a new level during the 1960s with the Alliance for Progress, which involved Central and South America. This era of assistance culminated with the war in Vietnam, a major turning point for US policy that shaped the concept of FID as the United States now conducts it. In 1969, with US public and congressional opinion moving strongly against the war in Vietnam and against US intervention in general, President Richard M. Nixon announced a new US approach to supporting friendly nations. The Nixon Doctrine (also called the Guam Doctrine) expressed this policy with emphasis on the point that the US would assist friendly nations, but would require them to provide the manpower and be ultimately responsible for their own national defense. This principle of nations developing their own IDAD programs, supported through US training and materiel assistance, has become the basis for today's FID concept.

d. In recent times, the United States has provided the same type of assistance in El Salvador, Colombia, Kuwait, the Philippines, Afghanistan, and the Republic of Georgia. Although not of the same magnitude as the post-World War II efforts, the United States contributed to restoring stability in the various regions after crisis situations.

3. Relationship of Foreign Internal Defense to Internal Defense and Development

a. It is important to frame the US FID effort in perspective with the overall span of US doctrine that it supports and to understand how it fits into the HN IDAD program.

b. **Types of military operations other than war related to FID** are nation assistance and/or support to counterinsurgency; combatting terrorism; peace operations (PO); Department of Defense (DOD) support to counterdrug (CD) operations; and foreign humanitarian assistance (FHA). These categories may, to some degree, include FID operations as an integral component in supporting the fight against subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency.

c. US military support to FID should focus on assisting a HN in anticipating, precluding, and countering these threats or other potential threats. Emphasis on internal developmental programs as well as internal defense programs when organizing, planning, and executing military support to a FID program is essential. This assists the HN to address the root causes of instability in a proactive manner.

d. **US military involvement in FID has traditionally been focused toward counterinsurgency.** Although much of the FID effort remains focused on this important area, US FID programs may aim at other threats to a HN's internal stability, such as civil disorder, illicit drug trafficking, and terrorism. These threats may, in fact, predominate in the future as traditional power centers shift, suppressed cultural and ethnic rivalries surface, and the economic incentives of illegal drug trafficking continue. **Focusing on the internal development portion of IDAD enables the FID program to address areas other than counterinsurgency.**

e. US military operations to support a FID program provide training, materiel, advice, or assistance to support local forces in executing an IDAD program, rather than US forces conducting the IDAD mission for the HN.

f. **US FID efforts are always directed at supporting internal HN action programs aimed at bolstering IDAD.** The fundamental principle of all FID efforts is that they foster internal solutions and assist IDAD programs for which the supported nation has ultimate responsibility and control.

g. US military efforts designed to defend nations against external aggression are extended through mutual defense treaties and are not the topic of this publication.

4. The Foreign Internal Defense Operational Framework

a. As shown in Figure I-1, **characteristics of FID involve all instruments of national power used together to support a HN IDAD program**. Although this publication centers on the military instrument's contribution, it is also important to understand the overlying national strategy that directs FID activities and how all instruments of national power support the concept.

b. The FID operational framework, shown in Figure I-2, is discussed in more detail throughout the remainder of this chapter.

c. **Diplomatic Instrument.** FID makes extensive use of the diplomatic instrument of national power. A dysfunctional political system in a nation results in internal instability. Diplomacy is often the first instrument exercised by the United States. Indirect and direct military support provided through training, logistics, or other support all make significant diplomatic statements by demonstrating US commitment and resolve.

d. **Informational Instrument.** Effective use of public diplomacy, public affairs (PA) activities, and psychological operations (PSYOP) are essential to a FID program. FID programs offer a great opportunity for public misunderstanding and for exploitation by elements hostile to

CHARACTERISTICS OF FOREIGN INTERNAL DEFENSE

- ✓ **May involve all instruments of national power**
- ✓ **Can occur across the range of military operations**
- ✓ **Supports and influences a host nation's internal defense and development program**
- ✓ **Includes training, materiel, technical and organizational assistance, advice, infrastructure development, and tactical operations**
- ✓ **Generally, the preferred methods of support are through assistance and development programs**

Figure I-1. Characteristics of Foreign Internal Defense

the United States and its allies. US foreign assistance has often been met with skepticism by our public and typically has been the target for adversary propaganda. **FID offers a tremendous opportunity to portray US support in a positive light, but not at the expense of the supported nation that may be sensitive to accepting aid.** Accurate portrayal of US FID efforts through positive information programs can influence worldwide perceptions of the US FID programs and HN desire to embrace changes and improvements necessary to correct its problems as well as deter those opposed to such changes.

e. **Military Instrument.** The military plays an important supporting role in the overall FID program and this role cannot be conducted in isolation. In some cases, the role of the US military may become more important because military officials have greater access to and credibility with HN regimes that are heavily influenced or dominated by their own military. The ability of the US military to influence the professionalism of the HN military, and thus its democratic process, is considerable. In such cases, success may depend on US representatives being able to persuade host military authorities to lead or support reform efforts aimed at eliminating or reducing corruption and human rights abuse. **The FID effort is a multinational and interagency effort, requiring integration and synchronization of all instruments of national power.** US military support also requires joint planning and execution to ensure that the efforts of all participating combatant commands, subordinate joint force commands, and/or Service or functional components are mutually supportive and focused. **Military FID programs generally can be categorized into indirect support, direct support (not including combat operations), and combat operations.** These categories represent significantly different levels of US diplomatic and military commitment and risk. It should be noted, however, that various programs and operations within these categories can occur simultaneously. As an example, certain forms of indirect support and direct support (not including combat operations) may continue even when US forces are committed to a combat role (see Figure I-3).



Figure I-2. The Foreign Internal Defense Framework

f. **Economic Instrument.** Economics influence every aspect of FID support. Often, the internal strife a supported nation faces is brought on by unfavorable economic conditions within that nation. These conditions weaken national infrastructures and contribute to instability, particularly when the HN government is perceived as not being able to meet the basic needs of the people. These instabilities may produce an environment ripe for increasing subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency. The economic tool is used in a variety of ways, ranging from direct financial assistance and favorable trade arrangements to the provision of foreign military financing under SA.

5. Department of Defense Foreign Internal Defense Tools

a. **Indirect Support.** These operations emphasize the principle of HN self-sufficiency. **Indirect support focuses on building strong national infrastructures through economic and military capabilities that contribute to self-sufficiency.** The US military contribution to



Figure I-3. Foreign Internal Defense: An Integrated Program

this type of support is derived from security cooperation guidance and provided primarily through SA, supplemented by multinational exercises, exchange programs, and selected joint exercises.

(1) **Security Cooperation. Security cooperation involves all DOD interactions with foreign defense establishments to build defense relationships** that promote specific US security interests, develop allied and friendly military capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations, and provide US forces with peacetime and contingency access to a HN. The relationship of security cooperation, SA, and FID is depicted in Figure I-4. The DOD security cooperation guidance provides goals and activities for specific regions, directs the preparation of theater security cooperation (TSC) strategies and implementation plans by the geographic combatant commanders, and provides the overarching framework for many FID-related activities.

(2) **Security Assistance.** SA is a principal instrument in the US FID effort. Like FID itself, SA is a broad, encompassing topic and includes efforts of civilian agencies as well as



Figure I-4. The Relationship of Security Cooperation, Security Assistance, and Foreign Internal Defense

those of the military. By definition, **SA is the provision of defense articles, military training, and other defense-related services by grant, loan, credit, or cash sales in furtherance of US national policies and objectives**. SA, while integral to our FID program, is also much broader than FID alone. SA is predominately aimed at enhancing regional stability of areas of the world facing external rather than internal threats. SA directed at external threats is outside the purview of this publication. **Note that only a portion of the overall SA effort fits into the FID area, but that it is a large part of the overall FID effort.** Also, it is important to note that the direct support (not involving combat operations) category makes up the preponderance of the remaining military operations. The SA program is authorized by the Foreign Assistance Act (FAA) of 1961 as amended, and the Arms Export Control Act (AECA) of 1976 as amended, and is under the supervision and general direction of Department of State (DOS). **The military component of SA, implemented by DOD in accordance with policies established by DOS, has as its principal components the foreign military financing program (FMFP), international military education and training (IMET), foreign military sales (FMS), and PO.** DOS provides financial support to international peacekeeping operations (PKO), a subset of PO, through a PKO fund. These components, combined with the Economic Support Fund (ESF) and commercial sales licensed under the AECA, are SA with tools that the United States can use to further its national interests and support the overall FID effort. The specific procedures for

requesting and approving HN SA requests and integrating the SA tool into the combatant commanders' military plans to support a FID program are complex and will be examined in more detail later in this publication. Figure I-5 offers a general overview of the SA management process and lists the key military programs.



Figure I-5. United States Security Assistance

Foreign military sales, often realized through the foreign military financing program, is a key security assistance tool in support of a foreign internal defense program.

(a) **FMS.** This is a nonappropriated program through which governments can purchase defense articles, services, and training from the United States. Eligible nations can use this program to help build national security infrastructures. A limitation of this program is that the nations that require assistance are often unable to finance their needs.

(b) **FMFP.** The program provides funding to purchase defense articles and services, design and construction services, and training through FMS or commercial channels. The FMFP can be an extremely effective FID tool, providing assistance to nations with weak economies that would otherwise be unable to afford US assistance.

(c) **IMET.** IMET contributes to internal and external security of a country by providing training to selected foreign militaries and related civilian personnel on a grant aid basis. The program helps to strengthen foreign militaries through US military training (and exposure to values) that are necessary for the proper functioning of a civilian controlled, apolitical, professional military. This program has long-term positive effects on US and host nation bilateral relations. IMET serves as an "influential" foreign policy tool where the US shapes doctrine; promotes self-sufficiency in maintaining and operating US acquired defense equipment; encourages Western values; and occasionally has a marked effect on the policies of the recipient governments. Foreign students — many of who occupy the middle and upper echelons of their country's military and political establishments — are taught US defense doctrine and employment of US weapon systems resulting in greater cooperation and interoperability.

(d) **PO.** This program funds US PO, such as the multinational force and observers in the Sinai and the US contribution to the United Nations Force in Cyprus. PO encompass PKO and peace enforcement operations. These operations are limited in scope and funding levels and, although related to FID operations, are generally considered separate activities with very focused goals and objectives.

For further information on PO, refer to Joint Publication (JP) 3-07.3, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (JTTP) for Peace Operations.

(e) **Antiterrorism (AT) Assistance.** AT assistance, under the overall coordination of the Secretary of State, is designed to enhance the ability of foreign law enforcement personnel to deter terrorist acts such as bombing, kidnapping, assassination, hostage taking, and hijacking. Such assistance may include training services and the provision of equipment and other commodities related to bomb detection and disposal, management of hostage situations, physical security, and other counterterrorism matters. (Note: DOD training of law enforcement personnel is significantly restricted by Section 660 of the FAA.)

For further information on AT, refer to JP 3-07-2, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Antiterrorism.

> *Security assistance has been and still remains an important instrument of US foreign policy. Arms transfers and related services have reached enormous dimensions and involve most of the world's nations, either as a seller/provider or buyer/recipient.*
>
> **Secretary of State Colin Powell,**
> **Written testimony for the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 8 March 2001**

(3) **Joint and Multinational Exercises.** These programs strengthen US-HN relations and interoperability of forces. They are joint and Service-funded and complement SA and civil-military operations (CMO) by validating HN needs and capabilities and by providing a vehicle for the conduct of humanitarian and civic assistance (HCA) programs. There are very strict legal restrictions on the type of support that can be provided and on the monetary limits of such support. More detail is provided in Chapter V, "Foreign Internal Defense Operations," and Appendix A, "Commander's Legal Considerations."

(4) **Exchange Programs.** Military exchange programs also support the overall FID program by fostering mutual understanding between forces, familiarizing each force with the organization, administration, and operations of the other, and enhancing cultural awareness. Exchange programs, coupled with the IMET SA program, are extremely valuable in improving HN and US relations and may also have long-term implications for strengthening democratic ideals and respect for human rights among supported governments. It is important, however, that such exchange programs (funded with Title 10 monies) do not themselves become vehicles for SA training or other services to the HN in contravention of the FAA and AECA.

b. **Direct Support (Not Involving Combat Operations).** As shown in Figure I-6, **these operations involve the use of US forces providing direct assistance to the HN civilian populace or military**. They differ from SA in that they are joint- or Service-funded, do not usually involve the transfer of arms and equipment, and do not usually but may include training local military forces. Direct support operations are normally conducted when the HN has not attained self-sufficiency and is faced with social, economic, or military threats beyond its capability to handle. **Assistance will normally focus on CMO (primarily, the provision of services to the local populace), PSYOP, communications and intelligence sharing, and logistic support.** In some cases, training of the military and the provision of new equipment may be warranted.

(1) **CMO.** CMO are a variety of activities that establish, maintain, influence, or exploit relations among military forces, governmental and nongovernmental civilian organizations and authorities, and the civilian populace in a friendly, neutral, or hostile operational area in order to facilitate military operations, and to consolidate and achieve operational US objectives. **CMO not only can support a counterinsurgency program, but also can enhance all FID programs.** CMO may be used in a preventive manner in order to address root causes of instability, in a reconstructive manner after conflict, or in support of disaster relief, consequence management, civil defense, CD, and AT activities.

For further information on CMO support to FID, refer to JP 3-57, Joint Doctrine for Civil-Military Operations.



Figure I-6. Direct Support (Not Involving Combat Operations)

(a) **Civil Affairs (CA) Activities.** CA activities are those performed or supported by CA units that enhance the relationship between military forces and civil authorities in areas where military forces are present. These activities may involve application of CA functional specialty skills, in areas normally the responsibility of civil government, to enhance conduct of CMO. CA activities serve as a critical link between US forces providing support in a HN and a HN government, military force, and civilian population. In FID, CA facilitates the integration of US military support into the overall IDAD programs of the supported nation.

For further information on CA support to FID, refer to JP 3-57.1, Joint Doctrine for Civil Affairs.

(b) **FHA.** The purpose of FHA is to relieve or reduce the results of natural or manmade disasters or other endemic conditions such as human suffering, disease, or privation that might present a serious threat to life or loss of property. FHA provided by US forces is limited in scope and duration. FHA programs are often an integral part of an overall FID program.

(c) **HCA.** HCA activities are designed to provide assistance to the HN populace in conjunction with US military operations. HCA activities are integrated into the overall FID program in order to enhance the stability of the geographic combatant commander's area of responsibility (AOR) as well as to improve the readiness of US forces deployed in the theater.

(d) **Military Civic Action (MCA).** MCA is the use of predominantly indigenous military personnel to conduct construction projects, support missions, and services useful to the local population. These activities may involve US supervision and advice but will normally be

Direct support of a host nation will normally focus on civil-military operations.

conducted by the local military. MCA is an essential part of military support to a FID program to assist the local government develop capabilities to provide for the security and well being of its own population.

(2) **PSYOP.** The focus of joint military PSYOP objectives during FID operations is to **support US national objectives, to support the geographic combatant commander's regional security strategy objectives, and to support the objectives of the country team**. Additionally, PSYOP is used to promote the ability of the HN to defend itself against internal and external insurgencies and terrorism by fostering reliable military forces and encouraging empathy between HN armed forces and the civilian populace. PSYOP also may be used to modify the behavior of selected target audiences toward US and multinational capabilities.

For further information on PSYOP support to FID, refer to JP 3-53, Doctrine for Joint Psychological Operations.

(3) **Military Training Support. US military training support to FID should focus on assisting HNs in anticipating, precluding, and countering threats or potential threats.** Emphasis on IDAD when organizing, planning, and executing military training support to a FID program is essential. This emphasis helps the HN address the root causes of instability in a preventive manner rather than reacting to threats. US military involvement in FID has been traditionally focused towards counterinsurgency, however US FID programs may also aim at other threats to a HN's internal stability, such as civil disorder, corruption, human rights abuses, illicit drug trafficking, and terrorism.

(4) **Logistic Support.** US military capabilities may be used to **provide transportation or maintenance support to the HN military** in operations that do not expose US personnel to hostile fire. The FAA does not generally authorize the transfer of equipment or supplies. Logistic support must be provided with consideration of the long-term effect on the capability of the local forces to become self-sufficient.

(5) **Intelligence and Communications Sharing.** US intelligence sharing ranges from strategic analysis to current intelligence summaries and situation reporting for tactical operations. **An adequate intelligence collection and dissemination capability is often one of the weakest links in a HN military capability.** US military communications hardware and operators may also be supplied in cases where HN infrastructure cannot support intelligence operations. The release of classified information to the HN is governed by national disclosure policy. Detailed guidance must be provided to the senior US commander in the chain of command and distributed to subordinate commands supporting FID in accordance with National Security Decision Memorandum 119, *Disclosure of Classified United States Military Information to Foreign Governments and International Organizations*, and National Disclosure Policy-1, *National Policy and Procedures for the Disclosure of Classified Military Information to Foreign Governments and International Organizations.* Detailed written guidance may be supplemented with limited delegation of authority where appropriate.

c. **US Combat Operations. The introduction of US combat forces into FID operations requires a Presidential decision and serves only as a temporary solution until HN forces are able to stabilize the situation and provide security for the populace.** In all cases, US combat operations support the HN IDAD program and remain strategically defensive in nature. While joint and Service doctrine provides specific tactical procedures, there are certain principles that should guide employment of US forces in a tactical role in support of a FID program. These principles, and the specific command and control (C2) and employment considerations for joint and multinational tactical operations in FID, serve as the focus for discussions of tactical operations in this publication.

(1) The primary role for US military forces in tactical operations is to support, advise, and assist HN forces through logistics, intelligence or other combat support, and service support means. This allows the HN force to concentrate on taking the offensive against hostile elements.

(2) If the level of lawlessness, subversion, or insurgency reaches a level that HN forces cannot control, US forces may be required to engage the hostile elements. In this case, the objective of US operations is to protect or stabilize the HN political, economic, and social institutions until the host military can assume these responsibilities.

(3) In all cases, the strategic initiative and responsibility lie with the HN. To preserve its legitimacy and ensure a lasting solution to the problem, the host government must bear this responsibility. A decision for US forces to take the strategic initiative amounts to a transition to war.

(4) Given the multinational and interagency impact of conducting combat operations supporting FID, joint force commanders (JFCs) can expect complex C2 relationships. More information on C2 relationships and issues is provided in Chapter II, "Organization and Responsibilities for Foreign Internal Defense."

(5) The nature of US tactical participation in HN internal conflicts requires judicious and prudent rules of engagement (ROE) and guidelines for the application of force. Inappropriate destruction and violence attributed to US forces may easily reduce the legitimacy and sovereignty of the supported government. In addition, these incidents may be used by adversaries to fuel anti-American sentiments and assist the cause of the opposition.

CHAPTER II
ORGANIZATION AND RESPONSIBILITIES FOR FOREIGN INTERNAL DEFENSE

"I believe it must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures."

Harry S. Truman,
Message to Congress, 1947

1. General

a. Integrated Effort

(1) When it is in the interests of US national security, the United States may employ all instruments of national power in order to assist a friendly nation in conducting IDAD programs.

(2) **For FID to be successful in meeting a HN's needs, the US Government (USG) must integrate the efforts of multiple government agencies.** Interagency coordination during joint operations becomes extremely important. This is the best way to ensure that the efforts complement each other and that available resources are used effectively and efficiently. Effective integration is difficult and consists of much more than mere coordination. Ideally the FID program will incorporate all instruments in a coordinated and supporting manner that addresses HN requirements and US national policy and interests.

(3) Such integration and coordination are essentially vertical between levels of command and organization, and horizontal between USG agencies and HN military and civilian agencies. In addition, integration and coordination requirements may extend to allied nations and coalition partners participating with the US in multinational FID efforts. As is evident in Figure II-1, **the lines of organization and C2 in a FID situation are complex**. This factor, combined with the breadth of potential FID operations, makes complete integration and coordination of all national FID efforts a daunting challenge.

b. The Need for Specialized FID Management

(1) Management of the FID effort begins at the national level, with the selection of those nations the US will support through FID programs. This decision is made by the President with advice from the Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, and other officials. Funding for these programs is appropriated by Congress.

(2) **The United States will normally consider FID support only if the following three conditions exist:**

(a) The existing or threatened internal disorder threatens US national strategic goals.



Figure II-1. Foreign Internal Defense Coordination

(b) The threatened nation is capable of effectively using US assistance.

(c) The threatened nation requests US assistance.

(3) If the President or Secretary of Defense makes the decision to provide military support to a FID program, the level and type of assistance required must be determined. No two FID programs are exactly alike.

(4) Ordinarily, when the decision limits FID support to minor levels of SA or CMO, there is no requirement for a special management program. In these cases, standard interagency

coordination should be adequate. The major FID programs (i.e., those in support of nations important to US national interests) demand levels of management and coordination beyond what is normally found at the interagency, combatant command, and country team levels.

(5) **National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD)–1.** NSPD-1 was titled "Organization of the National Security Council System" (dated 13 February 2001) and was the first in a series of NSPDs. NSPDs replaced both Presidential decision directives (PDDs) and Presidential review directives as an instrument for communicating presidential decisions about the national security policies of the United States. NSPD-1 has had a lasting influence on the development and execution of complex contingency operation planning and execution. It mandated changes of behavior that continue to increase and improve interagency coordination and unity of effort centering on the institutionalization of the National Security Council (NSC) practices to manage a crisis and coordinate political-military plans.

2. National-Level Organizations

a. **NSC**. The first step in translating national-level decisions and guidance into operation plans (OPLANs) and specific guidance to government agencies and departments begins at the NSC. The functions, membership, and responsibilities of the NSC and its advisory bodies are set forth in the National Security Act of 1947 (as amended) and NSPD-1. These documents establish the National Security Council System (NSCS) as the principal forum to advise the President with respect to the integration of domestic, foreign, and military policies relating to national security and the NSCS as the process to coordinate executive departments and agencies in the effective development and implementation of those national security policies. Participation among USG agencies in the NSCS and these advisory bodies is depicted in Figure II-2.

b. **DOS. DOS is generally the lead government agency in executing US FID programs.** Major responsibilities of DOS related to the planning and execution of FID include:

(1) The Secretary of State has responsibility for advising the President in forming foreign policy and has other major specific responsibilities key to the overall planning and execution of the national FID effort.

(2) DOS assists the NSC in building national FID policies and priorities, and is the lead government agency to carry out these policies in the interagency arena. DOS involvement extends from policy formulation at the highest level to mission execution at the HN and country team levels. The Policy Planning Staff and the Political-Military Affairs Bureau are the elements of DOS most involved with interagency planning for FID operations.

(3) The Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security is the principal adviser and focal point for SA matters within DOS. Control and coordination of SA extends from this office to the Assistant Secretary of State for Political-Military Affairs. These lines of supervision and administration interface with DOD at the individual country teams and security assistance organizations (SAOs) in the HNs (see Figure I-5). DOS manages the overall US SA program; the DOD role is limited to implementing the military portion of SA.

PARTICIPATION IN NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL SYSTEM ACTIVITIES

	PARTICIPANTS			
	OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE	JOINT STAFF	DEPARTMENT OF STATE	OTHER EXECUTIVE BRANCH
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL	SECRETARY OF DEFENSE	CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF	SECRETARY OF STATE	PRESIDENT, VICE PRESIDENT, DIR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE, NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR, US REP TO UN, SEC OF TREAS, ASST FOR ECONOMIC POLICY, CHIEF OF STAFF TO THE PRESIDENT, ATTORNEY GENERAL, OTHER
PRINCIPALS COMMITTEE	SECRETARY OF DEFENSE	CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF	SECRETARY OF STATE	NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR, DCI, US REP TO UN, ASST FOR ECONOMIC POLICY, OTHER
DEPUTIES COMMITTEE	DEPUTY SECRETARY OR UNDER SECRETARY FOR POLICY	VICE CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF	DEPUTY SECRETARY FOR INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS	NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR TO THE VICE PRESIDENT, OTHER DEPUTIES
POLICY COORDINATION COMMITTEES	REPRESENTATIVES FROM THE EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENTS, OFFICES, AND AGENCIES REPRESENTED IN THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL/DEPUTIES COMMITTEE.			

ASST	Assistant	SEC	Secretary
DCI	Director of Central Intelligence	TREAS	Treasury
DIR	Director	UN	United Nations
REP	Representative	US	United States

Figure II-2. Participation in National Security Council System Activities

(4) At the national level, the DOS Bureau of Political-Military Affairs is the principal channel of liaison between DOS and DOD. In addition, this bureau has primary responsibility for assisting the Secretary of State in executing the responsibilities of managing the military portion of SA. The Political-Military Affairs Bureau is also the focal point within DOS for the production of military plans as described in PDD-56 (1997) and NSPD 18 (2002).

(5) The Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, DOS, is especially important in FID programs as a coordinating link in US support of HN CD programs.

(6) Comprised predominantly of what was once the US Information Agency, the Coordinator for International Information Programs supports US foreign policy objectives. This is done by informing the public in other nations about US programs and policies, and administering overseas cultural and exchange programs. These activities enhance US military operations in

support of HN IDAD programs through public diplomacy to the supported government and its populace. DOD and DOS International Information Programs efforts must be mutually supportive. Close coordination among embassy public affairs officers (PAOs) and cultural attaches, military PA offices, and PSYOP elements is essential.

c. **United States Agency for International Development (USAID).** The USAID takes guidance and direction from the DOS. Its activities have a significant impact on military activities in support of FID programs. **USAID carries out nonmilitary assistance programs designed to assist certain less developed nations to increase their productive capacities and improve their quality of life.** It also promotes economic and political stability in friendly nations. USAID administers two kinds of foreign economic assistance: developmental assistance and ESF. The mission of USAID and the parallel DOD developmental activities supporting FID underscore the importance of employing an integrated interagency effort.

d. **Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).** The CIA supports the FID mission in both a national-level advisory capacity and at the regional and country levels through direct support of FID activities. The Director of Central Intelligence advises the NSC in matters concerning the coordination and implementation of intelligence activities in support of national-level FID programs. On the regional level, the CIA provides intelligence in support of FID threat analysis and needs assessments and supports the chief of mission with intelligence at the country team level. This intelligence support is extremely important in determining the level and degree of required resources and in determining the effectiveness of these committed resources. **Military intelligence activities are linked with CIA activities, either directly or through the country team**, to ensure the exchange of information necessary to support the FID program.

e. **DOD.** The DOD national-level organizations involved in FID management include the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and the Joint Staff.

(1) **OSD.** In most FID matters, **OSD acts as a policy-making organization**. Numerous activities at the OSD level affect FID programs. The five activities listed below are directly involved in the areas of SA and in the general areas of low-intensity conflict- and FID-related issues.

(a) The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USD[P]) exercises overall direction, authority, and control concerning SA for OSD through the various Assistant Secretaries of Defense.

(b) The Assistant Secretary of Defense (Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict) (ASD[SO/LIC]) oversees DOD special operations and has far-reaching policy responsibilities that can impact on virtually all areas of FID policy and programs.

(c) The Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs) establishes SA policy and supervises SA programs through the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA).

(d) DSCA administers and supervises SA planning and formulates and executes SA efforts in coordination with other government programs. The DSCA also conducts international logistics and sales negotiations with representatives of foreign nations and serves as the DOD focal point for liaison with US industry regarding SA. Finally, the DSCA develops and promulgates SA procedures, maintains the database for the programs, and makes determinations with respect to the allocation of FMS administrative funds.

(e) The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs supervises and establishes policy for PA programs with the DOD. PA is an integral part of military support to FID programs.

(2) **Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.** The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff **plays an important role in providing strategic guidance to the combatant commanders for the conduct of military operations to support FID programs**. This guidance is provided primarily through the National Military Strategy (NMS), the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP), the Joint Planning Document, the Chairman's Program Assessment, and key components of the Joint Strategic Planning System (JSPS). This guidance is provided after, and often modified as a result of, the interagency coordination and policy development process described earlier in this chapter. Because of their familiarity with the needs of the friendly nations in their regions, the combatant commanders are given great latitude in managing and coordinating their military activities in support of FID programs.

(a) Because of the wide variety of potential military activities to support FID, no one Joint Staff directorate monitors all military activities to support FID.

(b) Three staff directorates provide the majority of the input to planning guidance and provide most of the oversight for FID operations.

1. The Strategic Plans and Policy Directorate (J-5) contributes to the strategic FID guidance provided to combatant commanders through the JSCP. Primary functions include coordinating SA with US military plans and programs and advising the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on SA programs.

2. The Operations Directorate (J-3) monitors major current military operations in support of FID.

3. The Intelligence Directorate (J-2) assists with the coordination of national-level intelligence and counterintelligence (CI) support requirements and provides oversight guidance on intelligence operations and HN training requests in support of FID.

3. Combatant Command Organization

a. **Geographic combatant commanders** are responsible for planning and executing military operations in support of FID within their AORs. **Other combatant commanders** play a supporting role by providing resources to conduct operations as directed by the President or Secretary of Defense.

b. The geographic combatant commander has the responsibility of coordinating and monitoring all the military activities in the AOR in support of FID programs. **TSC plans are integral tools of the combatant commanders used to coordinate FID activities.** Organizing for military operations in FID will vary, but there are fundamental principles that apply when planning or executing FID operations. For example:

(1) Military activities in support of FID are an integral part of the long-range strategic plans and objectives for the command's AOR. These plans must reflect national security priorities and guidance.

(2) Combatant commanders may coordinate to expand the military presence in the country team. In most instances, the application of US military resources in support of a HN's IDAD programs will function through the framework of SAOs. However, should it become necessary to expand US assistance by introducing selected US military forces, a joint task force (JTF) normally will be established to coordinate this effort.

(3) Although planning and executing military operations in FID require a coordinated staff and interagency effort, responsibility and accountability remains with the commander.

c. **Staff Organization.** The general purpose and functions of the combatant commander's joint staff are provided in JP 0-2, *Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF*). The purpose of this discussion is to outline general organizational requirements for FID oversight and management at the combatant command level.

(1) **Plans and Policy Directorate.** The J-5, as the staff planner, **incorporates military support to FID programs into theater strategy and plans**. The J-5 has three ways to accomplish this: the plans division prepares the combatant commander's vision and strategy, looking out five to ten years and providing long-term and mid-term objectives for military support to FID programs; the political-military affairs division links the combatant command to the SAOs; and the SA section provides oversight of military SA efforts and coordinates integration of regional SA activities into theater-wide activities. The SA section may be organized within another directorate of the combatant command staff, depending on the desires of the combatant commander.

(2) **Operations Directorate.** The J-3 **monitors the execution of military operations in support of a FID program**. Additionally, the J-3 uses the CMO and the PSYOP sections to orchestrate specifically designed programs to maximize the positive effects of military activities in support of FID. The J-3 also employs a special operations staff element that assists in the planning and employment considerations for special operations forces (SOF) in support of FID. Combatant commanders may elect to assign the above programs and planning for SOF in support of FID to the theater subunified special operations command (SOC) or designated element.

(3) **Intelligence Directorate.** The J-2 **supplements estimates produced by the national intelligence agencies**. Important information includes economic, political, and social conditions as well as military threats. Critical to military operations in support of FID is the

accurate detection and assessment of internal instability. Through the CI staff officer (CISO) the J-2 is also responsible for planning for CI support to the military portion of the FID operation. CI support is critical to the execution of FID operations and can provide commanders with valuable tools for force protection planning as well as maintain the integrity and operations security of FID operations. Additionally, in those instances where a force protection detachment is stationed in the HN, the CISO or designated CI coordinating authority is responsible for coordinating FID support. Cooperative intelligence liaisons between the US and the HN are vital, however, disclosure of classified information to HN or other multinational FID forces must be authorized.

(4) **Political Advisor (POLAD).** Geographic combatant commanders may be assigned a POLAD or a Foreign Policy Advisor by DOS. **The POLAD serves as a link between DOS and the combatant commander's staff.** An effective use of the POLAD's skill in FID-intensive theaters may be for the combatant commander to establish **a FID interagency working group** (see Figure II-3) consisting of interagency representatives and military staff from country teams and the combatant commander's staff. This group acts as a focal point for the coordination and integration of military and nonmilitary support to FID programs.

(5) **Legal Adviser.** The legal adviser should evaluate all military operations in support of a FID program because of the current legal restrictions and complex funding sources. See Appendix A, "Commander's Legal Considerations," for more information about the legal considerations when supporting a FID program.

(6) **PA Element.** Integral to successful military operations in support of FID programs is public awareness and support. A coordinated public information program to support a FID program is essential. The PAO must be an early and active participant in military planning to support FID.

(7) **Other Staff Elements.** All staff elements contribute to the overall support of the FID program. Some, such as the logistics directorate (J-4) and the command, control, communications, and computer systems directorate, may be given primary responsibility for specific military technical support missions. These staff elements will usually focus on the direct support (not involving combat operations) category of military support to FID.

4. Subordinate Unified Commands

a. Combatant commanders may form area and functional subordinate unified commands.

b. An example of a regional subordinate unified command is US Forces, Korea, under the United States Pacific Command. The responsibilities for FID support in these commands closely parallel those discussed for the combatant commands. Specific authority for planning and conducting FID depends on the level of authority delegated by the combatant commander. However, basic principles and staff organization remain consistent.



Figure II-3. Notional Foreign Internal Defense Interagency Working Group

c. Functional subordinate unified commands such as US Special Operations Command South, which is the theater SOC for United States Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM), control a specific functional capability. These functional commands contribute to FID planning and execution through management of FID areas related to their functional areas of expertise.

d. **Theater subordinate unified SOCs are of particular importance because of the significant role of SOF in FID programs.** The theater SOC normally has operational control (OPCON) of all SOF in the theater and has primary responsibility to plan and execute SOF operations in support of FID. SOF assigned to a theater are under the combatant command

(command authority) of the geographic combatant commander. The geographic combatant commander normally exercises this authority through the commander of the theater SOC. Coordination between the theater subordinate unified SOC and the other component commands of the geographic combatant commander is essential for effective management of military operations in support of FID, including joint and multinational exercises, mobile training teams (MTTs), integration of SOF with conventional forces, and other operations.

5. Joint Task Forces

Combatant commanders may form JTFs to execute complex missions. The JTF formed under the United States Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) to control CD operations (JTF-6) is an example of this concept. Another example, JTF-BRAVO, which is subordinate to USSOUTHCOM, was formed by the combatant commander for the primary mission of coordinating and supporting US military training exercises in Honduras during a time when a US forward presence in Central America was deemed necessary. The large number of training exercises and related HCA projects conducted were a primary factor in the decision to form the JTF. Other JTFs may be organized to accomplish specific functional missions such as road construction and support for transportation and communications efforts.

For further information on JTFs, refer to JP 5-00.2, Joint Task Force Planning Guidance and Procedures.

6. The United States Diplomatic Mission and Country Team

a. The US diplomatic mission to a HN includes representatives of all US departments and agencies physically present in the country. **The President gives the chief of the diplomatic mission, normally an ambassador, full responsibility for the direction, coordination, and supervision of all USG executive branch employees in-country.** However, this authority does not extend to personnel in other missions or those assigned to either an international agency or to a geographic or other supported combatant commander. Although the diplomatic mission is beyond the realm of the geographic combatant commander's responsibility, close coordination with each mission in the commander's AOR is essential in order to build an effective overlying regional FID program.

b. **Organization.** The **country team concept** (see Figure II-4) denotes the process of in-country, interdepartmental coordination among key members of the US diplomatic mission. The composition of a country team varies, depending on the desires of the chief of mission, the in-country situation, and the number and levels of US departments and agencies present. **The principal military members of the country team are the defense attache (DATT) and the chief of the SAO.** Although the US area military commander (the combatant commander or a subordinate) is not a member of the diplomatic mission, the commander may participate or be represented in meetings and coordination conducted by the country team. The following discussion provides an outline of typical country team representatives and explains the military elements important to the FID mission.



Figure II-4. The Country Team Concept

(1) The ambassador is the personal representative of the President for that particular country. Ambassadorial authority extends to all elements of the mission and all official USG activities and establishments within the HN. The only exceptions to the ambassador's authority over USG activities are the control of military elements under the separate command of a geographic combatant commander or the control of elements of another US mission or personnel assigned to an international agency. Within this authority, the ambassador coordinates much of the FID effort in the assigned country. The ambassador accomplishes this task either through the assigned SAO or through the country team.

(2) The US DOS is generally represented on the country team by the following:

(a) The deputy chief of mission serves as executive officer and chief of staff for the ambassador, and directs the diplomatic mission in the ambassador's absence (then called the Chargé d'affairs).

(b) The political counselor directs the political section and is often third in command of the mission. The political section may also contain a political and/or military officer to assist in the coordination of military activities supporting FID programs.

(c) The commercial attaché is trained by the Department of Commerce and promotes US commercial interests.

(d) The cultural attache is a DOS public diplomacy officer responsible for implementing the US information program throughout the HN. This individual will often double as the PAO.

(3) The Agency for International Development is represented by the in-country director of USAID. The director directs the nonmilitary US developmental efforts in the HN.

(4) Other USG departments, agencies, and interests may be represented by the following.

(a) Treasury attaché.

(b) Agricultural attaché.

(c) Labor attaché.

(d) Air attaché.

(e) Science attaché.

(f) Drug Enforcement Administration representative.

(g) Director of the Peace Corps.

(h) Legal attaché (representing the Department of Justice).

(5) The DOD organization and representation within the diplomatic mission and country team can range from as little as an envoy to a full complement of Service attachés or a major SAO. In nations with active FID programs, there is likely to be a larger military presence with most of these resources centered in the SAO.

(a) **The US defense representative (USDR)** is the ambassador's liaison for all matters relating to administrative and security coordination for DOD personnel and organizations under the chief of mission authority. The USDR is designated by the USDP, with the concurrences of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the appropriate combatant commander. The position is advisory only; thus the USDR has neither command nor tasking authority. The appointment as the USDR does not change either the scope of this designated officer's primary responsibilities or accountability to the chain of command in the DOD command structure.

(b) **The DATT is the officer in charge of the US defense attaché office (USDAO).** The DATT and other Service attaches serve as the Secretary of Defense, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and combatant commander's diplomatic representative to their HN

counterparts. USDAOs are operated by Defense Intelligence Agency. The attachés also serve the ambassador and coordinate with and represent their respective Military Departments on Service matters. The attachés assist the FID program by exchanging information with the combatant commander's staff on HN military, social, economic, and political conditions. In the majority of countries, the functions of an SAO are carried out within the USDAO under the direction of the DATT.

(c) In nations where large concentrations of US military personnel are resident or transit, OSD-sponsored force protection detachments may also be deployed to support DOD CI support to force protection requirements. Force protection personnel are specially trained, area-oriented, and language-qualified. Force protection detachments interface with HN local law enforcement and security services to enhance CI and security support to force protection for US troops in theater.

(d) **The SAO is the most important FID-related military activity under the supervision of the ambassador.** The specific title of the SAO may vary, however, these differences reflect nothing more than the political climate within the HN. As examples, an SAO may be referred to as a Military Assistance and Advisory Group, Military Advisory Group, Office of Military Cooperation, or Office of Defense Cooperation. SAOs may have up to six members of the Armed Forces before congressional approval is required. Usually, a US military officer serves as the chief. When programs involve more than one Service, the SAO organization will be joint. The organization (departmental and functional alignments) of a typical SAO are indicated in Figures II-5 and II-6.

1. The SAO reports to the US Ambassador and assists HN security forces by planning and administering military aspects of the SA program. SA offices also help US country teams communicate HN assistance needs to policy and budget officials within the USG and combatant command for recommended inclusion in the Foreign Operations Budget.

2. **The SAO is essentially a management organization that helps assess the HN needs and articulate them through the instruments described above.** SAOs manage equipment and service cases, manage training, monitor programs, evaluate and plan HN military capabilities and requirements, provide administrative support, promote rationalization, standardization, interoperability, and perform liaison exclusive of advisory and training assistance. In addition, the SAO provides oversight of training and assistance teams temporarily assigned to assist the HN. The SAO is limited by law from giving direct training assistance that is normally provided through special teams and organizations assigned to perform limited tasks for specific periods. These include technical assistance field teams (TAFTs), MTTs, technical assistance teams (TATs), language training detachments, weapon system logistics offices, quality assurance teams (QATs), as well as site survey and defense requirement survey teams.

(6) Extensive and effective lines of coordination in an organization such as the country team are critical to its effective functioning. Effective coordination from the national level down to the smallest independent agencies operating within the HN is essential. This arrangement and lines of coordination are illustrated in Figure II-7.



Figure II-5. Security Assistance Organization (Departmental Alignment)



Figure II-6. Security Assistance Organization (Functional Alignment)

7. The Supported Host Nation

a. **The HN IDAD program is always the centerpiece of any FID program.** The entire FID effort is tailored to the needs of the individual nation and to effectively interact with the HN IDAD organization. Appendix B, "Internal Defense and Development Strategy," provides a more extensive explanation and also details a generic IDAD organizational structure. This



Figure II-7. Embassy and Security Assistance Organization Working Relationships

appendix can be useful to understand how the HN may organize and also provides a basis from which to provide guidance to HNs on how to improve their IDAD organization.

b. **IDAD Principles.** Although IDAD organizations will vary depending on the environment, resources available, and other factors, certain basic principles guide a successful IDAD program. **These principles include unity of effort, maximum use of intelligence, PSYOP, and CMO, minimum use of violence, and a responsive government.** These may seem overly simplistic and obvious; however, if they are not applied properly, the result may be a disjointed effort that damages the legitimacy and stability of the HN government. Appendix B, "Internal Defense and Development Strategy," provides further discussion of these principles.

c. **HN Organization for IDAD.** Just as the United States organizes to support a FID program, so must a HN organize to facilitate the extensive coordination required in a complex IDAD program. Appendix B, "Internal Defense and Development Strategy," provides a detailed view of an organizational method that facilitates this control and coordination. The concept generally requires an organization that is geographically organized into national and regional levels, where each level has its own functional structure. This concept facilitates management at both the macro and micro levels of those areas critical to accomplishing balanced development with the concomitant security, neutralization, and mobilization functions.

8. Multinational Foreign Internal Defense Force

a. Multinational operations in support of FID, both those that include combat and those that do not, are conducted within the structure of an alliance that are the result of formal agreements or a coalition that has ad hoc arrangements for common action. Such **multinational operations require innovative C2 and coordination procedures for FID planning and execution in order to facilitate unity of effort**.

b. Each multinational operation in support of FID is different, and key considerations involved in planning and execution may vary with the international situation and perspectives, motives, and values of the organization's members.

FOREIGN INTERNAL DEFENSE IN LATIN AMERICA

Threats to peace, stability, progressive growth, and democracy in Latin America come from political extremes and deeply rooted economic, social, and political problems. United States national interests in the region [are] the promotion of democracy and sustainable economic development. Human rights, the development of higher living standards throughout the region, combating the illegal drug trade, and the curtailment of illegal migration to the United States will probably endure as issues at least through the turn of the century.

While most countries in Latin America continue the process of democratization, some are under pressure from authoritarian alternatives. This is especially so in countries where democratically elected governments have yet to fulfill popular expectations. A rapidly expanding urban population and the attendant socioeconomic problems of decapitalization, unemployment, violent crime, and drug abuse create conditions which promote emigration, subversion, terrorism, insurgency, and the kind of political instability which fosters coups d'etat. United States assistance in reinforcing democratic institutions and building strong economies remains the best defense against [such] authoritarian alternatives.

SOURCE: Donald E. Schulz, Latin America Regional Assessment, The 1995 Strategic Assessment from the Strategic Studies Institute E.H. Tilford, Jr., Ed., February 10 1995

Intentionally Blank

CHAPTER III
PLANNING FOR FOREIGN INTERNAL DEFENSE

"Long and careful deliberation promises great safety in war, whereas hasty and impetuous generals usually commit serious blunders."

Byzantine Emperor Maurice,
The Strategikon, 600 AD

1. General

a. FID is designed to bolster the internal stability and security of the supported nation. Only a comprehensive planning process at both the national and regional level can provide the means to reach this goal.

b. **The national FID effort should involve the integration of all instruments of national power** including consideration of the conduct of military operations in support of the FID program.

c. **NSC Directives Promulgate US FID Policy.** JSPS documents reflect the military responsibilities for carrying out this broad guidance.

d. The entire focus of US assistance under FID is to assist a HN, if possible, in anticipating, precluding, and as a last resort, countering an internal threat. The type of planning necessary is obviously dictated by the type or types of support being provided. **Support in anticipating and precluding threats is preventive in nature and is likely to require a mix of indirect support and direct support not involving combat operations.** An existing threat is likely to require responses that span all categories of FID support, to include US combat operations. A detailed discussion of employment considerations is included in Chapter V, "Foreign Internal Defense Operations."

2. Planning Imperatives

a. FID has certain aspects that make planning for it complex. Some **basic imperatives** when integrating FID into strategies and plans are:

b. **Maintain HN Sovereignty and Legitimacy.** If US military efforts in support of FID do anything to undermine the sovereignty or legitimacy of the HN government, then they have effectively sabotaged the FID program. **The FID program is only as successful as the HN's IDAD program.**

c. **Understand long-term or strategic implications and sustainability of all US assistance efforts** before FID programs are implemented. This is especially important in building HN development and defense self-sufficiency, both of which may require large investments of time and materiel. Comprehensive understanding and planning will include assessing the following:

(1) The end state for development.

(2) Sustainability of development programs and defense improvements.

(3) Acceptability of development models across the range of HN society, and the impact of development programs on the distribution of resources within the HN.

(4) Second-order and third-order effects of socio-economic change.

(5) The relationship between improved military forces and existing regional, ethnic, and religious cleavages in society.

(6) The impact of improved military forces on the regional balance of power.

(7) Personnel life-cycle management of military personnel who receive additional training.

(8) The impact of military development and operations on civil-military relations in the HN.

d. **Tailor military support of FID programs to the environment and the specific needs of the supported HN.** Consider the threat as well as local religious, social, economic, and political factors when developing the military plans to support FID. Overcoming the tendency to use a US frame of reference is important because this potentially damaging viewpoint can result in equipment, training, and infrastructure not at all suitable for the nation receiving US assistance.

e. **Ensure Unity of Effort.** As a tool of US foreign policy, FID is a national-level program effort that involves numerous USG agencies that may play a dominant role in providing the content of FID plans. Planning must coordinate an integrated theater effort that is joint, interagency, and multinational in order to reduce inefficiencies and enhance strategy in support of FID programs. An interagency political-military plan that provides a means for achieving unity of effort among USG agencies is described in Appendix D, "Illustrative Interagency Political-Military Plan for Foreign Internal Defense."

f. **Understand US Foreign Policy.** NSC directives, plans, or policies are the guiding documents. If those plans are absent, JFCs and their staffs must find other means to understand US foreign policy objectives for a HN and its relation to other foreign policy objectives. They should also bear in mind that these relations are dynamic, and that US policy may change as a result of developments in the HN or broader political changes in either country.

3. Department of Defense Guidance

a. **Much of the military planning for FID is conducted at the combatant command level.** The combatant commander bases strategy and military planning to support FID on the broad guidance and missions provided in the JSPS. This section will briefly discuss the major

JSPS guidance documents and their relation to the combatant commander's FID planning process. Only those documents most relevant to the FID planning process will be discussed.

For further information on joint planning, refer to JP 5-0, Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations, *and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 3100.01A,* Joint Strategic Planning System.

b. The NMS is derived from the national security strategy and attempts to promote peace, deter aggression, and, failing that, fight and win. The NMS provides the advice of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in consultation with other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the combatant commanders, to the President, the NSC, and the Secretary of Defense as to the recommended NMS and fiscally constrained force structure required to attain national security objectives. The theater strategies and plans that combatant commanders develop to support national strategic objectives are largely influenced by the NMS, but are tasked through the JSCP process. **The NMS allows the combatant commanders to provide feedback about priorities and force structure requirements that may be significant in highlighting those FID areas of importance that the JSCP (discussed below) has not resourced** or recognized as specified or implied missions.

c. **The JSCP.** The JSCP is the principal vehicle by which the combatant commanders are tasked to develop OPLANs and operation plans in concept format (CONPLANs) for regional contingencies. **Through the guidance and resources provided in the JSCP, the combatant commanders develop their OPLANs and CONPLANs to support FID programs.** Generally, the JSCP provides guidance important to FID in the following areas.

(1) The JSCP provides general taskings to the combatant commanders that may mandate military support to a FID program or provide the strategic guidance and direction from which combatant commanders may deduce military missions to support FID programs.

(2) The JSCP provides **a list of major combat forces expected to be available during the planning period** and apportions those forces for planning purposes.

(3) The supplemental instructions to the JSCP provide **additional planning guidance, capabilities, and amplification of tasking for planning in specified functional areas**. Most of these supplemental instructions impact on military planning and execution to support FID programs; however, four are directly tied to FID, as described in Figure III-1.

d. The combatant commander, using an integrated priority list, also identifies requirements to support FID programs and request authorization and resourcing.

4. General Theater Planning Requirements

a. Geographic combatant commanders may develop theater strategies and/or campaign plans that support taskings by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the JSCP. Combatant commanders vary the planning instruments that they use to direct activities in their AORs.



Figure III-1. Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan Supplemental Instructions that Impact Foreign Internal Defense Operations

Regardless of how commanders may tailor the planning process, **military activities in support of FID requirements are integrated into concepts and plans from the strategic level down to the tactical level**.

b. **Theater strategy** translates national and alliance strategic tasks and direction into long-term, regionally focused concepts to accomplish specific missions and objectives. The NMS and JSCP guide the development of this strategy that incorporates peacetime and war objectives and reflects national and DOD policy and guidance. **Peacetime goals will normally focus on deterring hostilities and enhancing stability in the theater. FID is an integral part of this strategy.** The determination of the desired end state for the theater is an important element in the strategy process. This determination establishes the theater's strategic direction on which commanders and their staffs base campaign plans as well as other plans. There is no specific format for developing or documenting the theater strategy. In general, the theater strategy will

normally include an analysis of US national policy and interests, a strategic assessment of the AOR, a threat analysis, the combatant commander's vision, and a statement of theater missions and objectives.

c. **Theater campaign plans are operational extensions of the theater strategy.** They provide the commander's vision and intent through broad operational concepts and provide the framework for supporting OPLANs.

For further information on campaign plans, refer to JP 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations*, and JP 5-00.1,* Joint Doctrine for Campaign Planning.

d. **Theater Security Cooperation Planning and FID. TSC plans are deliberate plans for all military activities involving other nations intended to shape the security environment in peacetime.** Based on guidance from the Secretary of Defense and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the combatant commanders develop plans and employ forces and personnel in peacetime to protect and promote US interests and regional objectives. TSC is comprised of the combatant commander's strategic concept. The geographic combatant commanders and executive agents develop TSC plans; the functional combatant commanders, Services, and other Defense agencies as required develop supporting and/or coordinating plans.

For further information on TSC, refer to Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual (CJCSM) 3113.01A, Theater Engagement Planning.

e. The Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) is the approved system for conventional operation planning and execution. The JOPES deliberate planning process interrelates with the NMS and other planning documents to develop OPLANs. **The deliberate planning process is particularly applicable to FID planning, since most military activities in support of FID programs should be planned well in advance as part of a larger strategy or campaign.**

5. Foreign Internal Defense Planning Procedures and Considerations

a. The JOPES deliberate planning process consists of five phases, as shown in Figure III-2. This section will discuss **major FID planning considerations in each of these five phases** and show how they fit into the overall combatant commander's strategy and plans.

b. **Initiation.** There are **three methods by which the combatant commander identifies requirements for military activities to support FID**. Plans for these specific military operations in support of FID become part of the overall theater effort and are incorporated into all levels of planning.

(1) **Top down through the JSPS.**

(2) **Bottom up from a HN or country team in the geographic combatant commander's AOR.** The geographic combatant commander may forward these requests to the



Figure III-2. Joint Operation Planning and Execution System Deliberate Planning Process Phases

Secretary of Defense for authorization. The geographic combatant commander may authorize these support missions whenever they are in accordance with US law and directed through the JSPS.

(3) **Combatant Commander Initiated.** Military support to FID programs that is not directed under an existing specified or implied mission may be identified. The combatant commander endorses these requirements and obtains authorization from the Secretary of Defense.

c. **Concept Development.** The specific steps followed in this phase of the JSPS are detailed in JP 5-0, *Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations*. Figure III-3 provides an overview of the major concept development stages. This section addresses important FID considerations.

(1) Before beginning FID planning, **the commander's staff will conduct a thorough mission analysis of the operational environment and threat**. This mission analysis establishes the operational framework for FID concept development and planning. The following areas are considered when developing the concept.

(a) **Threats to HN IDAD.** Threats may be specific, such as illicit drugs or terrorism, or they may be more general as in social unrest and instability. **Identification of the root cause is key** so that military activities in the FID plans may target long-term causes rather than short-term symptoms. Appendix C, "Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace to Support Foreign Internal Defense," provides detailed guidance for conducting intelligence preparation of the operational area necessary for effective FID planning.

(b) **The HN Social, Economic, and Political Environment.** FID programs are intended to support IDAD programs in a manner that is acceptable to the HN's cultural and political realities. **The capability of the HN government and leadership as well as existing treaties and social infrastructure are all factors that planners must consider.** This step may result in the conclusion that the best solution from the US perspective may not be the best solution for the supported HN. This proposed solution may be outside the realm of FID and may be better accomplished through other means. This situation must be resolved in diplomatic channels between the USG and the HN. For example, a treaty may meet US goals and objectives independent of the HN IDAD program and interests.

(c) **International Aspects.** FID requires JFCs and their staffs to identify the threat centers of gravity and vulnerable points in its operational system.



Figure III-3. Concept Development

(d) **Mission Analysis.** Mission analysis for military operations in support of FID normally will be conducted in conjunction with normal operation planning. During this phase, commanders and their staffs must analyze the assigned tasks, develop a mission statement, formulate subordinate tasks, and prepare guidance for the commander's approval. The first two of these are discussed below.

1. Analyze Assigned Tasks. Tasks to support FID will be specified and implied and may range from supporting SA efforts to providing forces to conduct FHA efforts.

2. Develop a Mission Statement. The mission statement guides much of the remaining planning process. The mission statement will provide the who, what, when, where, why, and possibly how. The theater mission established by the combatant commander may be general, but could also identify FID-related tasks. The mission statement focuses on the priority threats to the security and stability of the HN.

(2) During the planning guidance phase, the commander outlines tentative courses of action (COAs), additional assumptions, and a planning directive to his staff and subordinate commanders. **Several important FID guidelines must be considered** to ensure that future planning results in the most efficient employment of the commander's resources.

(a) **Legal Authorizations and Restrictions.** The legal restrictions governing military activities in support of FID are complex and subject to changing US legislation. **The staff legal adviser has an active role in the FID planning process.** The basic funding authorizations for military activities in support of FID come through either the FAA, AECA, or through DOD operation and maintenance (O&M) funding sources. **While combatant commanders may use O&M funding for specified and limited FID activities such as HCA, they may not use O&M funds for SA or exceed strict dollar limits on military construction (MILCON) projects.** Appendix A, "Commander's Legal Considerations," provides a look at the legal aspects of FID.

(b) **Third Country Interests. US FID efforts may impact on countries throughout the region.** In some theaters, traditional rivalries and hostility toward the US will be a factor. For example, US assistance to a nation with long-standing adversaries in the area may be perceived by these adversaries as upsetting the regional balance of power. Also, these same nations may see US intervention in the area simply as US imperialism. These factors will not dictate US policy, but will require careful evaluation and consideration. Commanders may consider active information programs to accurately depict US efforts and to defeat adversary propaganda efforts. In general, US commanders must consider friendly, neutral, and hostile nations in the supported HN's region and envision how they will perceive US support.

(c) **Restrictive Use of Force.** US combat operations in FID will generally require a judicious selection and employment of forces. The purpose of such selection and employment is to ensure that the HN military and other civilian security forces rapidly accept the responsibility for its security and to minimize HN civilian casualties.

1. Specific ROE are likely to be more restrictive in FID than in other operations. However, the existence of such restrictive ROE does not preclude the US from employing another level of force when the President or Secretary of Defense determines it is necessary to stabilize a friendly HN government or to protect the lives of deployed US personnel. It also will not restrict the authority of on-scene commanders to respond with appropriate force and use all necessary means available and take all appropriate actions in self-defense when they perceive a threat to the safety and security of US personnel.

2. Standing rules of engagement (SROE) are provided for US forces' as stand-alone guidance that can be easily and quickly amended or clarified to meet mission-specific requirements. SROE apply in the absence of specific guidance from higher authority in the form of supplemental measures. SROE also provide lists of numbered supplemental measures that may be provided by, or requested from, higher authority to tailor ROE for a particular mission. SROE do not apply to multinational forces; civil disturbance operations; disaster relief operations; US Coast Guard units (and other units under their OPCON) conducting law enforcement operations; and US forces in support of operations not under OPCON of a combatant commander or performing missions under direct control of the Secretary of Defense, Military Departments, or other USG departments or agencies. Combatant commanders also may augment the SROE in order to respond to mission and threat in their AOR.

(3) The staff analyzes and refines tentative COAs during the staff estimate process of concept development. These detailed options serve as the foundation for the commander's decision to select a COA. Military options to support FID under consideration can involve any of the categories of indirect support, direct support (not involving combat operations), or combat operations. **Staff planners must carefully develop the following three estimates to facilitate an effective FID plan.**

(a) **The intelligence estimate is essential to accurately identify the threat upon which to base FID efforts.** The intelligence estimate supporting FID operations will have an orientation quite different from that of a conventional estimate. A comprehensive and intimate knowledge of the environment is essential in building this estimate. The conventional J-2 intelligence estimate concentrates on adversary situation; adversary capabilities, to include their capacity to produce WMD and the location of materials that could be used to produce such weapons; an analysis of those capabilities; and finally, conclusions drawn from that analysis. **In FID, however, analysis must focus more on the local population and its probable reactions to potential US or opposition actions.** This requires knowledge of the ethnic, racial, economic, scientific, technical, religious, and linguistic groups in the HN, as well as their locations and an understanding of how they may perceive future operations. Understanding the operating environment and the HN's social, economic, and political systems is essential in order to build effective FID programs to support the local IDAD program. Appendix C, "Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace to Support Foreign Internal Defense," discusses in detail the FID-unique aspects of intelligence preparation that must be considered in order to successfully plan and execute a long-range FID program.

(b) **The CA estimate examines each military COA for required CA assistance and reviews potential operations for any civil administration implications.** CA will also complete area studies where operations are likely. For military operations to support FID, these assessments focus on social, economic, and political factors that relate to existing or potential lawlessness, subversion, or insurgency. These assessments may include overlays that show local demographics, civil supply support, public utilities, and population displacement. CA support, like PSYOP, should be incorporated into all FID operations. A limiting factor in accomplishing this is the shortage of qualified personnel to support peacetime operations in support of FID. Ninety-six percent of the CA are in the Reserve Component (RC). This situation forces commanders to optimize the use of limited active CA resources and to integrate RC CA fully into operational missions. Appendix E, "Civil Affairs Estimate of the Situation," provides a sample format for the CA estimate and offers special considerations for incorporating CA into the overall plan.

(c) **The PSYOP staff estimate process examines the potential impact of proposed US military operations in support of FID programs.** Internal stability is closely connected to the HN populace's perceptions; therefore PSYOP must be considered in every FID operation. In addition to evaluating the psychological impact of planned operations, planners must develop specific PSYOP actions and incorporate them logically into the commander's plans in order to influence the target audience or to combat the adversary's PSYOP programs. More specific guidance on the actual conduct of PSYOP will be included in the PSYOP annex

to the appropriate plan. **At the combatant command level, PSYOP concepts and plans must be coordinated through the military PA and country teams.** This coordination is discussed in more detail in Chapter V, "Foreign Internal Defense Operations." An example of a PSYOP estimate and special considerations for incorporating PSYOP into the overall plan is provided in Appendix F, "Psychological Operations Estimate of the Situation."

(d) In addition to the planning imperatives previously discussed, there are **several important FID guidelines** to consider when developing possible COAs. These guidelines are:

1. **Maximize Intelligence and CI Capabilities.** Identify political, economic, scientific, technical, and social threats, in addition to the conventional hostile military factions. This is a complex task, especially when working in an unfamiliar culture in which US personnel may have little or no experience and in which high-technology collection and processing equipment may be of little use. Despite this challenge, commanders and their staffs must integrate all available assets and use culturally trained specialists to define these threats and to appropriately tailor the COAs.

2. **ROE and Economy of Force Measures.** Carefully establish ROE and economy of force measures. ROE are determined by threat, political considerations, and the type of military operations supporting a FID program. Commanders and staffs must evaluate operations closely in order to determine the increased risks of large deployments of US personnel in the area. In a high-threat condition, it may be prudent to delay the FID mission or commit a smaller element, rather than to commit a larger force that has a higher profile and is more difficult to protect.

3. **Account for Sustainment.** Commanders and staff must be cognizant of HN culture and their appreciation for sustainment, maintenance, and budgeting. FID programs are frequently at risk in the out years because US planners may develop programs that will not receive careful HN investment. This applies both to physical infrastructure and programs to improve human capital, good governance, and other intangibles.

4. **Measures of Effectiveness (MOEs). Clearly define and focus on MOEs.** The success of US FID programs can be measured only in terms of the success of the HN's IDAD program. MOEs should focus on long-term, attainable objectives rather than short-term targets, limited objectives, or over-ambitious development goals. In addition, transition points must be established that define when the supported HN will incrementally assume responsibility for the total IDAD effort.

(4) The commander's selection of the COA completes the staff estimate process and serves as the foundation for the combatant commander's strategic concept. This concept is reviewed by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and, when approved, the plan development phase begins.

d. **Plan Development.** The plan development phase begins after the combatant commander's strategic concept is fully developed. **This phase matches mission requirements**

against available resources. This action is particularly important because a large portion of the force needed to conduct FID is in the RC and, in most cases, is unavailable (short of use of Presidential Reserve Callup Authority) for long-term operations. In major military operations in support of a FID program, the commander must consider this shortage of Active Component (AC) CA and PSYOP capability when beginning to develop the plan. Imaginative use of RC forces may alleviate shortfalls and assist organizing and tailoring resources to carry out the military support to FID as efficiently as possible. HN, third-party nations, and USG interagency coordination (country team) remains paramount during plan development. This is an extension of the coordination that began during the plan initiation phase.

e. **Plan Review.** This essential step is a comprehensive review of the plan for adequacy, acceptability, feasibility, and compliance with joint doctrine, and is part of the general review process that continues at intermediate stages throughout the planning process. The review for adequacy determines the sufficiency of scope and content of operations to accomplish the assigned task, the validity of assumptions, and the degree of compliance with higher headquarters task assignment and guidance. The review for feasibility measures the ability to accomplish assigned tasks using available resources within the timeframes contemplated by the plan. It considers both the appropriateness and the planned use of available resources. Acceptable plans are proportional and worth the anticipated cost. They provide for accomplishment of the mission with available resources without incurring excessive losses in personnel, equipment, materiel, time, or position. Incorporation of appropriate joint doctrine when preparing OPLANs facilitates crisis action planning and the execution of operations. **Commanders and their staffs should consider that many FID objectives will involve a long-term effort, and that MOEs may be difficult to evaluate in the short term.**

f. **Supporting Plans.** Supporting plans are prepared by a supporting commander or a subordinate commander to satisfy the requests or requirements of the supported commander's plan. Subordinate commanders receive their task assignments from which to construct supporting plans in paragraph 3 of the supported plan. **Supporting FID plans may come from a variety of units such as Service or functional component commanders, JTF commanders, supporting combatant commanders or subordinate CA, PSYOP, engineer, medical, transportation, special forces or other combat units.** Supporting plans cover mobilization, deployment, and employment, and are the "how to" of the plan.

6. Planning for Force Protection

a. **JFCs and their subordinate commanders must address force protection during all phases of FID operations**, from planning through deployment, employment, and redeployment. All aspects of force protection must be considered and threats minimized to ensure maximum operational success. JFCs and their subordinate commanders must implement force protection measures appropriate to all anticipated threats, to include terrorists and the use of WMD.

b. Supported and supporting commanders must ensure that deploying forces receive thorough briefings concerning the threat and personnel protection requirements prior to and upon arrival in the operational area.

c. In addition, JFCs and their subordinate commanders must evaluate the deployment of forces and each COA for the impact of terrorist organizations supporting the threat and those not directly supporting the threat but seeking to take advantage of the situation within the HN.

d. JFCs also must plan for CI support to the FID operation and should incorporate umbrella concepts for CI force protection source operations in the planning process.

For further information on force protection and related considerations, refer to JP 2-01.2, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Counterintelligence Support to Operations, *JP 3-07.2,* Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Antiterrorism, *and JP 3-54,* Joint Doctrine for Operations Security.

7. Summary

Commanders and staffs must realize that planning for joint FID operations is an integrated process. It is totally integrated into theater planning and is reflected in planning documents extending from the JSCP and the combatant commander's strategy down to subordinate joint force and Service component supporting plans. During the concept development of FID planning, a broad approach to intelligence preparation of the operational area must be considered. In addition, PSYOP and CA estimates are included in formulating adequate and feasible COAs from the FID standpoint. Finally, the staff must review FID plans for adequacy, acceptability, feasibility, and compliance with joint doctrine, and they must ensure the creation of appropriate supporting plans to support theater-level operations.

CHAPTER IV
TRAINING

"A government is the murderer of its citizens which sends them to the field uninformed and untaught, where they are to meet men of the same age and strength, mechanized by education and discipline for battle."

Light-Horse Harry Lee III, 1756-1818

1. General

a. FID programs may be conducted by a single individual in remote isolated areas, small groups, or large units involved in direct support (not involving combat operations) or combat operations. In many of these situations, conventional US forces will be operating in unfamiliar circumstances and cultural surroundings.

b. FID programs may be conducted in uncertain and hostile environments. Combined with the stresses of operating in a foreign culture, this may require training that is not routinely offered to conventional forces.

2. Responsibilities for Foreign Internal Defense Training

a. **The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff** is responsible for formulating policies for the joint training of the Armed Forces of the United States and for seeing that joint training is conducted in response to operational requirements deemed necessary by the combatant commanders.

b. **Combatant commanders** exercise authoritative direction over all aspects of joint training of assigned forces. Further, they are responsible for coordinating with components concerning aspects of training necessary to carry out the missions assigned to the command.

c. The **Services** are responsible for providing trained forces that may be used in support of FID programs.

d. **Commander, United States Special Operations Command** (CDRUSSOCOM) is charged by legislation with training assigned forces to meet mission taskings (including FID) and to ensure their interoperability with conventional forces as well as other SOF. Continuing individual education and/or professional training peculiar to special operations are the responsibility of CDRUSSOCOM.

F*or further information on CDRUSSOCOM training and education responsibilities, refer to JP 3-05,* Doctrine for Joint Special Operations.

3. Training and Skills Needed for Success in Foreign Internal Defense

a. The following subparagraphs highlight some of the training needed for successful military operations in support of FID.

b. **Overall US and Theater Goals for FID.** Personnel engaged in military activities in support of FID programs must understand the overall goals and objectives of the supported combatant commander. This knowledge is similar to understanding the commander's intent in conventional operations. An understanding of these goals provides a framework for the individual to determine if his or her actions and programs support overall theater objectives.

c. **Area and Cultural Orientation.** Knowledge of the operational area is required to maximize the effectiveness of military operations in support of FID programs. It is difficult to successfully interact with the HN if individuals supporting a FID program do not have an understanding of the background of the nation, the culture, and the customs.

d. **Language Training.** It is very important for all personnel conducting FID operations to be able to communicate with HN personnel in their native language. Language capabilities can significantly aid trainers and others who have daily contact with HN military personnel and the local population. Personnel can function much more effectively if they conduct language training in the target language prior to deployment. Although language training is important, it is equally important for personnel conducting FID operations to conduct training on working with and speaking through interpreters.

e. **Standards of Conduct.** It is extremely important that all US military personnel understand the importance of the image they project to the HN population. This impression may have a significant impact on the ability of the US to gain long-term support for the overall FID program. US standards of conduct are, to a great extent, an example of the professionalism and respect inherent in our system — a respect and professionalism that can be passed by example to the HN population. Training in standards of conduct, which complement cultural awareness training, should be mandatory for all personnel involved in FID programs.

f. **Relationship of FID Programs to Intelligence Collection.** Because of their proximity and access to the local populace, personnel conducting military activities in support of FID programs are passive information collectors and have much valuable information to provide to the intelligence system. These units and teams absorb information on the social, economic, and political situation that is essential to the operational area evaluation discussed in Appendix C, "Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace to Support Foreign Internal Defense." This information would be very difficult for more distant collectors to obtain. Care must be taken, however, to ensure that the relationship with their HN counterparts is not damaged by these activities. Personnel involved in FID operations must know and understand their responsibilities in these areas.

g. **Coordinating Relationships with Other USG Agencies.** FID programs are likely to interact at all levels with other USG agencies. For example, special forces, PSYOP, and CA

elements may coordinate with the embassy PAO or cultural attaché, and CA may work closely with the USAID. This type of coordination may be new to some military personnel supporting a FID program; therefore, specific training or procedures may be required.

h. **Legal Guidelines.** In order to function effectively, personnel supporting a FID program must be aware of a variety of legal guidelines. These include provisions of applicable status-of-forces agreements (SOFAs) as well as restrictions on the transfer of equipment and on other types of assistance that may be provided. Because many military activities take place within the HN, applicable legal guidelines may include those of the HN government and the status of US personnel while in country (for example, existing SOFAs). Accordingly, a country law briefing, cultural orientation, and review of any international agreements affecting status-of-forces should be included in training.

i. **ROE.** A thorough understanding of the ROE is very important to units involved in combat operations and for individuals involved in any military activities in support of FID.

j. **Tactical Force Protection Training.** FID programs often require small US elements to deploy in isolated areas to support threatened HN governments. This requirement makes for a potentially dangerous situation for US personnel. US forces must be prepared for these situations, with proper training in self-protection programs and measures. Training should include individual and collective techniques.

4. Foreign Internal Defense Training Strategy

a. Training to prepare for military operations to support FID requires that a broad range of areas be covered. The training also must be designed to support a mix of personnel, ranging from language-trained and culturally focused SOF to those totally untrained in the specific area where the FID program is located. Some training, such as language qualification, requires an investment in time and money that will not be practical for all personnel. **A combination of institutional and unit-conducted individual and collective training will be required.**

b. **Institutional Training.** SOF, primarily US Army special forces, PSYOP, and CA, receive extensive institutional training in language, cultural considerations, and instructional techniques as qualifications in their basic specialty. These personnel should be extensively used to train HN forces and facilitate liaison with the HN. However, consideration must be given on how to train conventional forces in required skills. Some institutional courses are available that can be used by commanders in order to train personnel for FID missions. Listed below are some of the types of institutional training that is provided by one or more of the Military Services. Consult appropriate training catalogs for DOD course listings.

(1) Language training.

(2) Cultural awareness and interpersonal communications training.

(3) General FID and IDAD principles training.

(4) Revolutionary warfare training.

(5) Force protection and antiterrorism awareness training.

(6) SA team orientation training.

(7) SA technical training.

c. **Unit Training.** Much of the training necessary to prepare personnel to support a FID program may be conducted within the unit. This training can be individually focused or, in the case of unit-size participation, may involve large-scale collective training. Training resources may be drawn from a variety of sources, but SOF are valuable because of their area orientation and FID focus. When feasible, units should conduct operational rehearsals of the FID mission. These rehearsals allow participants to become familiar with the operation and to visualize the plan. Such rehearsals should replicate, as much as possible, the potential situations that a unit may encounter during a FID mission.

5. Conclusion

Training for operations to support a FID program is a command responsibility. The consequences of fielding an improperly trained FID element may impact negatively on US national security interests. The commander has several options available, including unit, individual, and collective training, as well as institutional training at the Service and subordinate command levels.

CHAPTER V
FOREIGN INTERNAL DEFENSE OPERATIONS

"The war on terrorism "will be fought with increased support for democracy programs, judicial reform, conflict resolution, poverty alleviation, economic reform, and health and education. All of these together deny the reason for terrorist to exist or to find safe haven within borders."

Colin Powell
Secretary of State
UN Security Council, 12 November 2001

SECTION A. EMPLOYMENT CONSIDERATIONS

1. General

a. Thus far, the discussion of FID has generally centered on the strategic and operational levels. This chapter transitions to a more focused examination of the employment principles, tools, and techniques used in conducting FID operations.

b. **US forces will usually be employed under the command of a geographic combatant commander as part of the overall theater strategy.** This strategy will incorporate FID programs with other major peacetime training and maintenance functions.

c. **FID programs are part of the unified actions of the combatant command and are joint and multinational in nature.** Even small tactical operations will usually be multinational in terms of efforts with the supported HN. Although some operations such as road building may be executed by a single Service component, these smaller efforts fit into the overall theater strategy and plans.

2. Employment Factors

a. As in planning, several areas deserve special attention when discussing employment of forces in FID operations (see Figure V-1).

b. **Information Operations (IO) Impact.** IO involve actions taken to affect adversary information and information systems while protecting one's own information and information systems. IO apply across all phases of an operation, throughout the range of military operations. IO and related activities affect the perceptions and attitudes of adversaries and a host of others in the operational area. During FID operations, IO disciplines must be closely integrated in all aspects of planning and execution.

c. **Psychological Impact.** Regardless of whether the operation is supported by or in support of the PSYOP, all efforts supporting a FID program will be executed with the PSYOP objective in mind. The impact of these efforts may occur incidentally, as a result of another unrelated operation, or may be the result of an operation specifically executed for its psychological effect.

FORCE EMPLOYMENT FACTORS IN FOREIGN INTERNAL DEFENSE OPERATIONS

INFORMATION OPERATIONS IMPACT	Information operations disciplines must be closely integrated in all aspects of foreign internal defense (FID) planning and execution
PSYCHOLOGICAL IMPACT	The psychological effort is relevant to the entire FID operation
INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT	A thorough intelligence analysis must focus on the political, social, scientific, technical, medical, and economic aspects of the area as well as on an analysis of hostile elements
SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES	Special Operations Forces are an integral part of FID
CONVENTIONAL FORCES	Conventional forces can also participate in FID operations by providing specific expertise and various levels of support
PUBLIC INFORMATION PROGRAMS	Public information is an important ongoing effort during the employment phase of any FID mission
LOGISTIC SUPPORT	Logistic operations in support of a FID program are both supporting missions to United States forces and primary operational missions when supporting host nation civilians or military forces with medical, construction, maintenance, supply, or transportation capabilities
COUNTERDRUG OPERATIONS IN FOREIGN INTERNAL DEFENSE	United States military support of the national counterdrug effort has increased tremendously in recent years
GLOBAL WAR ON TERRORISM IN FOREIGN INTERNAL DEFENSE	Subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency can all contribute to the growth of terrorist and terrorism
OPERATIONS SECURITY	A major problem in all FID activities is denial of critical information about friendly intentions, capabilities, and activities to hostile elements
LESSONS LEARNED	As FID programs are implemented, it is critical to document lessons learned to allow the commander to modify the FID program to fit the special circumstances and environment

Figure V-1. Force Employment Factors in Foreign Internal Defense Operations

d. **Intelligence Support.** A thorough intelligence analysis must focus on the political, social, scientific, technical, medical, and economic aspects of the area as well as on an analysis of hostile elements. Active intelligence support must continue through to the end of the employment of military forces in support of a FID program. This continuous intelligence effort will gauge the reaction of the local populace and determine the effects on the infrastructure of US efforts as well as evaluate strengths, weaknesses, and disposition of opposition groups in the area.

(1) Appendix C, "Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace to Support Foreign Internal Defense," provides intelligence considerations and a format for intelligence preparation of the FID operational area. Although the considerations must be modified for the specific FID program, generally the operational area must be surveyed for an operational area evaluation; a geographic, population, and climatology analysis; and a threat evaluation. These factors will dictate the employment techniques and FID tools to use.

For further information on intelligence preparation of the battlespace, refer to JP 2-01.3, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace.

(2) **Human intelligence (HUMINT) resources support is likely to be the most important type of intelligence support of FID.** The analysis requires a large HUMINT effort. This requires a more decentralized intelligence gathering approach than in conventional operations. Small units and teams deployed in the operational area are in a good position to evaluate the social, economic, and military situation in the HN. In a FID environment, the best US intelligence may come from units and teams that work closely with the local population and HN military forces. These units and teams must be prebriefed and debriefed for priority intelligence requirements, and this information should contribute to the data used in conducting the intelligence preparation of the operational area.

(3) **Information sharing across USG and national boundaries is an important concept in FID.** There are likely to be several government agencies operating in a HN, and all are exposed daily to information valuable to the FID program. This requires a strong focus on lateral coordination and the development of an effective program of interagency information exchange. In addition, the very nature of FID denotes the sharing of information between the supported HN and the US joint force headquarters controlling the FID effort. This information exchange may be further complicated by a friendly third nation participating in the FID program.

For further information on interagency coordination, refer to JP 3-08, Interagency Coordination During Joint Operations.

(4) **The nature of FID missions and the high degree of dependence on HUMINT sources necessitate an active counterintelligence and operations security (OPSEC) program.** At a minimum, US FID mission forces must be able to:

(a) Accomplish liaison with HN counterintelligence and security forces.

(b) Provide a conduit to country team counterintelligence and security elements.

(c) Conduct analysis of opposing force intelligence collection, security, counterintelligence, and deception capabilities, and opposing force PSYOP/CA activity.

(d) Conduct the full range of counterintelligence operations.

(e) Conduct counterintelligence vulnerability assessments of US forces.

(f) Provide counterintelligence input to US FID plans.

(5) US force deployments for FID missions must be structured to provide adequate counterintelligence resources and plan for reachback to the national strategic CI community to accomplish these missions. Guidance for interaction with HN intelligence and security services is covered in JP 2-01.2, *Joint Doctrine and Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Counterintelligence Support to Operations*.

e. **SOF.** SOF are an integral part of FID. **The United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) is the only combatant command with a legislatively-mandated FID core task.** In fulfilling its core task, USSOCOM provides SOF in support of geographic combatant commanders. Commanders should use these regionally focused and culturally oriented personnel to assist in the FID mission. SOF contribute to the FID effort normally under OPCON of the theater SOC, which has primary responsibility to plan and supervise the execution of SOF operations in support of FID. SOF also provide dedicated theater forces. The permanent regional focus and cross-cultural skills of US SOF offers greater utility in direct support operations (prior to combat). SOF have proven to be adept at initiating programs for hand-over to conventional forces (Georgia and Afghanistan), or in extended long-term programs (El Salvador). SOF also possess specialized capabilities for FID, including support for counterinsurgency, and for unconventional warfare. Other support includes coordination conducted by CA elements, as well as SOF support of mission execution through PSYOP teams, specialized HN training teams, and direct action forces conducting highly specialized missions. Despite this very important role, commanders and their staffs must understand that SOF is only part of the FID program. **The SOF role in FID is to train, advise, and support HN military and paramilitary forces.** SOF operations in support of FID are frequently unilateral, but may support other ongoing US military assistance efforts. When planning for use of SOF, command, control, communications, and computers (C4) requirements among the combatant command, the country team, and SOF must be assessed. Communications requirements for C2, administration, logistics, and emergencies must be clarified.

f. **Conventional Forces.** Although USSOCOM is legislatively-mandated to conduct FID, which it does as a core task, other designated DOD conventional forces may contain and employ organic capabilities to conduct limited FID indirect support, direct support, and combat operations.

g. **Public Information Programs.** Public information is important during all phases of any FID mission. While it is important to correctly portray the FID effort to HN personnel through PSYOP, it is also important to employ an effective PA program to inform HN and US publics of current FID actions, goals, and objectives. History has shown that without the support of these publics, it may be impossible to develop an effective FID program. At the US national level, public diplomacy programs will accurately depict US efforts. This national program is supported through the combatant commander's (or subordinate JFC's) information programs designed to disclose the maximum amount of information possible within applicable security restrictions and the guidelines established by the President or Secretary of Defense. Coordination is essential between the PA staff and the media, the country team, and other information agencies within the HN and region.

h. **Logistic Support.** Logistic operations in support of FID **support both US forces and primary operational missions** (supporting HN civilians or military forces with medical, construction, maintenance, supply, or transportation capabilities). General guidelines for logistic issues in support of US forces conducting FID operations include:

(1) There may be a ceiling imposed on the number of US military personnel authorized to be in the HN to support FID programs. Maximum use should be made of host-nation support (HNS) capabilities, but where reliance on the HN is not feasible, logistic support requirements must be minimized. Efficient use of throughput of supplies (an average quantity that can pass through a port on a daily basis), airlift resupply, and inter-Service support agreements should also be considered.

(2) Commanders must carefully balance the advantages of using HNS with the danger of establishing dependence on potentially unreliable sources.

(3) Logistic operations in support of FID are task-organized according to the type of mission. Service logistic support elements will be integrated into the overall joint force. Logistic support for the deployed forces, however, will remain a Service responsibility.

(4) HNs often require support beyond their organic capabilities. Accordingly, **when conducting FID with multinational partners, there becomes a need to establish multinational logistic support agreements**. The need for such non-organic support must be identified during the planning phase of FID support and arranged for prior to participation in the operation. Acquisition and cross-servicing agreements negotiated with multinational partners are beneficial to the FID effort in that they allow US forces to exchange most common types of support. Authority to negotiate these agreements is usually delegated to the geographic combatant commander by the Secretary of Defense. Authority to execute these agreements lies with the Secretary of Defense, and may or may not be delegated.

For further information on international logistics, refer to JP 4-08, Joint Doctrine for Logistic Support of Multinational Operations.

i. **CD Operations in FID.** Narcotics production and trafficking can flourish in countries where subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency exist. Accordingly, **FID operations complement CD efforts by reducing those problems in target nations**. CD focused programs are integrated into theater strategies as a coordinated effort to support HN government's IDAD strategies.

(1) DOD resources may be used in connection with CD activities in nations receiving military assistance in support of a FID program. This military assistance is often centered on source operations, but can be involved with in-transit CD operations.

(a) **DOD is the lead agency of the USG for the detection and monitoring (DM) of aerial and maritime transit of illegal drugs into the US.** This DM mission is performed with O&M funds, notwithstanding the possibility of incidental benefit to the HN. Such activities may include nonconfrontational intercepts for intelligence or communication purposes and

gathering and processing of tactical intelligence from a variety of sources, including fixed and mobile surveillance assets and certain intelligence sharing.

(b) In a CD support role (subject to national policy and legislative guidance) DOD may offer certain direct support to HN CD personnel, and certain enhanced support to US civilian law enforcement agencies that may be operating in the HN, and to DOS, Bureau of International Narcotics Matters.

(2) Absent direction from the Secretary of Defense, US forces engaged in CD activities are prohibited from engaging in direct law enforcement activity. They may not directly participate in an arrest, search, seizure, or other similar activity. DOD personnel are not authorized to accompany HN forces on actual CD field operations or participate in any activities where hostilities are likely to occur.

(3) As directed by the Secretary of Defense through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, combatant commanders will be given the authority to plan and execute HN programs using a combination of SA, training and advisory assistance (non-SA-funded), intelligence and communications sharing, logistic support, and FHA. These efforts are designed to bolster the HN's capability to operate against the infrastructure of the drug-producing criminal enterprises.

(4) Combatant commands and subordinate JFCs must coordinate closely with the country team Drug Enforcement Administration and DOS international narcotics matters representatives. Liaison with the Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) is also vital. ONDCP is legislatively charged with the responsibility of establishing the national drug control strategy and with coordinating and overseeing the implementation of the consolidated National Drug Control Program budget. This coordination is crucial to an efficient national CD program to combat illicit drug trafficking in source regions.

For further information on joint counterdrug operations, refer to JP 3-07.4, Joint Counterdrug Operations.

j. **Global War on Terrorism and FID.** Subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency can all contribute to the growth of terrorists and terrorism. FID can complement the global war on terrorism by reducing these contributing factors. **Specific AT and counterterrorism efforts can be conducted as part of the FID program for a HN.**

(1) Enhancing the will of other states to fight global terrorism primarily is the responsibility of DOS. Effective FID programs, however, can improve public perceptions of the HN and USG and facilitate more active HN policies to combat terrorism. More directly, military-to-military contacts can help make HN officials advocates of potential operations against terrorist capabilities.

(2) In many cases, measures increasing the capacity of a state to fight terrorism also will strengthen its overall IDAD program. These measures can include the following:

(a) Developing the ability of the HN financial transactions, break funding streams for criminal and insurgent groups, and prosecute their members. This may involve greater US-HN cooperation in developing regulated financial institutions.

(b) Ensuring that HN security personnel have access to appropriate equipment and training to conduct all phases of combatting terrorism operations.

(c) Training personnel at entry and exit points (including airports, seaports, and border crossings) to identify and apprehend individuals and materials being used by international terrorist groups.

(d) Assisting HN security and intelligence agencies to be included into international networks that can share information on terrorist activities.

(e) Developing effective judicial systems, and minimizing corruption and intimidation of HN officials.

k. **OPSEC.** A major problem in all FID activities is denial of critical information about friendly intentions, capabilities, and activities to hostile elements. The nature of FID implies that many HN officials and populace will know of certain US activities as they occur. Criminal and insurgent groups may have members or sympathizers within HN institutions that could be informants. US and foreign personnel involved in FID and IDAD programs should be provided extensive OPSEC training to ensure effectiveness of their operations.

For further information on OPSEC refer to JP 3-54, Joint Doctrine for Operations Security.

l. **Lessons Learned.** As FID programs are implemented, it is critical to document lessons learned to allow the commander to modify the FID program to fit the special circumstances and environment. Comprehensive after-action reviews and reports focusing on the specifics of the FID operations should be conducted to gather this information as soon as possible after mission execution. The Joint Center for Lessons Learned within the United States Joint Force Command, the Services, and other government agencies lessons learned programs provide readily available sources of information to FID planners and operators. In addition, USSOCOM's Special Operations Debrief and Reporting System also can provide additional information on peacetime FID missions.

For further information for specific reporting procedures, refer to CJCSI 3150.25, Joint After-Action Reporting System.

3. Department of Defense Foreign Internal Defense Tools

Chapter I, "Introduction," discussed the general categories of FID operations (indirect support, direct support [not involving combat operations], and combat operations) and the specific operations within each of these. Sections B, C, and D of this chapter will address each of the

subcategories in detail. However, because FID by definition encompasses a broad range of military activities, only the most common types of military support to FID will be discussed.

SECTION B. INDIRECT SUPPORT (See Figure V-2)

4. Security Assistance

a. This section will discuss specific military SA operations and how the geographic combatant commander may use this tool to further support FID programs. **The military will primarily provide equipment, training, and services to the supported HN forces.** In the SA arena, geographic combatant commanders and subordinate JFCs do not have authority over the SA program, but have responsibility for planning and executing military activities to support FID within the SA process. Geographic combatant commanders are active in the SA process by advising ambassadors through the SAO and by coordinating and monitoring ongoing SA efforts in their AORs. In addition, through coordination with HN military forces and supporting SAOs, the combatant commander can assist in building credible military assistance packages that best support long-term goals and objectives of regional FID programs. The following paragraphs describe the SA support areas of equipment, services, and training as well as the employment considerations for each.

b. **Equipment.** The combatant commander and subordinate JFC can have the greatest impact in this area during the planning and resource identification phase of developing the theater strategy. **Regional threats identified and level of absorbable HN technology will determine the general equipment needs of the supported HNs in the theater.** Each SAO will coordinate resultant military equipment requests with the combatant commander's staff and country team. Finally, the combatant commander endorses requirements and provides



Figure V-2. Indirect Support in Foreign Internal Defense

recommendations to the Secretary of Defense on appropriate equipment or distribution. Throughout this process, HN needs must be evaluated in terms of the threat and existing social, political, and economic conditions. Care must be taken to guard against a US solution or to support unnecessary requests, as explained below.

(1) **The FID planning imperative to tailor support to HN needs is extremely important in providing equipment support.** Environmental factors, level of HN training, ability to maintain equipment, HN infrastructure, and myriad other factors will determine equipment appropriate to HN needs. If equipment in the US inventory is not appropriate for use by the HN, the commander may recommend a nonstandard item to fill the requirement. Sustainability of nonstandard equipment, as well as interoperability with existing equipment, must be considered.

(2) HNs may request expensive equipment as a status symbol of regional military power. This is often done in spite of the fact that the overall strength of the military would be best enhanced by improved training and professionalism among the existing force. This is a delicate political situation, but one that the ambassador and the combatant commander may be able to influence.

c. **Services.** Services include any service, test, inspection, repair, training, publication, technical or other assistance, or defense information used for the purpose of furnishing military assistance, but does not include military education and training activities. **Services support is usually integrated with equipment support.** The combatant commander has oversight to ensure that the equipment is suitable for HN needs and that the HN is capable of maintaining it. These types of services will almost always be required to ensure an effective logistic plan for the acquired equipment. There are two common types of service teams: QATs and TATs. QATs are used to ensure that equipment is in usable condition and are short term. TATs are used when the HN experiences difficulty with US-supplied equipment. For detailed information on teams available for initial and follow-on equipment support, see DOD Manual 5105.38M, *Security Assistance Management Manual*.

Equipment that is delivered to a host nation must address needs in terms of the threat as well as the existing social, political, and economic conditions.

d. **Training.** The training portion of SA can make a very significant impact on the HN

IDAD program. **The combatant commander is actively involved in coordinating, planning, and approving training support with the SAO and HN.** The Services, through their SA training organizations, are the coordinators for SA-funded training.

(1) The following are the general objectives of training programs under SA (see Figure V-3).

(a) **O&M Skills.** To create skills needed for effective O&M of equipment acquired from the US.

(b) **Effective Management.** To assist the foreign country in developing expertise and systems needed for effective management of its defense establishment.

GENERAL OBJECTIVES OF TRAINING PROGRAMS UNDER SECURITY ASSISTANCE

- ✓ Operation and Maintenance Skills
- ✓ Effective Management
- ✓ Development of Training Self-Sufficiency
- ✓ Rapport and Understanding
- ✓ Increased Awareness

Figure V-3. General Objectives of Training Programs Under Security Assistance

(c) **Development of Training Self-Sufficiency.** To foster development by the HN of its own training capability.

(d) **Rapport and Understanding.** To promote military-to-military understanding leading to increased standardization and interoperability.

(e) **Increased Awareness.** To provide an opportunity to demonstrate the US commitment to the basic principles of internationally recognized human rights.

(2) The following force structure, training plan, and training activities considerations should be understood before implementing a SA training program.

(a) **Training Force Structure.** SOF are very important in training HN forces because of their language capabilities and regional cultural focus. **SA-funded training is not limited to SOF.** Conventional forces and contractors also may be integrated into the training effort, particularly in areas where the technical aspects of the required training limit the use of SOF. In technical areas such as communications, intelligence, and equipment maintenance, conventional forces or SA funded contractors may conduct the training augmented by SOF in order to provide language and cultural training that conventional forces may lack.

(b) **Training Plan.** The training portion of SA is identified and coordinated by the SAO with the HN military. Combatant commanders and subordinate JFCs will incorporate the SA training, planning, and requirements into the overall military planning to support FID programs.

1. The SAO will develop a 2-year plan that consolidates HN needs from a joint perspective, taking into consideration all sources of training and funding. These plans will be approved by the appropriate combatant command.

2. Each year the geographic combatant commanders, except USNORTHCOM, will host a Joint Service Program Management Review. During this workshop the staff will refine and coordinate the 2-year plans previously approved by the combatant commanders, finalize the budget year training program, and announce and discuss changes in the command's training policy or procedures.

3. The SAO must ensure that the HN looks beyond its current needs toward the future. A tool to accomplish this is the 2-year plan.

4. Commanders and their staffs must also ensure that US forces involved in training HN personnel are fully aware of restrictions on their involvement in HN combat operations and that they employ vigilant force protection measures. US training teams should be considered likely targets of attack if supported forces are facing an active armed threat.

(c) **Training Activities. Pre-combat training and equipping of HN forces frequently fall under SOF.** The combatant commander has a number of training activities that should be considered when reviewing individual country training plans. These programs may be carried out by HN personnel attending military schools in the US or by deploying teams of SOF, conventional forces, or a combination of both. Consideration should be given to language capabilities, cultural orientation, theater objectives, complexity of tasks/missions to be performed, and the supported HN's IDAD program when selecting forces. The following are the primary types of training that may be employed as part of military support to the SA program.

1. **MTTs.** MTTs are used when a HN element requires on-site training and to conduct surveys and assessments of training requirements. An MTT may be single-Service or joint, SOF or conventional forces, but is tailored for the training the HN requires. An MTT is employed temporary duty (TDY) basis for a period not to exceed 179 days, including travel. If HN forces require training for a longer period, training in the United States should be considered as an alternative.

2. **Extended Training Service Specialists (ETSSs).** ETSS teams are employed on a permanent change of station (PCS) basis (usually for 1 year) in order to assist the HN in attaining readiness on weapons or other equipment. These teams train the HN's initial instructor cadre so that they can assume the responsibility for training their own personnel.

3. **TAFTs.** TAFTs are also deployed on a PCS basis and train HN personnel in equipment-specific military skills.

4. **IMET Program.** IMET provides HN personnel with military training opportunities in the US. This type of training not only meets the immediate HN requirement of increased training, but also has a longer term impact of improving US-HN relations.

5. **Contractors.** Contracted SA funded assistance under the supervision of a SAO can substitute for active duty DOD personnel when necessary and feasible and be an effective force multiplier. SAOs that use contractor support should understand DOD Instruction 3020.37, *Continuation of Essential DOD Contractor Services During Crises* should a situation escalate from indirect to direct support.

6. **The Regional Defense Counterterrorism Fellowship Program (RDCFP).** RDCFP is a critical tool for the Department of Defense to provide grant aid education and training to support regional nations in our collective efforts in support of the global war on terrorism. RDCFP offers education and training to foreign military officers, ministry of defense civilians, and other foreign civilian security force personnel. The DOD funded program is implemented through the US Services' security assistance training management systems.

5. Joint and Multinational Exercises

These exercises can enhance a FID program. **They offer the advantage of training US forces while simultaneously increasing interoperability with HN forces and offering limited HN training opportunities.** The participation of US forces in these exercises, primarily designed to enhance the training and readiness of US forces, is funded by the O&M funds of the providing Service or USSOCOM if SOF are involved. Airlift and sealift may be provided by the combatant command from its airlift and sealift budget. Certain expenses of HN forces participation may be funded by the developing country multinational exercise program as arranged by the conducting combatant command. **These expenses differ from SA funding because SA is designed to train HN forces, whereas multinational and selected joint exercises are designed to train US forces in combination with HN forces. In addition, forces involved in these exercises come under the combatant command (command authority) of the geographic combatant commander and OPCON of the designated subordinate JFC, while SA forces are under the control of the chief of the diplomatic mission.** Legal restrictions on what FID programs can be conducted in conjunction with these exercises are complex. Appendix A, "Commander's Legal Considerations," provides general guidelines on these restrictions. Prior legal guidance is important to the concept of the exercise and related FID operations. Exercises should be planned as part of the overall training program for the theater, and other FID activities should be integrated into the framework of these exercises. Examples of this integration are found in the conduct of HCA missions. The implementation of HCA programs into exercises will be examined in detail later in this chapter. Multinational and selected joint exercises can yield important benefits for US interests and the overall theater FID program. The most significant of these benefits:

a. Enhance relationships and interoperability with HN forces;

b. Demonstrate resolve and commitment to the HN; and

c. Familiarize US forces and commanders with HN employment procedures and potential combat areas.

6. Exchange Programs

a. These programs allow the commander to use O&M money for the exchange of units or individuals and may be used to expand the efforts of the SA programs funded under IMET that allow HN personnel to train in the US. **These exchange programs foster greater mutual understanding and familiarize each force with the operations of the other.** Exchange programs are another building block that can help a commander round out his FID plan. These are not stand-alone programs; however, when commanders combine them with other FID tools described in this chapter, the result can be a comprehensive program that fully supports the HN IDAD program. The general types of exchange programs that commanders should consider are described below. Appendix A, "Commander's Legal Considerations," provides a more detailed explanation of the legal aspects of these types of training.

b. **Reciprocal Unit Exchange Program.** This program is for squad-to battalion-size elements. Each nation's forces trains the other in tactics, techniques, and procedures. This program is a good vehicle for US commanders to use in order to sensitize their forces to the cultural and social aspects of the HN while simultaneously increasing the training readiness of HN forces. The proficiency of the units must be comparable to preclude exchanging fully trained US forces for untrained HN forces.

c. **Personnel Exchange Program (PEP).** The PEP is a 1- to 3-year program in which one person from the HN is exchanged with a US member. This program, like reciprocal unit exchanges, requires that the exchanged personnel be of comparable proficiency in their area of expertise.

d. **Individual Exchange Program.** This program is similar to the PEP. It is different, however, because it is a TDY assignment in theater. This program gives the commander flexibility, since he will not lose personnel for extended periods and the commander is able to expose a larger portion of the force to the program.

e. **Combination Programs.** Commanders should consider combining SA efforts with joint or multinational exercises in order to obtain maximum benefit for all concerned. For example, exchange of key personnel during exercises will gain more in terms of interoperability than exchanges during normal operational periods. Also, the exchange of units with similar equipment, especially if the HN is unfamiliar with the equipment, may be very beneficial.

SECTION C. DIRECT SUPPORT (NOT INVOLVING COMBAT OPERATIONS) (See Figure V-4)

7. General

a. **This category of support involves US forces actually conducting operations in support of the HN.** This is different from providing equipment or training support in order to enhance the HN's ability to conduct its own operations. Direct support operations provide immediate assistance and are usually combined in a total FID program with indirect operations.



Figure V-4. Direct Support (Not Involving Combat Operations)

b. Two types of direct support operations critical to supporting FID across all categories are CMO and PSYOP. Because these operations involve US forces in a direct operational role, they are discussed under direct support (not involving combat operations).

8. Civil-Military Operations

a. CMO span a very broad area in FID and include activities across the range of military operations. Using CMO to support military activities in a FID program can enhance preventive measures, reconstructive efforts, and combat operations in support of a HN's IDAD program. This discussion is limited to those portions of CMO that most directly contribute to a commander's support of a FID program.

b. **CA Activities.** CA activities enhance the relationship between military forces and civil authorities in areas where military forces are present. CA activities, usually planned, directed, and conducted by CA personnel because of the complexities and demands for specialized capabilities involved in working within areas normally the responsibility of indigenous civil governments or authorities, enhance the conduct of CMO.

For further information on CMO, refer to JP 3-57, Joint Doctrine for Civil-Military Operations.

c. **CA. CA are vital to theater FID programs in areas from planning to execution.** They are a valuable resource in planning and facilitating the conduct of various indirect, direct support (not involving combat operations), and combat operations in support of the overall FID effort. CA also support the reconstitution of a viable and competent civil service and social infrastructures. CA also assist the HN civilian government by providing civil administration assistance within its governmental structure.

(1) **Force Structure.** Concurrently, 96 percent of the CA force structure is in the RC, therefore JFCs need to carefully consider how they will plan for and employ these limited CA assets to their optimum capability. Each combatant commander is apportioned AC and RC forces based upon approved OPLANs. The preponderance of the CA forces are in the US Army RC, although the US Marine Corps has a limited CA capability, which also is in their RC. Although RC forces are apportioned to a combatant commander, they are not available unless mobilized or called to active duty. **To help ensure that dedicated RC CA support will be available for FID programs and joint FID exercises, JFCs and their staffs need to understand the limitations that exist for the employment of RC forces.** Selective Reserve personnel and units are available for annual training up to 19 days per year, excluding travel time. Individual RC personnel are also available, for up to 179 days for voluntary or special active duty in support of projects supporting RC programs, or for temporary tours of active duty in support of operational active Army requirements. RC forces are also available for up to 270 days through a Presidential Reserve Callup. To help prevent CA shortfalls, therefore, combatant commanders need to ensure that their staffs conduct early and continuous coordination with their respective Service components.

(a) **CA Liaison.** CA liaison personnel may be assigned or attached to a combatant command to augment the CA staff planning element. These personnel can be instrumental in assisting in the planning of military operations to support FID and incorporating FID programs into the overall theater strategy.

(b) **CA Commands, Brigades, and Battalions.** CA commands and brigades are designed to plan, manage, and conduct civil military operations in support of the theater or operational area. CA battalions are organized along three different models, ranging from an AC rapid deployment unit comprised of CA generalists; RC special operations units aligned with theater SOCs; and RC units performing CA activities in support of corps to brigade level commands.

(2) **CA Capabilities.** CA units are regionally focused, possess varying levels of language capability, and generally have the following 16 functional specialties that fall into 4 broad categories: Government functions (public administration; public education; public safety; international and domestic law; and public health), public facilities functions (public transportation; public works and utilities; and public communications), economics and commerce functions (food and agriculture; economic development; and civilian supply), and special functions (emergency services; environmental management; cultural relations; civil information; and dislocated civilians). Commanders should consider using their CA assets in the following roles to support the overall FID program.

(a) Planning, supporting, and controlling other military operations in FID such as training assistance, FHA, MCA, HCA, and logistic support.

(b) Providing liaison to civilian authorities, international organizations, and nongovernmental organizations.

(c) Facilitating the identification and procurement of civilian resources to support the mission.

(d) Supporting and conducting civil administration.

(3) **CA Employment Considerations in FID.** The following are areas that commanders must consider when employing CA assets in planning, supporting, and executing FID programs.

(a) CA expertise must be incorporated in the planning as well as into the execution of military activities in support of FID programs.

(b) Successful FID operations hinge upon HN public support. Integrating CA and PSYOP with FID activities can enhance that support.

(c) The sovereignty of the HN must be maintained at all times. The perception that the US is running a puppet government is counter to the basic principles of FID. This is important to remember when providing civil administration assistance.

(d) HN self-sufficiency must be a goal of all CA assistance.

For further information on CA activities and CA, refer to JP 3-57.1, Joint Doctrine for Civil Affairs, *and JP 3-57,* Joint Doctrine for Civil-Military Operations.

d. **PSYOP. PSYOP supports the achievement of national objectives by creating desired emotions, attitudes, or behavior in select target foreign audiences.** To accomplish this, PSYOP units design activities to create or reinforce US resolve and commitment for attaining national objectives.

(1) **Target Groups and PSYOP Goals Within FID**

(a) **Insurgents.** To create dissension, disorganization, low morale, subversion, and defection within insurgent forces.

(b) **Civilian Populace.** To gain, preserve, and strengthen civilian support for the HN government and its IDAD program.

(c) **Military Forces.** To strengthen military support, with emphasis on building and maintaining the morale of HN forces.

(d) **Neutral Elements.** To gain the support of uncommitted groups inside and outside the HN.

(e) **External Hostile Powers.** To convince hostiles that the insurgency will fail.

(2) **PSYOP Activities**

(a) Improving popular support for the HN government.

(b) Discrediting the insurgent forces with neutral groups and the insurgents themselves.

(c) Projecting a favorable image of the HN government and the US.

(d) Supporting defector programs.

(e) Providing close and continuous support to CMO.

(f) Supporting HN programs that protect the population from insurgent activities.

(g) Strengthening HN support of programs that provide positive populace control and protection from insurgent activities.

(h) Informing the international community of US and HN intent and goodwill.

(i) Passing instructions to the HN populace.

(j) Developing HN PSYOP capabilities.

(3) **PSYOP Force Structure.** Similar to the CA force structure, over 85 percent of PSYOP assets are in the RC force. The Army has the preponderance of PSYOP assets and the only AC PSYOP capability. The US Air Force has a variety of assets capable of supporting PSYOP including a limited number of EC-130 COMMANDO SOLO aircraft. PSYOP forces are assigned to CDRUSSOCOM. Requests for PSYOP support are made through combatant command channels to USSOCOM for approval.

(a) **PSYOP Group (POG).** A POG plans, coordinates, and executes PSYOP activities at the operational and tactical levels. It also can provide limited support to strategic planning and operations. A POG is structured to support conventional forces and SOF deployed worldwide. It can support several joint psychological operations task forces (JPOTFs) at the combatant command and the JTF level.

(b) **Regional PSYOP Battalion (POB).** A regional POB has the same fundamental capabilities found in the POG. It plans and conducts PSYOP. Each geographic

combatant commander requires at least one dedicated regional POB. The regional POB has the following capabilities:

1. Command assigned and attached elements conducting PSYOP.

2. Form the nucleus of a JPOTF, when directed.

3. Augment the combatant command's PSYOP staff element.

4. Develop, coordinate, and execute the strategic theater-level PSYOP support plan to the combatant commander's PSYOP plan.

5. Supervise the planning, coordination, and execution of operational-level PSYOP by the regional PSYOP companies.

6. Coordinate military PSYOP with other USG agencies, the HN, and other foreign governments supporting US operations.

7. Provide the organization, C2, and staff capability to execute capabilities of the POG.

8. Provide headquarters command support to the JPOTF headquarters.

9. Plan, coordinate, and execute PSYOP.

10. Deploy globally with conventional forces and SOF.

11. Provide regionally oriented cultural, linguistic, marketing, and advertising expertise.

(c) **Tactical POB.** The tactical POB (also called the tactical PSYOP battalion [TPB]) provides tactical PSYOP support to corps-level units and below (including other Service equivalents). It also supports select joint special operations task force or conventional JTFs as directed. The PSYOP battalion staff and elements of its companies can plan and conduct operations at the component level. The TPB also can develop, produce, and disseminate tactical products within the guidance (such as themes and objectives) assigned by the JPOTF and authorized by the product approval JFC. When the TPB deploys in support of a maneuver unit, it normally is task-organized with assets from the dissemination PSYOP battalion. At the battalion level, the TPB generally is augmented with a theater support team from the dissemination battalion's signal company which provides product distribution and command, control, and communications support. The TPB has the following capabilities:

1. C2 assigned and attached forces.

2. Augment the corps or JTF PSYOP staff element.

3. When directed, establish a JPOTF with regional and dissemination PSYOP assets augmentation.

4. Plan, coordinate, and execute tactical PSYOP in support of the strategic, operational, and tactical levels by tactical PSYOP companies.

5. Provide regional, cultural, and linguistic expertise.

6. Deploy globally with conventional forces and SOF.

(4) **PSYOP Capabilities.** Psychological operations personnel prepare an in-depth analysis of the target nation's social, political, religious, cultural, and economic environment as background for the development of the supporting PSYOP plan. (See Appendix F, "Psychological Operations Estimate of the Situation," for more detail on this process.) The PSYOP planner will recommend a PSYOP theme (subject, topic, or line of persuasion used to achieve a psychological objective) to the combatant commander. The PSYOP planner may recommend certain symbols as a means of conveying the theme. Once the commander chooses a theme and symbols, the tone and general parameters for much of the PSYOP to support the FID program have been established, and all military operations should be evaluated against these parameters. Objectives and themes frame the products that reach foreign target audiences and reflect national and theater policy and strategy. **Approval of themes and messages is reserved by USG policy at Office of the Secretary of Defense-levels where the interagency process can address PSYOP products with a broad range of considerations.** In addition to establishing the psychological theme and symbols, the PSYOP element will project a favorable image of US actions, using all resources to channel the behavior of the target audience so that it supports US objectives. Given these extensive capabilities, commanders should use their PSYOP assets to complement the FID plan in the following roles:

(a) Providing planning assistance for military support to FID. Planning tasks include identification of those military operations conducted primarily for their PSYOP effect and review of other military operations that have PSYOP impact.

(b) Working with the military PAO and DOS PA personnel to build an extensive information effort to inform the local populace of US intentions in the FID effort and to strengthen the credibility of the HN government.

(c) Gathering intelligence through PSYOP assessments of the local area that assist in determining FID requirements and MOEs.

(5) **PSYOP Employment Considerations in FID.** The following are areas that commanders must consider when employing PSYOP assets in support of FID operations.

(a) Accurate intelligence is imperative to successful PSYOP and FID. An inadequate analysis of the target audience could result in the use of improper themes or symbols and damage the entire FID effort.

(b) PSYOP programs are audience driven; an analysis is required for each new target audience and must be updated as attitudes and vulnerabilities change.

(c) PSYOP is a combat multiplier and should be used as any other weapon system. This use includes evaluation of targets through joint targeting procedures.

(d) Military PSYOP programs must be coordinated and in synchronization with other USG information efforts.

(6) **PSYOP Reachback Capabilities.** To make the best use of all available technologies and resources, PSYOP use reachback capabilities. **This concept allows a portion of PSYOP forces that support forward-deployed elements to transfer products and ideas instantaneously through the use of secure communications links.** Under this concept, a portion of the PSYOP development centers of the regional battalions normally remains with the JPOTF (Rear) (or, if so chartered, the JTF [Rear]) and the media production center, depending on the mission requirements. Here, personnel work on long-range planning and develop PSYOP products based on mission requirements and then provide them to the JPOTF (Forward). The remainder of the PSYOP development centers and dissemination POBs will continue to deploy to the joint operations area (JOA) to develop, produce and disseminate PSYOP products at the tactical and operational levels, using PSYOP internal assets or other military or civilian assets in the JOA. That portion of the JPOTF (Rear), however, may move forward as the situation dictates.

(a) This reachback capability offers the JPOTF several advantages. The number of personnel deployed forward and the accompanying "footprint" are reduced, resulting in cost reduction and enhanced force protection. Those PSYOP forces needed to coordinate with the JFC and to disseminate products (for example, using loudspeaker, print, radio, or television means) deploy forward with the JPOTF. Thus, the mixing of reachback technology with the PSYOP force structure, organization, equipment, and C2 can help the JPOTF commander to better monitor the PSYOP plan. This capability requires the supported combatant commander's communication organization to plan for and integrate the Product Distribution System into its existing command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence structure and to provide dedicated bandwidth to the JPOTF.

(b) Also, reachback allows the JPOTF commander to leverage existing fusion centers and information systems as well as product development resources such as video and audio libraries and PSYOP forces located in other countries. This ability to reach back into national intelligence databases and fusion centers allows for near-real-time access to raw and finished intelligence products and real-time exchange of intelligence (for example, dedicated joint deployable intelligence support system connectivity collocated with the joint intelligence center/joint intelligence support element of the supported JFC), that is not only critical during the PSYOP development process (target audience analysis), but also during dissemination and evaluation.

(7) **Overt Peacetime PSYOP Programs.** Geographic combatant commanders may develop such programs, in coordination with the chiefs of US diplomatic missions, that plan,

Medical assistance programs employ joint forces to promote nonmilitary objectives.

support, and provide for the conduct of PSYOP, during military operations other than war, in support of US regional objectives, policies, interests, and theater military missions.

For further information on PSYOP, refer to JP 3-53, Doctrine for Joint Psychological Operations.

e. **FHA. FHA programs are conducted to relieve or reduce the results of natural or manmade disasters or other endemic conditions.** FHA provided by US forces is generally limited in scope and duration. The assistance provided is designed to supplement or complement the efforts of the HN civil authorities or agencies that may have the primary responsibility for providing FHA. FHA may be planned into the geographic combatant commander's military strategy to support FID as a component of the overall program to bolster the HN's IDAD capability. Often, however, FHA efforts are in response to unforeseen disaster situations. FHA efforts may also extend outside the FID umbrella. When FHA is provided to a nation that is experiencing lawlessness, subversion, or insurgency, these efforts must be considered as part of the FID effort. As such, all of the PSYOP and CA activities considerations discussed earlier must be considered as the FHA programs are planned and executed.

(1) **FHA Missions and Assistance.** A single FHA operation may contain one or more FHA missions. Common missions include: relief missions, dislocated civilian support missions, security missions, technical assistance and support functions, and consequence management operations. Common examples of FHA that commanders may provide and/or restore are

temporary shelter, food and water, medical assistance, transportation assistance, or other activities that provide basic services to the local populace. These services are often in response to a natural disaster such as an earthquake, a volcano, or a flood. In addition, FHA support may include assistance to the populace of a nation ravaged by war, disease, or environmental catastrophes. Missions also could be conducted within the profile of consequence management.

(2) **FHA Coordination and Control**

(a) **DOS.** The US Ambassador to the affected nation is responsible for declaring the occurrence of a disaster or emergency in a foreign country that requires US FHA support. This declaration is sent to the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) and the DOS to begin possible USG assistance. **USAID, which is under the direct authority and foreign policy guidance of the Secretary of State, acts as the lead federal agency for US FHA.** USAID administers the President's authority to provide emergency relief and rehabilitation through OFDA. Should OFDA request that DOD conduct certain FHA operations, DOS would reimburse DOD for those operations. Appendix A, "Commander's Legal Considerations" covers the legal authorizations and restrictions for these operations.

(b) **DOD.** The USD(P) has the overall responsibility for developing military policy for FHA operations. The ASD(SO/LIC) administers policy and statutory programs. Policy oversight is executed by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Stability Operations). Program management and funding of these programs is the responsibility of the Defense Security and Cooperation Agency. Much of FHA is provided through the excess property authorization under Title 10, US Code (USC) 2547, which permits the transfer of excess DOD property to authorized nations.

(c) **Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.** The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is responsible for recommending supported and supporting commands for FHA operations. The Joint Staff's Director for Operational Plans and Joint Force Development has the primary responsibility for concept review of OPLANs in support of FHA; the J-4 oversees Service logistic support; and the J-3 will be involved when a military force is inserted into a foreign country as part of a US humanitarian response.

(d) **Combatant Commander.** The combatant commander considers FHA when formulating and establishing theater strategic objectives. Planning is conducted in accordance with JOPES. The supported combatant commander structures the force necessary to conduct and sustain FHA operations. In certain circumstances where coordination and approval lead times are not adequate, the combatant commander is authorized to commit the command's resources to provide immediate assistance. This general authority is provided under DOD Directive 5100.46, *Foreign Disaster Relief*.

(3) **FHA Employment Considerations.** Certain major points that combatant commanders and other JFCs should consider when planning or executing FHA operations are listed in Figure V-5.

FOREIGN HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE EMPLOYMENT CONSIDERATIONS

Constructing likely event joint operation plans. Theater joint operation plans should be established for likely events that may require a foreign humanitarian assistance (FHA) response. For example, if the combatant commander's area of responsibility covers a likely earthquake region, the command's response for an earthquake should be included in a joint operation plan to decrease response time and make execution easier and more effective.

Incorporating psychological operations and civil affairs activities into the FHA program. FHA programs that are not properly coordinated with local government officials, improperly assessed, or are misrepresented by opposition propaganda efforts may severely damage the theater foreign internal defense program.

Coordinating all FHA activities with the country team. The US Agency for International Development and its subordinate element, the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance, must be carefully consulted on disaster assistance. In addition, ensure that all proposed FHA efforts are coordinated with the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Special Operations/Low-Intensity Conflict). The Department of State is the lead agent for this type of support and all FHA programs must be thoroughly coordinated to ensure an efficient national-level program.

Monitoring the legal authorizations carefully. These authorizations are subject to change and misinterpretation. A legal review must be conducted before planning FHA missions.

Figure V-5. Foreign Humanitarian Assistance Employment Considerations

For further information on FHA, refer to JP 3-07.6, JTTP for Foreign Humanitarian Assistance.

f. **HCA.** These programs can be very valuable to the combatant commander's support of FID programs, while at the same time offering valuable training to US forces. It is important to understand the difference between HCA and FHA programs. FHA programs, as discussed above, focus on the use of DOD excess property, emergency transportation support, disaster relief, or other support as necessary to alleviate urgent needs in a host country caused by some type of disaster or catastrophe. HCA programs are specific programs authorized under Title 10, USC 401 funding. **These programs are designed to provide assistance to the HN populace in conjunction with a military exercise.** These are usually planned well in advance and are usually not in response to disasters, although HCA activities have been executed following

disasters. Specific activities for which HCA funds can be used include medical, dental, and veterinary care; construction of rudimentary surface transportation systems; well drilling; construction of basic sanitation facilities; and rudimentary construction and repair of public facilities. **Assistance must fulfill unit training requirements that incidentally create humanitarian benefit to the local populace.** A detailed examination of the legal authorizations and restrictions for HCA are included in Appendix A, "Commander's Legal Considerations."

(1) **HCA Coordination and Control.** The coordination requirements for HCA projects are similar to those for FHA. HCA activities (other than *De Minimis* HCA) conducted in a foreign country require the specific approval of the Secretary of State. Within the DOD, the USD(P) oversees HCA and the ASD(SO/LIC) acts as the program manager. Combatant commanders develop a proposed annual execution plan for HCA activities within their AORs and execute HCA activities in conjunction with other military operations. Coordination with USAID and the country team is also very important to efficient HCA operations. The HCA program is a more decentralized program than FHA. This allows the combatant commander to have greater influence and to plan for a larger role in this area.

(a) In past years, Congress has established a ceiling on HCA authorizations. Funds are included in the combatant commanders' budgets. This allocation is made based on national security priorities and guidance from the Secretary of Defense.

(b) Valid HCA priorities within the AOR are identified and included in the FID planning process. These priorities then compete with those of other combatant commands for

Humanitarian and civic assistance as part of a foreign internal defense program includes engineering construction projects.

approval and funding. The resulting exercises and projects should then be managed as both FID and US training.

(2) **HCA Employment Considerations.** The nature of HCA operations makes the employment considerations for this type of operation quite different than for FHA. The following are the key employment considerations for HCA.

(a) Plan for use of RC as well as AC forces. The medical, veterinary, dental, construction, and well drilling activities of HCA are well suited to skills found in the RC forces. Typical HCA missions allow these forces to get the realistic training they normally do not receive at their home stations or at other US training sites.

(b) Incorporate PSYOP and CA into HCA just as in FHA operations.

(c) Subject all HCA plans to close legal scrutiny. Like FHA operations, the legal aspects of all HCA operations must be understood.

(d) Plan adequate deployed force protection measures. HCA operations are sometimes conducted in areas that are subject to unrest and internal instability. US forces may become targets of opposition forces' terrorist attacks. Security measures must be included in each operation.

(e) Establish the primary purpose of HCA missions as training for US forces. Incidental to this purpose are the benefits received by the civilian population.

(f) Conduct all HCA operations in support of the host civilian populace. No HCA support may be provided to HN military or paramilitary forces.

g. **MCA.** MCA programs offer the JFC a CMO opportunity to improve the HN infrastructure and the living conditions of the local populace, while enhancing the legitimacy of the HN government. **These programs use predominantly indigenous military forces at all levels in such fields as education, training, public works, agriculture, transportation, communications, health, sanitation, and other areas that contribute to the economic and social development of the nation.** These programs can have excellent long-term benefits for the HN by developing needed skills and by enhancing the legitimacy of the host government by showing the people that their government is capable of meeting the population's basic needs. MCA programs can also be helpful in gaining public acceptance of the military, which is especially important in situations requiring a clear, credible demonstration of improvement in host-military treatment of human rights. MCA is a tool that combatant commanders and subordinate JFCs should use, whenever possible, to bolster the overall FID plan.

(1) **MCA Examples.** US forces may advise or assist the HN military in conducting the MCA mission. This assistance may occur in conjunction with SA training or as a combatant commander's separate initiative. In all cases, the actual mission must be performed by the HN military. Some of the most common MCA projects are in the area of construction.

(2) **MCA Coordination and Control.** Coordination for MCA missions is slightly less involved than for FHA and HCA missions. First, the US level of involvement is generally less than that required for other types of FID missions. Second, the program is essentially a US military to HN military project. As with all FID programs, however, the US ambassador and country team should be aware of all operations in their assigned country. If the US military support to MCA is provided through SA, normal SA coordination procedures apply, but if it is provided through a separate combatant commander's initiative using O&M funds, most of the coordination will be internal to the command.

(3) **MCA Employment Considerations.** Many of the same considerations apply when employing US military personnel in support of MCA as in supporting FHA and HCA. The essential difference is that in MCA, US personnel are limited to training and advisory roles. In addition to this general point, commanders should also consider the following employment guidelines when planning or executing MCA programs.

(a) Select projects that are simple and achievable and can be maintained by the HN. If the HN military is unable to accomplish the mission, confidence in the local government and military may be significantly damaged.

(b) HN forces will do the work required to accomplish the mission.

(c) Because of the nature of MCA missions, commanders will normally include CA, PSYOP, other SOF trainers, and combat support and combat service support elements to support MCA missions.

(d) Coordinate projects with the country team. The USAID representative should be consulted for assistance on any major MCA developmental project and should be informed of all MCA efforts.

9. Military Training to Host Nation Forces

a. The HN FID situation may intensify and increase the need for military training beyond that of indirect support. Direct support operations should provide more immediate benefit to the HN and may be used in conjunction with various types of SA indirect support training.

b. Increased emphasis on IDAD becomes important and training may focus on specific subversion, lawlessness, or insurgency problems encountered by the HN that may be beyond its capabilities to control.

10. Logistic Support

a. The final area to be discussed under the FID category of direct support (not involving combat operations) is logistic support to the HN military. Logistic support as discussed here does not include activities authorized under SA. **Logistic support operations are limited by US law and usually consist of transportation or limited maintenance support.** Legal

restrictions prohibit the transfer of equipment or supplies under these programs. In addition, authorization for combatant commanders to provide logistic support to the HN military must be received from the President or Secretary of Defense. Often authorization to provide this type of support is in response to a major military emergency that threatens the internal security of the HN. **This type of support will normally be authorized for limited periods in order to accomplish very narrow objectives.**

b. In some cases, the President or Secretary of Defense may direct a show of force exercise to demonstrate support for the HN and to provide the vehicle for provision of logistic support. An example of such a show of force was Operation GOLDEN PHEASANT conducted in support of the Government of Honduras in 1987.

c. Logistic support is integrated into the overall theater FID plan. This is even more important if the supported nation is involved in an active conflict.

d. The following are major employment considerations that should be considered when providing logistic support as part of the theater FID program.

(1) Develop definitive ROE and force protection measures.

(2) Educate all members of the command on permissible activities in providing the logistic support mission. For example, ensure that everyone understands equipment and supplies may not be transferred to the HN military.

(3) Build a logistics assessment file on logistic resources available in country. This database should include information of local supply availability, warehousing and maintenance facilities, transportation assets, lines of communications (LOCs), and labor force availability.

(4) Tailor the proper types of equipment maintenance and training sustainability packages to the needs of the HN.

11. Intelligence and Communications Sharing

a. An active intelligence liaison should be ongoing among the HN, country team, and combatant commander's intelligence staff, thus establishing the basis for any intelligence and communications sharing. Counterintelligence elements can provide this support with HN military counterintelligence elements, security service, and police forces when deployed in support of FID operations. During the geographic combatant commander's assessment of the AOR, the HN intelligence and communications capabilities should be evaluated. Based on this evaluation, the combatant commander is in a good position to provide or recommend approval of intelligence or communications assistance. **The sharing of US intelligence is a sensitive area that must be evaluated based on the circumstances of each situation.** Cooperative intelligence liaisons between the US and HN are vital; however, disclosure of classified information to the HN or other multinational FID forces must be authorized. Generally, assistance may be provided in terms of evaluation, training, limited information exchange, and equipment support.

b. Any intelligence assistance must be coordinated with the country team intelligence assets to benefit from operational and tactical capabilities.

c. The initial focus of assistance in this area will be to evaluate HN intelligence and communications architecture. Based on this evaluation, the combatant commander will be able to determine the HN's requirements.

d. Examine the intelligence process as it applies to the current situation. The needs of the HN as well as their technical expertise and equipment must be considered when evaluating their systems. The HN intelligence and communications systems must reflect the HN's environment and threat.

e. Following the evaluation, a determination must be made as to how the US FID program may assist. Any intelligence sharing must be evaluated against US national security interests and be both coordinated and approved at the national level.

f. Equipment deficiencies should be identified in the assessment. US assistance in equipment normally will be provided through the SA process.

g. Training support for intelligence operations, which is indirect support, will also normally be conducted under SA. Some limited informal training benefits may also be provided during exchange programs and daily interface with HN military intelligence and communications assets.

h. **Employment Considerations.** The following items summarize the major considerations that commanders and planners must be aware of as they conduct intelligence and communications sharing activities in support of the FID program.

(1) Direct most intelligence and communications assistance efforts toward creating a self-sufficient HN intelligence and communications capability. US assistance that creates a long-term reliance on US capabilities may damage the overall HN intelligence and communications system.

(2) Scrutinize any training assistance to ensure that it is provided within legal authorizations and ensure that information or processes are not revealed without authorization.

(3) Tailor assistance to the level of the threat, equipment, and technology within the HN.

SECTION D. COMBAT OPERATIONS

12. General

US participation in combat operations as part of a FID effort requires Presidential authority.

13. Considerations for United States Combat Operations

a. This section is not designed to provide a doctrinal guide for combat operations in FID or to supplement existing joint tactics, techniques, and procedures publications. The purpose is to discuss areas at the operational and strategic levels of war that must be considered when conducting combat operations in support of a HN's IDAD program. Many of the considerations discussed in the other two categories of FID remain important in tactical operations. The most notable of these involve the coordinated use of PSYOP and CA as well as coordination with other USG agencies operating within the HN. The following are areas that the JFC also should consider when employing combat forces in support of FID.

b. **HN IDAD Organization.** Maintain close coordination with the elements of the government responsible for HN IDAD efforts. **If a nation has reached a point in its internal affairs that it requires combat support from the US, it should have already developed a comprehensive IDAD strategy.** The organization to effect this strategy will vary among nations. It may simply be the normal organization of the executive branch of the HN government. The important point is that an organization should exist to pull together all instruments of power to defeat the source of internal instability. JFCs must be involved in this coordination and control process. Appendix B, "Internal Defense and Development Strategy," provides a detailed explanation of an IDAD strategy as well as a sample IDAD organization. US commanders supporting an IDAD program must be integrated into the organizational structure that controls the program.

c. **Tiers of Forces.** Historically, counterinsurgency and stability efforts are led initially by SOF (principally special forces, PSYOP, and CA). If HN capabilities are not sufficiently improved and MOEs are not attained, conventional forces may be required.

d. **Transition Points.** Establish transition points at which combat operations are to be returned to the HN forces. This process establishes fixed milestones (not time dependent) that provide indicators of success of the HN IDAD program.

e. **Joint, Interagency, and Multinational Focus.** Combat operations supporting FID will normally be joint, and may also include multinational operations involving the HN, the US, and other multinational forces. Interagency coordination should also be anticipated, given the inherent nature of FID programs.

f. **US Combat Operations.** A priority for US combat operations should be to identify and integrate logistics, intelligence, and other combat support means. When tactically feasible, actual combat operations and support for them should be done by HN forces, thus increasing the legitimacy of the HN government and reducing the dependency on US forces.

g. **Offensive Operations.** US forces will conduct combat operations only when directed by legal authority to stabilize the situation and to give the local government and HN military forces time to regain the initiative. In most cases, the objective of US operations will be force protection rather than to focus on destruction of adversary forces. Gaining the strategic initiative

Employing joint forces in combat operations in foreign internal defense requires a Presidential decision.

is the responsibility of the HN. Commanders must evaluate all operations to ensure that they do not create the impression that the US is executing a war for a nation that has neither the will nor the public support to defeat internal threats.

h. **Human Rights Considerations.** Strict adherence to respect for human rights must be maintained. This includes US forces as well as forces from the HN and other participating multinational forces. Repression and abuses of the local population by the legitimate government will reduce the credibility and popular support for the HN government and also may cause the President to consider withdrawing US support; therefore, commanders must consistently reinforce human rights policies. In many FID combat situations, the moral high ground may be just as important as the tactical high ground.

i. **Rules of Engagement.** Judicious and prudent ROE are absolutely required in combat operations in FID. A balance between force protection and danger to innocent civilians as well as damage to nonmilitary areas must be reached. Each individual must be trained in order to prevent unnecessary destruction or loss of civilian life. Commanders must closely monitor this situation and provide subordinate commanders with clear and enforceable ROE as well as the flexibility to modify these ROE as the situation changes.

j. **Indiscriminate Use of Force.** Indiscriminate use of force must be prevented; however, commanders should not be constrained from using all necessary means available, and take all appropriate actions in self-defense to protect US forces.

k. **Intelligence.** The US joint intelligence network must be tied into the country team, the local HN military, paramilitary, and police intelligence capabilities, as well as the intelligence assets of other nations participating in the operation. Deployed military counterintelligence elements can provide this liaison with local HN military counterintelligence and security and police services in their areas of operations. In addition, social, economic, and political information must be current to allow the commander to become aware of changes in the operational environment that might require a change in tactics. Appendix C, "Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace to Support Foreign Internal Defense," provides detail on the type of information necessary for a thorough evaluation of the area of operation. The nature of the required information places a greater emphasis on HUMINT efforts than on technical collection capabilities.

l. **Integration With Other FID Programs.** The initiation of hostilities does not mean that other FID programs will be suspended. In fact, PSYOP, CMO, SA, FHA, intelligence, and logistic support are all likely to increase dramatically. The FID planning imperatives of taking the long-term approach, tailoring support to HN needs, and the HN bearing IDAD responsibility remain important throughout the combat operations phase.

14. Command and Control

The C2 relationships established for the combat operation may be modified based on the political, social, and military environment of the area. In general, the following C2 recommendations should be considered when conducting FID combat operations.

a. **The HN government and security forces must remain in the forefront.** The HN security forces must establish strategic policy and objectives, and a single multinational headquarters should be established to control combat operations.

b. **The chain of command from the President to the lowest US commander in the field remains inviolate.** The President retains command authority over US forces. It is sometimes prudent or advantageous to place appropriate US forces under the OPCON of a foreign commander to achieve specified military objectives, In making that determination, the President carefully considers such factors as the mission, size of the proposed US force, risks involved, anticipated duration, and ROE.

For further information on C2, refer to JP 0-2, Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF).

15. Sustainment

As with any operation, sustainment of US forces is essential to success. Sustainment of combat operations in FID is similar to sustainment for other types of operations. The political sensitivities and concern for HN legitimacy and minimum US presence does, however, change the complexion of sustainment operations in FID. The general principles that should be considered in planning and executing sustainment of combat operations in FID are:

a. **Maximum Use of HN Capabilities.** This includes routine services, supplies, facilities, and transportation. This approach reduces US overhead and the number of US personnel required in the HN.

b. **Maximum use of existing facilities such as ports, airfields, and communications sites.**

c. **Minimum Handling of Supplies.** For short duration operations (90 days or less), support will be provided through existing organic support packages and through air LOCs.

d. **Medical Self-Sufficiency.** Many areas of the world where the US is likely to conduct FID do not have adequate medical capabilities. Since commanders cannot rely on local capabilities, they must plan for self-sufficient health service support (HSS) for combat operations in FID. At a minimum adequate hospitalization, medical logistics resupply, patient movement, and preventive medicine must be established to support these operations. Appendix G, "Health Service Support", discusses HSS to support FID programs.

f. **Optimum use of mobile maintenance capabilities that stress repair as far forward as possible.** Equipment evacuation for repair should be kept to a minimum.

g. **Routine use of both intertheater and intratheater airlift to deliver supplies.**

APPENDIX A
COMMANDER'S LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS

1. General

a. This appendix provides general guidance on legal considerations for FID operations; it is not directive in nature. Legal guidance is subject to rapid change as legislation and US policy are modified. Given this, commanders must consult with their legal staff before establishing FID plans and policy.

b. Much of the information in this appendix is based on the Comptroller General's (CG) rulings (provided in 1984 and re-evaluated in 1986) on combined exercises in Honduras as supplemented by subsequent congressional authorizations for military activities.

c. Generally, legal considerations for commanders conducting FID center around using the proper funding authorizations for the type of mission being conducted. The two major types of funding are FAA funds and O&M funds. In most instances where commanders had problems, it was because O&M funds were used for projects that should have been funded through the FAA. This concept will be discussed in more detail later in this appendix. The following fiscal principles should be observed when conducting FID operations in order to ensure that all activities are conducted within the limits of US law.

2. Fiscal Law Principles

a. Commanders must be aware of fiscal law principles in order to avoid possible violation of Anti-Deficiency Act (Title 31, USC 1341[a]). The Anti-Deficiency Act violations are reportable to Congress and carry both civil and criminal penalties. Expenditures must not be made in advance or in excess of available appropriations.

b. Expenditures must be reasonably related to the purpose for which the appropriation was made.

c. The expenditure must not be prohibited by law.

d. The expenditure must not fall specifically within the scope of some other category of appropriation.

e. If two appropriations permit the expenditure, either may be used, but not in combination or interchangeably.

3. General Areas of Concern

a. Understanding the following discussion of recent rulings and legislation is valuable in informing commanders and in preventing a potential violation. In the Honduras Opinions, the

CG evaluated three specific military activities: training conducted before and during an exercise, MILCON in conjunction with a combined exercise, and HCA.

b. With respect to training and HCA, the CG concluded that the DOD improperly spent O&M funds for SA and development assistance activities. These activities should have been funded with appropriations for the FAA and AECA.

c. With respect to MILCON, the CG concluded that the DOD exceeded authorized ceilings for O&M expenditures.

d. In order to avoid repeating these errors, commanders must be able to distinguish FAA- and AECA-funded activities from DOD-funded activities.

(1) The FAA is divided into two basic parts. Part One authorizes development assistance activities (agriculture, nutritional and food assistance, and other items such as disaster relief for foreign countries). Part Two, in conjunction with the AECA, authorizes SA or military assistance to foreign countries.

(2) The FAA and AECA are managed under the authority of the Secretary of State; the DOD plays a significant role in Part Two activities. The interagency transaction authorities contained in the FAA give the executive branch a good deal of latitude as to how the goals of the two basic parts of the FAA are accomplished. This authority allows the DOD (with DOS approval and reimbursement) to accomplish Part One activities. For example, under this authority DOD engineers can participate in DOS-managed foreign disaster relief efforts. The essential point is that foreign assistance (including security or military assistance) activities are funded from appropriations for FAA and AECA, not from DOD appropriations.

(3) DOD appropriations are provided for diverse items such as research and development, personnel expenses, combined training, and special Title 10 activities for conducting military-to-military operations. Some Title 10 authorities were added after the Honduras Opinions were published in order to increase the combatant commander's ability to engage in cooperative programs with foreign military forces. For example, funding was authorized for military personnel from developing countries to attend planning conferences in the geographic combatant commander's AOR.

e. Activities funded from DOD appropriations may complement activities conducted under the FAA; however, fiscal law principles require that these activities may not augment (or duplicate) each other.

f. Funding and fiscal law considerations have been further complicated by the provisions of the American Service-Members' Protection Act (ASPA) (Title 22 USC 7401-7432 [2002]). The ASPA prohibits the Military Services from providing certain military assistance provided under chapter 2 or 5 of part II of the FAA, and defense articles or defense services furnished with the financial assistance of the USG, including through loans and guarantees under section 23 of the AECA, to countries (other than members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)

and major non-NATO allies, which include Australia, Egypt, Israel, Japan, Jordan, Argentina, the Republic of Korea, New Zealand, and Taiwan) that have ratified the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court but have not received a Presidential waiver of ASPA's restrictions. In Presidential Determination 2003-28, President Bush issued permanent waivers for those countries who have signed and ratified Article 98 agreements with the United States for as long as the agreements remain in force. Commanders must consult with their legal staff to determine each country's current status with regard to the ASPA restrictions.

4. General Legal Authorities for Commanders to Conduct Foreign Internal Defense Operations

a. Figure A-1 provides a general explanation of how commanders may legally fund FID operations.

b. The circle on the left indicates that O&M funds are appropriated for general rather than specific purposes. The DOD has a good deal of discretion in the use of these funds because they are general purpose funds. However, O&M funds cannot be used for any foreign relations programs for which Congress has specifically appropriated funds.

c. There exists on the periphery of O&M-funded activities a range of DOD operations that are extremely useful in implementing our national and regional FID programs. These include multinational exercises, exchange programs, special Title 10 authorities, and other such operations. The DOD can use these kinds of activities to complement foreign assistance activities.

d. The center figure is a square that represents a packaged program (FAA and AECA) enacted and funded by Congress for the specific purpose of conducting US foreign affairs. The FAA and AECA are the vehicles through which the United States contributes to the development of foreign countries (Part One, FAA) and to the internal and external security of foreign countries (Part Two, FAA and AECA).

e. These combined authorities allow our government to vary the mix of economic and military support in FID as the situation dictates. Combatant commanders should note that these authorities allow the DOD to participate in DOS-managed and funded programs under Part One, FAA (Developmental Assistance). For example, US military participation in a roadbuilding project in a foreign country can be obtained by an agreement between local DOS representatives and the combatant commander's representatives. The terms of reimbursement for DOD participation in these types of DOS-funded activities are prescribed by the interagency authorities contained in the FAA.

f. There is one other authority that permits DOD participation in activities that are not within DOD's statutory authority. The Economy Act (Title 31, USC 1535) is a freestanding general authority for one USG agency to provide goods and services to another USG agency on request and by mutual agreement. The agreement must include the details of reimbursement for the agency providing the goods and services. The Economy Act is not applicable where other



Figure A-1. The Commander's Statutory Authority and Funding for Foreign Internal Defense

legislation specifically authorizes interagency transactions; consequently, it is not applicable to FAA activities.

g. The triangular figure on the right side of Figure A-1 indicates that the DOD is always at the bottom point of the triangle. The DOD is doing what it may lawfully do; for example, deploying construction battalions to conduct a disaster response exercise under agreement with another USG agency. The "other agency" authority and funding is represented by the base of the triangle. The terms of reimbursement to the DOD for this kind of activity are prescribed in

the Economy Act. Full and complete reimbursement to the agency providing goods and services is the guiding principle of the Economy Act.

5. Detailed Review of Authority and Restrictions

a. This section provides more detailed guidance and information to the commander and staff on the legal aspects of FID. An examination of the Honduras Opinions will serve as the tool for this analysis. In particular, the major areas of multinational training, MILCON, and HCA will be examined. In addition, other FID activities funded by O&M will be reviewed.

b. **Multinational Exercise Training**

(1) **Purpose.** To test and evaluate mutual capabilities.

(2) **Type.** Safety, familiarization, and interoperability.

(3) **Funding.** O&M for US participation. Foreign force funds its own way except for special Title 10 funds.

(a) In the two decisions regarding DOD activities in Central America, the CG concluded that the DOD conducted such extensive training for the Hondurans that it was equal to the type of training normally provided under SA legislation (FAA and AECA).

(b) Because all these exercise-related training activities were funded with O&M funds, this conclusion was followed with a second opinion that the DOD improperly expended the O&M funds used to train the Hondurans.

(c) **Overview of Funding Sources for Training**

1. **O&M-Funded Training.** This funding provides overseas training opportunities for US personnel and training with foreign personnel to obtain coalition warfare and interoperability objectives.

2. **SA-Funded Training.** This funding provides training of foreign personnel in support of their defense objectives and training of foreign personnel on US equipment sold to them under SA procedures.

(d) The following discussion provides guidance as to whether US training of a foreign force may be O&M-funded or SA-funded:

1. O&M-funded multinational exercises during which HN forces receive training must be conducted to test and evaluate mutual capabilities. Such exercises, having a primary benefit to US readiness, do not necessarily constitute prohibited training of foreign forces.

2. The permissible scope of HN training during an O&M-funded multinational exercise includes safety training, familiarization training, and interoperability training. The level of training provided, however, must not be the formal level of training provided through SA.

3. Multinational exercises are properly funded with O&M funds. Each force funds its own participation, except in certain cases where the US uses Title 10 funds to support foreign participation.

(4) **Special Title 10 Authorities for Cooperative Programs With Foreign Countries.** As a result of fiscal restrictions announced in the Honduras Opinions, Congress provided combatant commanders additional authority and a source of funding to increase the commander's ability to interact with foreign militaries. This authority, known as the combatant commanders cooperative programs or Title 10 authority, covers three specific areas that greatly expand the use of multinational exercises and have great implications for FID.

(a) Title 10 cooperative programs allow combatant commanders to partially fund the participation of the developing country's armed forces in bilateral or multilateral exercises.

(b) Title 10 funding is available for the travel expenses of foreign personnel to attend conferences and planning seminars.

(c) Title 10 funding is available from the combatant commander Initiative Fund for selected operations, joint exercises, HCA, military education and training, and regional conferences in support of FID.

(d) HCA authority (separate from that funded by the combatant commander Initiative Fund) is the final authorization under Title 10 and will be discussed in detail later in this appendix.

(5) The above discussion focused on lawfully funded combined exercise training. The distinction between this O&M-funded training and SA-funded training is that the former is designed for US forces to take advantage of opportunities to train with foreign military forces, while the latter is designed for US forces to provide concentrated training for foreign military forces to improve their operational readiness. There is also a hybrid form of training in which the training of US forces results in training of HN forces, as well. This is commonly known as the SOF exception.

(6) **SOF Exception Training**

(a) **Purpose.** To test and evaluate SOF's ability to train foreign forces.

(b) **Type.** A special operations training force deployed to the field to perform its mission as a unit.

(c) **O&M Funding**

1. Some SOF have a mission to train foreign forces. This type of training benefits the US by using indigenous forces to obtain specific US operational goals; i.e., to evaluate SOF capabilities. Hence, this training may be O&M-funded rather than SA-funded. The CG has concluded that this training is not equivalent to SA-provided training as long as it is not comparable to — nor intended as — SA.

2. The concept of training US forces in a manner that also provides training or some other benefit to a foreign military force is expanding. It is important to note that this concept allows the United States to provide SA-type support without charge to SA appropriations — again, as long as the primary benefit is to the SOF involved and not to the forces of the host government. This type of O&M-funded SOF training is expressly authorized by Title 10.

(7) An expansion of the above concept is known as combat logistic support exercises.

(a) **Purpose.** The primary purpose must be to train US military personnel.

(b) **Type.** Multinational exercises that may include repairs to HN aircraft, reorganization of a warehouse, and an inventory of items in a warehouse.

(c) **Funding.** O&M for US participation. HN funds or SA funds for repair parts used during the exercise.

1. The CG's comment on this point further explains the difference between SA and multinational exercises. A multinational exercise that repaired a foreign nation's aircraft was held not to provide an "SA" benefit as long as the benefit to the HN was incidental and minor (we did not provide repair parts) and the clear primary purpose of the exercise was to train US troops (we worked on the aircraft). Our training of the foreign force must not equate to the type of formal training normally provided by and funded as SA.

2. The opinions concerning operations in Central America make it clear that if the foreign force is not proficient enough to conduct combined operations with the US force, FMS training must be conducted to equalize that force before combined exercises are undertaken. In addition, we cannot use multinational exercises to provide training to foreign military personnel if that training is normally provided as SA.

c. **Exercise-Related Construction.** The second of the three topics addressed in the Honduras Opinions is construction in conjunction with military exercises. In the Honduras Opinions, the CG concluded that the DOD exceeded authorized O&M funding ceilings for exercise-related construction. Because of CG criticism and subsequent congressional action, two sets of rules concerning exercise-related construction are currently applicable.

(1) **Non-Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Exercises**

(a) **Purpose.** Construction that is necessary for a multinational exercise.

(b) **Type.** Any separate construction project under US control. Must be completed at a cost of $750,000 or less.

(c) **Funding.** O&M (Title 10, USC 2805 [C][1]).

1. During non-Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff multinational exercises, O&M funds may be used to construct or improve facilities under US control. The facilities must be necessary for US participation in the multinational exercise.

2. Technical rules apply. Each project has to result in a complete and usable facility at a cost of $750,000 or less. The authority to accomplish this construction is contained in an exception to statutory rules concerning unspecified minor construction; this exception sets the $750,000 limit and permits the use of O&M funds for the construction.

(2) **Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Exercises**

(a) **Purpose.** Construction necessary for Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff exercises. (Title 10, USC 2805)

(b) **Type.** The construction project must be approved by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in advance.

(c) **Funding.** Budget line item as authorized and appropriated by Congress designated as unspecified minor construction. Cost per project must not exceed $1.5 million. These funds cover only materiel, supplies, nonmilitary labor costs, overhead (except planning and design costs), and DOD-funded costs applicable to operating and maintaining the equipment. O&M funds may not be used for Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff exercises overseas.

d. **HCA.** The third topic addressed in the Honduras Opinions is HCA. The CG concluded that the DOD conducted such extensive HCA projects that the projects should have been funded by DOS under Part One, FAA authority.

(1) HCA Title 10 authorities fall under one of the following: inherent authority; Stevens Amendment (Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff exercises only); or interagency transactions.

(2) **Title 10 Authority**

(a) **Inherent Authority.** The CG concluded that the DOD has an inherent ability to undertake civic and humanitarian activities. This authority is described as activities that, incidentally, create civic or humanitarian benefits and are carried out to fulfill training requirements of the unit involved. This form of HCA is accomplished in conjunction with authorized military activities such as statutory Title 10 (HCA) discussed below, but consists of "*de minimus*" HCA (O&M funds) for which only minimal expenditures may be incurred.

(b) **Stevens Amendment (Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Exercises Only).** The second CG opinion also approved of a new statutory authority for the DOD to conduct civic and humanitarian activities (the Stevens Amendment). The Stevens Amendment authorized DOD personnel to conduct such activities in conjunction with Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff- or combatant commander-sponsored exercises overseas. It permits DOD personnel to undertake civic and humanitarian activities unrelated to their own training requirements. The Stevens Amendment was a temporary solution, which has been continued through specific wording in annual DOD Appropriations legislation. Although funding methods could change, these HCA activities were deemed appropriate for the military.

(c) **Interagency Transactions.** Both CG opinions recognized the ability of the DOD to carry out such activities on a reimbursable basis for another USG agency with authority (and appropriations) to conduct such activities. Usually, this occurs when USAID funds economic assistance type activities under Part One, FAA. This is properly referred to as an interagency transaction. DOD personnel may perform DOS HCA activities using the interagency transaction authority contained in the FAA. Prior arrangements must be made for the DOS to reimburse the DOD in accordance with the provisions of the FAA.

(d) **Title 10 Authority (Cooperative Programs Legislation)**

1. A fourth, separately funded authority to conduct civic and humanitarian activities in conjunction with military operations (not necessarily multinational exercises) is contained in Title 10 Cooperative Programs legislation. These programs must promote US security interests and specific operational readiness skills of the members of the Armed Forces who participate in the activities.

2. This authority permits activities that complement, not duplicate, other forms of social or economic assistance provided to a foreign country by any other department or agency of the US. Hence, there is a requirement in this authority that the Secretary of State provide prior approval for the DOD to conduct civic and humanitarian activities. This authority prohibits funding to construct airstrips. It also prohibits HCA (directly or indirectly) to any military or paramilitary activity. The authority is intended to serve the basic economic and social needs of the people of the country concerned.

3. The following specific activities are authorized: medical, dental, and veterinary care provided in rural areas of a country; construction of rudimentary surface transportation systems; well drilling and construction of basic sanitation facilities; and rudimentary construction and repair of public facilities.

e. Other FID activities funded with O&M funds are:

(1) **Exchange Programs.** The purposes of exchange programs are to foster mutual understanding and to familiarize each force with the organization, administration, and operations of the other. There are three types of exchange programs: unit, personnel, and individual.

(a) **Reciprocal Unit Exchange Programs (Title 22, USC 2770a).** Reciprocity is broadly defined; it is not a dollar-for-dollar bargain. This permits the US to assume greater dollar costs; e.g., funding travel for both units. The US unit obtains comparable value by receiving extended training in the exchange country. Reciprocity is required to be accomplished within 1 year or the exchange country must pay for the training it received from the US. Unit exchange denotes an exchange of squad through battalion-size elements. Formal training is permitted for familiarization, normal orientation, checkout, and safety procedures. These O&M-funded activities are accomplished by international agreement approved by the appropriate Services and signed by the major commands.

(b) **PEP.** The PEP is a 1- to 3-year PCS program run on an individual basis using an international agreement. The PEP is conducted under the general authority of the Secretaries of the Military Departments; one person from each Service is exchanged per agreement. Funding is provided by each Service involved for PCS costs, pay, entitlements, and other such costs. The PEP is governed by Service regulations and managed at Service headquarters. These are billet-for-billet exchanges requiring, as does the reciprocal unit exchange, comparably proficient personnel.

(c) **Individual Exchange Programs.** Commanders conduct individual exchange programs in their operational areas. The exchanges are on a TDY or temporary additional duty basis rather than a PCS basis. This program is essentially a mini-PEP. Another form of individual exchange is contained in a recent amendment to the FAA. Service regulations may permit the reciprocal exchange of training slots at professional military education institutions, excluding the Service academies. The institution that provides the training to foreign personnel must be located in the United States. This program permits one-for-one exchanges during the course of a fiscal year without charge to the participating foreign country if the training is reciprocated. This activity is conducted pursuant to international agreement. The foreign country is precluded from using SA funds to defray its costs.

(2) **Combining the Exchange Programs**

(a) Reciprocal unit exchange programs can be buttressed by PEP in areas where SA programs have an impact. For example, if SA programs have delivered transportation assets, it may be of value to plan a unit exchange with a squad or company of a US transportation unit that uses similar equipment. A PEP, using a truck master or maintenance warrant officer, may be equally useful.

(b) Commanders may use these exchange units in multinational exercises and concentrate on areas that HN militaries want to improve. These need not be large-scale exercises. Moreover, unit exchanges are specifically authorized during Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff exercises.

(c) With the advent of Title 10 Cooperative Programs, commanders have the capacity to fund incremental costs of foreign militaries in order to encourage their participation

in bilateral or multilateral exercises. In addition, they can fund key personnel attendance at important planning meetings.

(d) Important DOS-funded economic assistance projects can be complemented by exercise-related construction and humanitarian projects.

(e) The goals of SA programs can be coordinated with the mutual objectives of multinational exercises and exchange programs. The coordination effort depends largely on the SAO's ability to conceptualize how these separately funded programs can complement each other.

(3) **Limitations**

(a) The combined exchange programs are somewhat limited by the foreign country's ability to participate in them. Both their financial ability and their military proficiency must be considered.

(b) The funds provided by Title 10 Cooperative Programs are limited and may not be augmented by other funds.

(c) O&M funds for US participation are limited.

(d) Combined activities cannot be used to duplicate SA programs.

6. Summary

Figure A-1 offers a good tool to summarize how commanders can use their FID strategy to support a HN in the areas of indirect and direct support (not involving combat operations). The left side of this figure represents our ability to use normal operating funds to influence the situation. By comparison to the amount of O&M money available, there is only a peripheral amount of it to do things which may support US FID efforts. The FAA and the AECA provide a well-defined legislative system for the major portion of FID support. The mix of US support efforts can be varied from developmental or infrastructure activities to military assistance, depending on the situation. Finally, the triangle on the right indicates another way the USG may undertake a mission to support a foreign government. If the mission is not a DOD mission and there is no law prohibiting DOD participation, the Economy Act may provide the vehicle for US participation using the authority and appropriations of the USG agency with the mission.

Intentionally Blank

APPENDIX B
INTERNAL DEFENSE AND DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY

1. General

The IDAD strategy is the full range of measures taken by a nation to promote its growth and to protect itself from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency. The strategy focuses on building viable political, economic, military, and social institutions that respond to the needs of society. Its fundamental goal is to prevent an insurgency or other forms of lawlessness or subversion by forestalling and defeating the threat and by working to correct conditions that prompt violence. The government mobilizes the population to participate in IDAD efforts. Thus, IDAD is ideally a preemptive strategy; however, if an insurgency, illicit drug, terrorist, or other threat develops, IDAD becomes an active strategy to combat that threat. FID planners must understand the HN's IDAD strategy if they are to plan effectively to support it. In some cases one of the objectives of FID may be to assist the HN to formulate appropriate IDAD strategy.

2. Concept

a. The IDAD strategy should integrate security force and civilian programs into a coherent, comprehensive effort. Security force actions provide a level of internal security that permits and supports growth through balanced development. This development requires change to meet the needs of vulnerable groups of people. This change may in turn promote unrest in the society. The concept, therefore, includes measures to maintain conditions under which orderly development can take place.

b. Often a government must overcome the inertia and shortcomings of its own political system before it can cope with the internal threats it is facing. This may involve the adoption of reforms during a time of crisis when pressures limit flexibility and make implementation difficult.

c. The successful IDAD strategist must realize that the true nature of the threat to the government lies in the adversary's political strength rather than military power. Although the government must contain the armed elements, concentration on the military aspect of the threat does not address the real danger. Any strategy that does not pay continuing, serious attention to the political claims and demands of the opposition is severely handicapped. Military and paramilitary programs are necessary for success, but are not sufficient alone.

3. Functions

a. The IDAD program blends four interdependent functions to prevent or counter internal threats (see Figure B-1). These functions are balanced development, security, neutralization, and mobilization.

b. Balanced development attempts to achieve national goals through political, social, and economic programs. It allows all individuals and groups in the society to share in the rewards of development, thus alleviating frustration. Balanced development satisfies legitimate grievances



Figure B-1. Internal Defense and Development Strategy Model

that the opposition attempts to exploit. The government must recognize conditions that contribute to the internal threat and instability and take preventive measures. Correcting conditions that make a society vulnerable is the long-term solution to the problem.

c. Security includes all activities implemented in order to protect the populace from the threat and to provide a safe environment for national development. Security of the populace and government resources is essential to countering the threat. Protection and control of the populace permit development and deny the adversary access to popular support. The security effort

should establish an environment in which the local populace can provide for its own security with limited government support.

d. Neutralization is a political concept that: makes an organized force irrelevant to the political process; is the physical and psychological separation of the threatening elements from the population; includes all lawful activities (except those that degrade the government's legitimacy) to disrupt, preempt, disorganize, and defeat the insurgent organization; can involve public exposure and the discrediting of leaders during a period of low-level unrest with little political violence; can involve arrest and prosecution when laws have been broken; or can involve combat action when the adversary's violent activities escalate. All neutralization efforts must be legal. They must scrupulously observe constitutional provisions regarding rights and responsibilities. The need for security forces to act lawfully is essential not only for humanitarian reasons but also because this reinforces government legitimacy while denying the adversary an exploitable issue. Special emergency powers may exist by legislation or decree. Government agents must not abuse these powers because they might well lose the popular support they need. Denying the adversary an opportunity to seize on and exploit legitimate issues against the government discredits their leaders and neutralizes their propaganda.

e. Mobilization provides organized manpower and materiel resources and includes all activities to motivate and organize popular support of the government. This support is essential for a successful IDAD program. If successful, mobilization maximizes manpower and other resources available to the government while it minimizes those available to the insurgent. Mobilization allows the government to strengthen existing institutions, to develop new ones to respond to demands, and promotes the government's legitimacy.

f. The HN continually analyzes the results of its IDAD program, establishes MOEs, and should have a methodology to provide feedback for future planning, refinement of strategy, and continued formulation of strategic national policy.

4. Principles

a. Although each situation is unique, certain principles guide efforts in the four functional areas to prevent or defeat an internal threat. Planners must apply the IDAD strategy and these principles to each specific situation. The principles are: unity of effort, maximum use of intelligence, maximum use of PSYOP/CA, minimum use of violence, and a responsive government.

b. **Unity of Effort.** Unity of effort is essential to prevent or defeat any credible threat. Unity of effort, however, requires coordination and cooperation among all forces and agencies toward a commonly recognized objective regardless of the command or coordination structures of the participants. The organizational basis for coordinating and controlling activities, including those of security forces, is included in paragraph 5 of this appendix.

c. **Maximum Use of Intelligence.** Maximum use of intelligence requires that all operations be based on accurate, timely, and confirmed intelligence derived from reliable sources. Successful

implementation of operations necessitates an extensive OPSEC and counterintelligence program to protect friendly FID operations and to counter and penetrate opposing force intelligence collection operations. Intelligence and CI operations must be designed so as to assess accurately the opposing force's capabilities; to provide timely warning to HN and US FID forces; and to penetrate and be prepared to compromise hostile operations on order. If the HN is not capable of performing these missions effectively upon the commitment of US FID forces, then US intelligence and CI elements must be deployed to accomplish these missions. In this event, the HN must develop its internal intelligence and security forces in order to perform these missions effectively. US elements may assist the HN in developing intelligence capability within the confines of USG directives and as deemed appropriate by the supported geographic combatant commander in coordination with the US ambassador of the HN.

d. **Maximum Use of PSYOP and CA.** Maximum use of PSYOP and CA will enhance the legitimacy and stability of the HN, and deny insurgents and other threats to internal security a focus of grievances against the HN. PSYOP and CA may deter hostilities and reduce or potentially eliminate the need for a use of violence to counter the threat. PSYOP and CA will enhance the HN's image as a responsive government, both internally and internationally. PSYOP and CA activities in support of FID/IDAD should occur prior to, during, and post mission. Examples of PSYOP and CA objectives in FID/IDAD include, but may not be limited to:

(1) Establishing the conditions for the entry of US or multinational forces.

(2) Reducing civil interference with military operations.

(3) Facilitation of civil order.

(4) Support of CMO.

(5) Increasing the effectiveness of, and respect for, HN law enforcement.

(6) Preparing the populace for elections.

(7) Informing the populace of available services (water, medical, subsistence, shelter, and sanctuary).

(8) Reduce the effectiveness of rumors and disinformation.

(9) Facilitating/enhancing the effectiveness and legitimacy of the HN government.

(10) Facilitating exit conditions for US or multinational forces.

e. **Minimum Use of Violence.** A threatened government must carefully examine all COAs in response to the internal violence. The government should stress the minimum use of violence to maintain order. At times, the best way to minimize violence is to use overwhelming force; at

other times, it is necessary to proceed with caution, extending the duration but limiting the intensity or scope of violence. In either case, discreet use of force is the guideline.

f. **A Responsive Government.** Positive measures are necessary to ensure a responsive government whose ability to mobilize manpower and resources as well as to motivate the people reflects its administrative and management capabilities. In many cases, the leadership must provide additional training, supervision, controls, and followup.

5. Organizational Guidance

a. The following discussion provides a model for an organization to coordinate, plan, and conduct IDAD activities. Actual organizations may vary from country to country in order to adapt to existing conditions. Organizations should follow the established political organization of the nation concerned. The organization should provide centralized planning and direction and facilitate decentralized execution of the plan. The organization should be structured and chartered so that it can coordinate and direct the IDAD efforts of existing government agencies; however, it should minimize interference with those agencies' normal functions. Examples of national and subnational organizations show how to achieve a coordinated and unified effort at each level.

b. **National-Level Organization.** The national-level organization plans and coordinates programs. Its major offices normally correspond to branches and agencies of the national government concerned with insurgency, illicit drug trafficking, and terrorist or other internal threats. Figure B-2 depicts a planning and coordination organization at the national level.

(1) The planning office is responsible for long-range planning to prevent or defeat the threat. Its plans provide the chief executive with a basis for delineating authority, establishing responsibility, designating objectives, and allocating resources.

(2) The intelligence office develops concepts, directs programs, and plans and provides general guidance on intelligence related to national security. The intelligence office also coordinates intelligence production activities and correlates, evaluates, interprets, and disseminates intelligence. This office is staffed by representatives from intelligence agencies and police and military intelligence.

(3) The population and resources control office develops economy-related policies and plans and also provides general operational guidance for all forces in the security field. Representatives of government branches concerned with commerce, as well as law enforcement and justice, staff this office.

(4) The military affairs office develops and coordinates general plans for the mobilization and allocation of the regular armed forces and paramilitary forces. Representatives from all major components of the regular and paramilitary forces staff this office.



Figure B-2. Counterinsurgency Planning and Coordination Organization

(5) Five separate offices covering PSYOP, information, economic affairs, cultural affairs, and political affairs represent their parent national-level branches or agencies, and develop operational concepts and policies for inclusion in the national plan.

(6) The duties of the administration offices are self evident and as directed.

c. **Subnational-Level Organization.** Area coordination centers (ACCs) may function as combined civil-military headquarters at subnational, state, and local levels. ACCs plan, coordinate, and exercise OPCON over all military forces, and control civilian government organizations within their respective areas of jurisdiction. The ACC does not replace unit tactical operations centers or the normal government administrative organization in the JOA.

(1) ACCs perform a twofold mission: they provide integrated planning, coordination, and direction for all internal defense efforts and they ensure an immediate, coordinated response to operational requirements. ACCs should conduct continuous operations and communications. ACCs are headed by senior government officials who supervise and coordinate the activities of the staffs responsible for formulating internal defense plans and operations in their areas of interest. The staffs contain selected representatives of major forces and agencies assigned to, or operating in, the center's area of operations. Each ACC includes members from the:

(a) Area military command.

(b) Area police agency.

(c) Local and national intelligence organization.

(d) Public information and PSYOP agencies.

(e) Paramilitary forces.

(f) Other local and national government offices involved in the economic, social, and political aspects of IDAD.

(2) There are two types of subnational ACCs that a government may form — regional and urban. The choice depends upon the environment in which the ACC operates.

(a) Regional ACCs normally locate with the nation's first subnational political subdivision with a fully developed governmental apparatus (state, province, or other). These government subdivisions are usually well established, having exercised government functions in their areas before the insurgency's onset. They often are the lowest level of administration able to coordinate all counterinsurgency programs. A full range of developmental, informational, and military capabilities may exist at this level. Those that are not part of the normal government organization should be added when the ACC activates. This augmentation enables the ACC to coordinate its activities better by using the existing structure.

(b) Urban areas require more complex ACCs than rural areas in order to plan, coordinate, and direct counterinsurgency efforts. Urban ACCs organize like the ACCs previously described and perform the same functions. However, the urban ACC includes representatives from local public service agencies, such as the police, fire, medical, public works, public utilities, communications, and transportation. When necessary, the staff operates continuously to receive and act upon information requiring an immediate response.

(c) When a regional or local ACC resides in an urban area, unity of effort may dictate that urban resources locate in that center where planners can coordinate and direct urban operations. The decision to establish an urban center or to use some other center for these purposes rests with the head of the government of the urban area who bases the decision on available resources.

(d) If the urban area comprises several separate political subdivisions with no overall political control, the ACC establishes the control necessary for proper planning and coordination. Urban ACCs are appropriate for cities and heavily populated areas lacking a higher level coordination center.

d. **Civilian Advisory Committees.** Committees composed of influential citizens help coordination centers at all levels monitor the success of their activities and gain popular support.

These committees evaluate actions affecting civilians and communicate with the people. They provide feedback for future operational planning. Involving leading citizens in committees such as these increases their stake in, and commitment to, government programs and social mobilization objectives.

(1) The organization of a civilian committee varies according to local needs; changing situations require flexibility in structure. The chairman of the committee should be a prominent figure either appointed by the government or elected by the membership. General committee membership includes leaders in civilian organizations and other community groups who have influence with the target population. These leaders may include:

(a) Education officials (distinguished professors and teachers).

(b) Religious leaders.

(c) Health directors.

(d) Minority group representatives.

(e) Labor officials.

(f) Heads of local news media, distinguished writers, journalists, and editors.

(g) Business and commercial leaders.

(h) Former political leaders or retired government officials.

(2) The success of a civilian advisory committee hinges on including leading participants from all major political and cultural groupings, including minorities.

APPENDIX C
JOINT INTELLIGENCE PREPARATION OF THE BATTLESPACE TO SUPPORT FOREIGN INTERNAL DEFENSE

1. Introduction

a. Joint intelligence preparation of the battlespace (JIPB) is the analytical process used by joint intelligence organizations to produce intelligence assessments, estimates, and other intelligence products in support of the JFC's decision-making process.

b. JIPB is conducted both prior to and during a joint force's operations, as well as during planning for follow-on missions. The most current information available regarding adversary situation and the battlespace environment is continuously integrated in the JIPB process. JIPB is a four-step process that: defines the battlespace environment; describes the battlespace's effects; evaluates the adversary; and determines the adversary potential COAs.

c. The primary purpose of JIPB support to FID is to heighten the JFC's awareness of the battlespace and threats the joint force is likely to encounter. It is important that an analyst understand the intent of each step in the JIPB process in order to modify or adapt the JIPB process, as necessary, to FID. Accordingly, JIPB for FID is divided into five categories: operational area evaluation; geographic analysis; population analysis; climatology analysis; and threat evaluation.

For further information on JIPB, refer to JP 2-01.3, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace.

2. Operational Area Evaluation

a. The JIPB to support FID begins with a broad operational area evaluation (OAE), which covers the JFC's JOA. During this phase, data is collected to satisfy basic intelligence requirements in the following areas: political; military; economic; religious; social; endemic diseases and health status of the population; geographic; psychological; cultural; friendly forces; threat forces; and nonbelligerent third party forces. Data is collected with respect to the specific operational area and mission and considers all instruments of national power from a strategic perspective. Of particular interest during this stage is the evaluation of the PSYOP and CMO situations.

b. The PSYOP OAE is initially comprised of special PSYOP studies and special PSYOP assessments. These studies identify psychological vulnerabilities, characteristics, insights, and opportunities that exist in the JOA. Analysts doing PSYOP OAE also focus on, but do not limit themselves to, identifying:

(1) The ethnic, racial, social, economic, religious, and linguistic groups of the area and their locations and densities.

(2) Key leaders and communicators in the area, both formal (such as politicians and government officials) and informal (such as businessmen and clergy).

(3) Cohesive and divisive issues within a community; as examples: what makes it a community, what would split the community, and what are the attitudes toward the HN.

(4) Literacy rates and levels of education.

(5) Types of media consumed by the community and the level of credibility each is perceived to carry within the community and/or segments within society.

(6) Any concentrations of third country nationals in the JOA and their purposes and functions.

(7) Scientific and technical developments, production, and trade, including significant trade agreements, restrictions and sanctions, or lack thereof.

(8) The use of natural resources, industry, agriculture, and destruction or exploitation of the environment.

(9) Location, type, and quantity of toxic industrial material.

c. In the course of OAE, the PSYOP planners coordinate with the military PA office to prepare a matrix identifying groups, their leaders, preferred media, and key issues that should be developed. Target groups are identified. The locations of mass media facilities in the area that can be used for the dissemination of PSYOP products, and the identification of their operational characteristics, are also important in the selection of the proper outlet for these products. In particular, the PSYOP planner must evaluate:

(1) Studios and transmitters for radio and television and their operational characteristics (wattage, frequency, and programming).

(2) Heavy and light printing facilities, including locations, types, and capacities of equipment that can supplement the capabilities of PSYOP units.

(3) Accessibility of such facilities to PSYOP forces; as examples, who controls them and whether they will cooperate with the United States.

d. CMO OAE in FID comprises an evaluation of HN civic action programs, population and resources control, civilian labor, and materiel procurement. The CMO planner also evaluates future sites and programs for civic action undertaken in the JOA by the HN unilaterally or with US support through CMO. In making this evaluation, the planner often relies primarily on the local and regional assets of the HN and the supported command to get an accurate feel for the lawlessness, subversion, insurgency, or other related FID threats that may exist in the area.

3. Geographic Analysis

a. The next JIPB category to support FID is the geographic analysis, which considers a wide range of factors that include the political, military, economic, religious, social, psychological, and cultural significance of the area.

b. Normally, the six map overlays described below are a result of the geographic analysis.

(1) **Population Status Overlay.** The generic population status overlay graphically represents the sectors of the population that are pro-government, anti-government, pro-threat, anti-threat, and uncommitted or neutral. This overlay is important because the population can provide support and security to friendly or threat forces. This graphic may also display educational, religious, ethnic, or economic aspects of the population. A more refined product in an urban environment displays the home and work places of key friendly and threat military or civilian personnel and their relatives. In this instance, large-scale maps and/or imagery are used to accurately plot information by marking rooftops of buildings. Such a refined product should be cross-referenced to order of battle (ORBAT) files that are analogous to the represented data such as personality files and or faction and organization files.

(2) **Cover and Concealment Overlay.** The cover and concealment overlay graphically depicts the availability, density, type, and location of cover and concealment from the ground as well as from the air. In areas of significant threat of aerial attack or observation, overhead cover and concealment may be important considerations for threat selection of base camps, mission support sites, drug laboratories, or other adversary areas. Surface configuration primarily determines cover, including natural and manmade features such as mines, bunkers, tunnels, and fighting positions. Vegetation is the primary feature that provides concealment. The canopy closure overlay is critical for the determination of areas that offer concealment from aerial observation, particularly in tropical rain forests, and is incorporated into the cover and concealment overlay for rural and other forested areas. In built-up areas, manmade structures are also assessed for the cover and concealment they offer. When used with the population status overlay, the cover and concealment overlay can be used to determine dwelling and work places, safe houses, routes of movement, and meeting places.

(3) **Logistics Sustainability Overlay.** Logistics is essential to friendly and threat operations. The detection and location of supply lines and bases are critical to finding and defeating hostile activities. Attention is given to basic food, water, medicine, and materiel supply. In rural areas, the logistics sustainability overlay depicts potable water supplies, farms, orchards, growing seasons, and other relevant items. In built-up areas, this overlay depicts supermarkets, food warehouses, pharmacies, hospitals, clinics, and residences of doctors and other key medical personnel. Key to preparing this overlay is knowledge of threat and friendly forces, their logistic requirements, and the availability and location of materiel and personnel to meet these requirements.

(4) **Target Overlay.** The target overlay graphically portrays the location of possible threat targets within the area. In FID environments, this overlay depicts banks, bridges, electric

power installations, bulk petroleum and chemical facilities, military and government facilities, the residences and work places of key friendly personnel, and other specific points most susceptible to attack based on threat capabilities and intentions. Hazard estimates are prepared for those targets with collateral damage potential. For example, the threat to a large airbase may focus on airframes, crew billets, and petroleum, oils, and lubricants storage as opposed to runways, aprons, or the control tower. The target overlay is significant to the friendly commander's defensive planning because it shows where defenses need to be concentrated and, conversely, where defenses can be diffused. It also provides counterintelligence personnel with a focus for indicators of threat preparation to attack; for example, to discover an indigenous worker pacing off the distances between perimeter fences and critical nodes. The target overlay is useful in disaster relief operations by identifying likely locations for rioting, pilfering, looting, or areas of potential collateral damage.

(5) **LOC Overlay.** The LOC overlay highlights transportation systems and nodes within the area such as railways, roads, trails, navigable waterways, airfields, drop zones (DZs), and landing zones (LZs). In urban environments, mass public transit routes and schedules, as well as underground sewage, drainage and utility tunnels, ditches and culverts, and large open areas that could be used for DZs and LZs are also shown. Where applicable, this overlay will also show seasonal variations. Care is taken to compare recent imagery and geospatial information to ensure that new LOCs are added to the final product. In many situations, LOC products will be readily available from the HN or other local sources.

(6) **Incident Overlay.** The incident overlay plots security related incidents by type and location. Clusters of similar incidents represent a geographic pattern of activity. These incidents can then be further analyzed for time patterns, proximity to population grouping, LOCs, targets, and areas of cover and concealment. This analysis assists in the day-to-day application of security resources.

c. PSYOP and CMO considerations also impact the geographic analysis as described below.

(1) PSYOP considerations in a geographic analysis focus on how geography affects the population of the area and the dissemination of PSYOP products. This step may include, for example, preparation of a radio line of sight (LOS) overlay for radio and television stations derived from an obstacle overlay depicting elevations and LOS information. PSYOP terrain analysis will, for example, focus on determining the respective ranges and audibility of signals from the most significant broadcast stations identified during OAE.

(2) CMO considerations in geographic analysis include the identification of critical government, insurgent, and terrorist threats and other threats to food and water storage facilities, toxic industrial material sites, resupply routes, and base locations. In addition, a primary consideration in FID is how terrain affects the ability of US and HN forces to conduct CMO. For example, extremely rugged or thickly vegetated areas may be unsuited to some CMO projects because of inaccessibility to the necessary manpower and equipment needed to run such projects.

4. Population Analysis

a. In FID, the local population is the key element to successful operations. Consequently, planners must conduct a population analysis of the FID JOA. During this analysis, the planner identifies, evaluates, and makes overlays and other products as appropriate for the following factors: social organization; economic organization and dynamics; political organization and dynamics; history of the society; nature of the insurgency (if applicable); nature of the government; effects on non-belligerents; and COAs of the insurgents, the HN government, and non-belligerents.

b. In evaluating social organization, planners look at:

(1) Density and distribution of population by groups, balance between urban and rural groups, sparsely populated areas, and concentrations of primary racial, linguistic, religious, or cultural groups.

(2) Race, religion, national origin, tribe, economic class, political party and affiliation, ideology, education level, union memberships, management class, occupation, and age of the populace.

(3) Overlaps among classes and splits within them; such as the number and types of religious and racial groups to which union members belong and ideological divisions within a profession.

(4) Composite groups based on their political behavior and the component and composite strengths of each; that is, those who actively or passively support the government or the threat, and those who are neutral.

(5) Active or potential issues motivating the political, economic, social, or military behavior of each group and subgroup.

(6) Population growth or decline, age distribution, and changes in location by groups.

(7) Finally, planners perform a factor analysis to determine which activities and programs accommodate the goals of most of the politically and socially active groups. Then they determine which groups and composite groups support, are inclined to support, or remain neutral toward the government.

c. In evaluating economic organization and performance, planners specifically look at:

(1) The principal economic ideology of the society and local innovations or adaptations in the operational area.

(2) The economic infrastructure such as resource locations, scientific and technical capabilities, electric power production and distribution, transport facilities, and communications networks.

(3) Economic performance such as gross national product, gross domestic product, foreign trade balance, per capita income, inflation rate, and annual growth rate.

(4) Major industries and their sustainability including the depth and soundness of the economic base, maximum peak production levels and duration, and storage capacity.

(5) Performance of productive segments such as public and private ownership patterns, concentration and dispersal, and distribution of wealth in agriculture, manufacturing, forestry, information, professional services, mining, and transportation.

(6) Public health factors that include, but are not limited to, birth and death rates, diet and nutrition, water supply, sanitation, health care availability, endemic diseases, health of farm animals, and availability of veterinary services.

(7) Foreign trade patterns such as domestic and foreign indebtedness (public and private), and resource dependencies.

(8) Availability of education including access by individuals and groups, sufficiency for individual needs; groupings by scientific technical, professional, liberal arts, and crafts training; and surpluses and shortages of skills.

(9) Unemployment, underemployment, and exclusion of groups, as well as horizontal and vertical career mobility.

(10) Taxing authorities, rates, and rate determination.

(11) Economic benefit and distribution, occurrence of poverty, and concentration of wealth.

(12) Population shifts and their causes and effects; as examples, rural to urban, agriculture to manufacturing, and manufacturing to service.

(13) Finally, planners identify economic program values and resources that might generate favorable support, stabilize neutral groups, or neutralize threat groups.

d. In evaluating political organization and dynamics, planners specifically look at:

(1) The formal political structure of the government and the sources of its power; that is, pluralist democracy based on the consensus of the voters or strong-man rule supported by the military.

(2) The informal political structure of the government and its comparison with the formal structure; that is, is the government nominally a democracy but in reality a political dictatorship.

(3) Legal and illegal political parties and their programs, strengths, and prospects for success. Also, the prospects for partnerships and coalitions between the parties.

(4) Nonparty political organizations, motivating issues, strengths, and parties or programs they support such as political action groups.

(5) Nonpolitical interest groups and the correlation of their interests with political parties or nonparty organizations such as churches, cultural and professional organizations, and unions.

(6) The mechanism for government succession, the integrity of the process, roles of the populace and those in power, regularity of elections, systematic exclusion of identifiable groups, voting blocs, and patron-client determinants of voting.

(7) Independence or subordination and effectiveness of the judiciary. That is, does the judiciary have the power of legislative and executive review? Does the judiciary support constitutionally guaranteed rights and international concepts of human rights?

(8) Independence or control of the press and other mass media and the alternatives for the dissemination of information and opinion.

(9) Centralization or diffusion of essential decision making and patterns of inclusion, or inclusion of specific individuals or groups in the process.

(10) Administrative competence of the bureaucracy. Are bureaucrats egalitarian in practice or in words only? Can individuals and groups make their voices heard within the bureaucracy?

(11) Finally, planners correlate data concerning political, economic, and social groups and then identify political programs to neutralize opposing groups as well as provide programs favorable to friendly groups.

e. In evaluating the history of the society, planners specifically look at:

(1) The origin of the incumbent government and its leadership. Was it elected? Does it have a long history? Have there been multiple peaceful successions of government?

(2) The history of political violence. Is violence a common means for the resolution of political problems? Is there precedent for revolution, coup d'etat, assassination, or terrorism? Does the country have a history of consensus-building? Does the present insurgency have causes and aspirations in common with historic political violence?

(3) Finally, the analysts determine the legitimacy of the government, acceptance of violent and nonviolent remedies to political problems by the populace, the type and level of

violence to be used by friendly and threat forces, and the groups or subgroups that will support or oppose the use of violence.

f. In evaluating the nature of the insurgency, planners specifically look at:

(1) Desired end state of the insurgency, clarity of its formulation, openness of its articulation, commonality of point of view among the elements of the insurgency, and differences between this end view and the end view of the government.

(2) Groups and subgroups supporting the general objectives of the insurgency.

(3) Divisions, minority views, and dissension within the insurgency.

(4) Groups that may have been deceived by the threat concerning the desired end state of the insurgency.

(5) Organizational and operational patterns used by the insurgency, variations and combinations of such, and shifts and trends.

(6) Finally, analysts determine the stage and phase of the insurgency as well as how far and how long it has progressed and/or regressed over time. They identify unity and disagreement with front groups, leadership, tactics, primary targets, doctrine, training, morale, discipline, operational capabilities, and materiel resources. They evaluate external support, to include political, financial, and logistic assistance. This should include not only the sources of support, but also specific means by which support is provided and critical points through which the HN could slow, reduce, negate, or stop this support. The planners determine whether rigid commitment to a method or ideological tenet or other factor constitutes an exploitable vulnerability and/or a weakness on which the government can build strength.

g. When examining hostile groups, planners examine from hostile perspectives:

(1) The leadership and staff structure and its psychological characteristics, skills, and C2 resources.

(2) Patterns of lawless activities (as examples, illicit drug trafficking, extortion, piracy, and smuggling) or insurgent operations, base areas, LOCs, and supporters outside of the country concerned.

(3) The intelligence, OPSEC, deception, and PSYOP capabilities of the hostile groups.

(4) The appeal of the hostile groups to those who support them.

h. In evaluating the nature of the government response, planners specifically examine:

(1) General planning, or lack of planning, for countering the insurgency, lawlessness, or subversion being encountered as well as planning comprehensiveness and correctness of definitions and conclusions.

(2) Organization and methods for strategic and operational planning and execution of plans such as resource requirements, constraints, and realistic priorities.

(3) Use of population and resources and the effects on each group.

(4) Organization, equipment, and tactical doctrine for security forces; for example, how the government protects its economic and political infrastructure.

(5) Areas where the government has maintained the initiative.

(6) Population and resource control measures.

(7) Economic development programs.

(8) Finally, planners correlate government and insurgent strengths and weaknesses and identify necessary changes in friendly programs, plans, organization, and doctrine.

i. In evaluating the effects on nonbelligerents, planners specifically examine:

(1) Mechanisms for monitoring nonbelligerent attitudes and responses.

(2) Common objectives of groups neither supporting nor opposing the insurgency.

(3) Effects on the populace of government military, political, economic, and social operations and programs. That is, does the government often kill civilians in its counterthreat operations? Are benefits of government aid programs evenly distributed?

(4) To whom is the populace inclined to provide intelligence?

(5) Finally, planners determine the strengths and weaknesses of the nonbelligerents, the depth of their commitment to remain neutral, and the requirements to make them remain neutral and/or to support friendly or threat programs or forces.

j. In evaluating COAs for threat forces, the government, and nonbelligerents, analysts balance the foregoing factors and determine likely COAs, as well as the probable outcomes for each element.

5. Climatology Analysis

Relevant weather factors extend beyond short-term weather analysis to consideration of the broader and longer term climatological factors. The area's climate, weather, and light

conditions are analyzed to determine their effects on friendly, threat, and nonbelligerent third-party operations. Planners consider climate types by area and season and their effects on military, political, social, and economic activities. Historic weather data and weather effects overlays are developed during this step. The effects of weather and climate are integrated with terrain analysis. Special considerations are made for the effects of weather and climate on CMO projects, PSYOP media and dissemination, amounts of accessible food, storage of explosives, and population patterns such as seasonal employment. Examples of potential effects are periods of drought that force farmers to become bandits or insurgents, and flooding that causes isolation and interference with the distribution of food and medicine.

6. Threat Evaluation

a. In conducting the threat evaluation in FID, particular attention is paid to the HN government's military and paramilitary police forces and the insurgent forces and infrastructure (guerrilla, auxiliary, and underground). Correlation of force evaluation in such environments includes a detailed analysis of the following factors for friendly, threat, and nonbelligerent forces: composition, strength (include number of active members, amount of popular support, funding method, and origin), training, equipment, electronics technical data, disposition (location), tactics and methods, operational effectiveness, weaknesses and vulnerabilities, personalities, and miscellaneous data.

b. The FID planners determine how the friendly, threat, and nonbelligerent forces can use geography, offensive actions, security, surprise, and cross-country mobility to develop locally superior application of one or more of the instruments of power. FID planners identify the strengths and weaknesses of friendly, threat, and nonbelligerent forces, and determine the political, social, economic, and psychological effects of each side's COAs, tactics, and countertactics. Finally, the planners develop COAs that will optimize the application of the elements of power by the friendly side.

c. The PSYOP threat evaluation serves two purposes. First, it provides the commander with an understanding of the existing and potential opposing propaganda in the area. It is a safe assumption that if US forces are conducting PSYOP in an area, some other organization is also conducting PSYOP in the area. US PSYOP forces in the area must anticipate and be able to counter, if not prevent, threat propaganda directed at United States and allied forces and the local populace. Second, the PSYOP threat evaluation provides the supported commander with the PSYOP consequences of US operations, and also provides alternative measures within each COA. To conduct an effective threat evaluation, the planner must determine the capabilities of threat organizations to conduct propaganda operations and to counteract US and allied PSYOP. (The demographics of any military or paramilitary threat should be evaluated at this step if they were not considered during OAE.) Specific capabilities to be evaluated include threat abilities to:

(1) Conduct offensive propaganda operations targeting US or allied forces or the local populace.

(2) Indoctrinate its personnel against US PSYOP efforts (defensive counterpropaganda).

(3) Counteract US PSYOP efforts by exploiting weaknesses in US PSYOP operations (offensive counterpropaganda).

(4) Conduct active measures.

(5) Conduct electronic attack against US or allied PSYOP broadcasts.

(6) Conduct electronic protection to safeguard organic PSYOP capability.

d. The CMO threat evaluation focuses on determining the adversaries in the HN population. This determination is especially critical when the opponent is not a standing military force or when the opposing force is not equipped with standard uniforms and weapons such as guerrillas or terrorists. These forces often blend into, or intermingle with, the civilian community. CMO threat evaluation identifies the threat, ORBAT, and modus operandi. Social, religious, and other types of fora through which threat forces employ the elements of power, as well as methods of countering such applications, are also identified.

Intentionally Blank

APPENDIX D
ILLUSTRATIVE INTERAGENCY POLITICAL-MILITARY PLAN FOR FOREIGN INTERNAL DEFENSE

1. Introduction

An interagency political-military plan for FID operations would include the following components:

a. **Policy Planning Guidance.** This section summarizes guidance provided by the President or other national security decisions pertaining to this situation.

b. **US Interests at Stake.** This section states the US interests at stake that warrant US FID assistance. Examples include significant economic interests and promoting the spread of democracy.

c. **US Strategic Purpose.** This section describes the overall purpose of conducting FID operations in the HN. Examples include stabilizing a country for the sake of regional stability and stabilizing a country so that it does not become a haven for terrorists.

d. **Mission Statement.** This section states the who, what, where, when and why of a USG FID operation.

e. **Desired End State.** This section describes the desired outcome of all FID assistance. An example might be a situation where a HN is stabilized to the point that an insurgency is reduced from a national security threat to a minor law enforcement problem.

f. **Operational Concept.** This section describes in broad terms how the USG will employ the instruments of national power in the FID operation.

g. **Phases.** This section describes phases of USG assistance to a HN. Examples might be support to a HN's transition to a new strategy, support to a HN's operations to regain the initiative, support to HN offensive operations, support to HN consolidation of counterinsurgency gains, and rehabilitation. Each phase includes triggers or transition points for movement to the next phase. An alternative type of phasing could be geographical, for instance, pacifying the eastern three regions of a country, then the center, then the west.

h. **Lines of Action and Political-Military Objectives.** This section describes the broad categories of FID activities that the USG will conduct and the objectives within each. An example of a line of action is support to HN security forces to enhance their capacity to deal with insurgency. Political-military objectives within that line of action could include training and equipping a counterguerrilla brigade, supplying 100 helicopters to a HN army, conducting intelligence sharing, and training the HN police to defend their stations against guerrilla attacks.

i. **Agency Responsibilities.** This section outlines the primary responsibilities of each USG agency involved in this FID operation.

j. **Implementation Matrix.** This section displays the political-military objectives for each phase in matrix form.

k. **Lines of Action Annexes.** Annexes contain key tasks, measures of success, costs, and issues for each line of action.

2. Purpose

Interagency political-military plans for FID accomplish the following.

a. Employ all instruments of US national power (diplomatic, military, economic, informational) in support of a HN IDAD effort.

b. Identify and sequence taskings for each USG agency over time.

c. Provide a mechanism for USG programs to be mutually supporting.

d. Include clear MOEs working toward clearly defined goals.

e. Integrate USG activities with those of HN and other interested parties.

f. Justify future budget requirements.

g. Provide a checklist for policy implementation.

h. Inform and guide agency strategies and plans.

APPENDIX E
CIVIL AFFAIRS ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION

1. General

The purpose of a CA estimate is to provide information on civil aspects of the situation that are important to the mission. This estimate may be used in a range of circumstances from indirect FID support to combat operations, and as such, the content must be tailored to the operating environment and mission. This appendix is a guide to elements that should be included; the level of detail and length of the CA estimate will be dictated by the degree of anticipated CMO and the supporting CA activities. The estimate is usually prepared by the combatant command's CA staff element in close collaboration with the other staff sections and subordinate commanders. A detailed written estimate may be made if time allows, or the format may be used as a mental checklist to ensure that all elements of the civil situation are considered. A major mission for CA in the FID environment will be to support and facilitate other CMO; therefore, any analysis of CA must include an analysis of the CMO missions. In many paragraphs of the CA estimate, both CA and CMO missions are examined together.

For further guidance on joint CA supporting FID, refer to JP 3-57.1, Joint Doctrine for Civil Affairs.

2. Format

The format for a CA estimate follows:

_____
(CLASSIFICATION)

Originating Section, Issuing HQ*
Place of Issue
Day, Month, Year, Hour, Zone

CIVIL AFFAIRS ESTIMATE NO _____ **

( ) REFERENCES:

a. ( ) Maps and charts.

b. ( ) Other relevant documents.

* When the CA estimate is distributed outside the issuing headquarters, the first line of the heading is the official designation of the issuing command and the final page of the estimate is modified to include authentication by the originating section, division, or other official, according to local policy.

** Number CA estimates sequentially within each calendar year.

1. ( ) MISSION

a. ( ) The overall mission of the commander as taken from the commander's mission analysis, planning guidance, or other statement.

b. ( ) The CA mission to support the commander's mission.

2. ( ) SITUATION AND CONSIDERATIONS

a. ( ) Intelligence Situation. Include information obtained from the intelligence officer. When the details make it appropriate and the estimate is written, a brief summary and reference to the intelligence document or an annex of the estimate may be used.

(1) ( ) Characteristics of the Operational Area. Physical features, climate, and basic political, economic, and psychological factors.

(a) ( ) Attitudes of the population. Whether cooperative or uncooperative.

(b) ( ) Availability of basic necessities. Food, clothing, water, shelter, and medical care. Include civilian capabilities of self-support.

(c) ( ) Availability of local materiel and personnel to support military operations.

(d) ( ) Number of dislocated civilians in the area to include concentrations and movement trends.

(e) ( ) Amount and type of damage suffered by the economy from the lawlessness, subversion, or insurgency being experienced; particularly in the transportation, public utility, and communications fields.

(f) ( ) Status and character of civil government.

(g) ( ) State of health of the civilian populace.

(h) ( ) Endemic and epidemic diseases and prevalence.

(2) ( ) Adversary strengths, weaknesses, and dispositions.

(3) ( ) Adversary Capabilities. Among others, consider sabotage, espionage, subversion, terrorism, illicit drug traffickers, potential for use of nuclear, biological, and chemical weaponry, and movement of dislocated civilians.

(a) ( ) Affecting the mission.

(b) ( ) Affecting CA and CMO.

b. ( ) Tactical Situation. Include information obtained from the commander's planning guidance and from the operations officer. The detail in this paragraph depends on the type and degree of internal threat the HN is facing.

(1) ( ) Present dispositions of major tactical elements.

(2) ( ) Possible COAs to accomplish the mission. These COAs are carried forward throughout the remainder of the estimate.

(3) ( ) Projected operations and other planning factors required for coordination and integration of staff estimates.

c. ( ) Personnel Situation. Include information obtained from the personnel officer.

(1) ( ) Present dispositions of personnel and administration units and installations that have an effect on CA and CMO.

(2) ( ) Projected developments within the personnel field likely to influence CA and CMO.

d. ( ) Logistic Situation. Include information obtained from the logistics officer.

(1) ( ) Present disposition of logistics units and installations that have an effect on CA or CMO.

(2) ( ) Projected developments within the logistics field likely to influence CA or CMO.

e. ( ) CMO Situation. In this subparagraph, status is shown under appropriate subheadings. In the case of detailed information at higher levels of command, a summary may appear under the subheading with a reference to an annex to the estimate.

(1) ( ) Disposition and status of CA and CMO elements and related significant military and nonmilitary elements.

(2) ( ) Current problems faced by the command. Estimate the impact of future plans of the supported unit operations pertinent to the CA mission.

(3) ( ) Projected impact of civilian interference with military operations.

(4) ( ) Government Functions.

(a) ( ) Public administration.

(b) ( ) Public education.

(c) ( ) Public safety.

(d) ( ) International and domestic law.

(e) ( ) Public health.

(5) ( ) Economic and Commercial Functions.

(a) ( ) Food and agriculture.

(b) ( ) Economic development.

(c) ( ) Civilian supply.

(6) ( ) Public Facilities Functions.

(a) ( ) Public transportation.

(b) ( ) Public works and utilities.

(c) ( ) Public communications.

(7) ( ) Special Functions.

(a) ( ) Displaced persons, refugees, and evacuees.

(b) ( ) Arts, monuments, and archives.

(c) ( ) Cultural affairs.

(d) ( ) Civil information.

f. ( ) Assumptions. Until specific planning guidance is available, assumptions may be required for initial planning or preparation of the estimate. These assumptions are modified as data become available.

3. ( ) ANALYSIS OF COURSES OF ACTION. Under each subheading (subparagraph 2e) for each COA, analyze all CA and CMO factors, indicating problems and deficiencies.

4. ( ) COMPARISON OF COURSES OF ACTION

a. ( ) Evaluate CA critical tasks and list the advantages and disadvantages of each proposed COA.

b. ( ) Discuss, from the CA standpoint, the advantages and disadvantages of each tactical COA under consideration. Those that are common to all COAs or are considered minor should be eliminated from the list. Include methods of overcoming deficiencies or modifications required in each COA. Priority will be given to the CA activities that most directly relate to the mission.

5. ( ) CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

a. ( ) Indicate whether the mission set forth in paragraph 1 can be supported from the CA standpoint.

b. ( ) Indicate which COAs can best be supported from the CA standpoint.

c. ( ) List primary reasons why other COAs are not favored.

d. ( ) List the major CA problems that must be brought to the commander's attention. Include specific recommendations concerning the methods of eliminating or reducing the effect of these deficiencies.

(Signed) _____
J-5/CA Staff Officer

( ) ANNEXES. (List by letter and title.) Annexes should be used when the information is in graph format or is of such detail and volume that inclusion in the body of the estimate would make it cumbersome. The annexes are lettered sequentially as they occur throughout the estimate.

( ) DISTRIBUTION. (According to procedures and policies of the issuing headquarters.)

_____
(CLASSIFICATION)

Intentionally Blank

APPENDIX F
PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION

1. General

The purpose of a PSYOP estimate is to provide information on PSYOP aspects of military operations to aid the commander in accomplishing the mission. This estimate is important to any plan but is particularly critical to successfully integrating FID. The estimate is usually prepared by the PSYOP staff element in close coordination with the other coordinating staff sections and subordinate commanders, to include the supporting PSYOP unit commander. Once completed, the PSYOP estimate becomes an annex to the operations officer's estimate of the situation. The estimate should be as thorough and detailed as time will permit. A detailed written estimate may be made if time allows, or the format may serve as a mental checklist to ensure that all elements of the PSYOP situation are considered. The detail varies with the level and type of command.

2. Format

The format for a PSYOP estimate follows:

(CLASSIFICATION)

Headquarters
Place
Date, time, and zone

PSYOP ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION NO._____

(U) REFERENCES:

a. ( ) List maps and charts.

b. ( ) Include other relevant documents (such as special PSYOP studies, special PSYOP assessments, and intelligence estimates).

(1) ( ) When the PSYOP estimate is distributed outside the issuing headquarters, the first line of the heading is the official designation of the issuing command, and the final page of the estimate is modified to include authentication by the originating section, division, or other official, according to local policy.

(2) ( ) Normally, PSYOP estimates are numbered sequentially within a calendar year. The estimate is usually distributed as an appendix to the operations annex.

1. ( ) MISSION

a. ( ) Supported unit's restated mission resulting from mission analysis.

b. ( ) PSYOP mission statement. Describe the PSYOP mission to support the maneuver commander's mission.

2. ( ) SITUATION AND CONSIDERATION

a. ( ) Characteristics of the Area of Operations.

(1) ( ) Weather. How will weather affect the dissemination of PSYOP products, access to target audiences (winds – leaflet drops, precipitation – print products, etc.)? End product – PSYOP weather overlay.

(2) ( ) Terrain. How will terrain affect dissemination of PSYOP products, movement of tactical PSYOP elements? End product – PSYOP terrain overlay.

(3) ( ) Analysis of media infrastructure (location and broadcast range of radio/television broadcast facilities, retransmission towers; print facilities, distribution/dissemination nodes); identify denied areas (not accessible by particular medium). End product – PSYOP media infrastructure overlay.

b. ( ) Key Target Sets. Note: These sets will be further refined into a potential target audience list. The target audiences will then be analyzed and further refined during the target audience analysis process. This is not the only target set that PSYOP will have to deal with. In order to fully support the supported unit commander, PSYOP must consider all key target sets, not solely adversary forces. PSYOP key target sets overlays (hostile, friendly, neutral).

(1) ( ) Hostile Target Sets. For each hostile target set, identify strength, disposition, composition, capabilities (ability to conduct propaganda, ability to help/hinder the PSYOP effort), and probable COAs as they relate to PSYOP.

(2) ( ) Friendly Target Sets. For each friendly target set, identify strength, disposition, composition, capabilities (ability to conduct propaganda, ability to help/hinder the PSYOP effort), and probable COAs as they relate to PSYOP.

(3) ( ) Neutral Target Sets. Include target sets whose attitudes are unknown. For each neutral target set, identify strength, disposition, composition, capabilities (ability to conduct propaganda, ability to help/hinder the PSYOP effort), and probable COAs as they relate to PSYOP.

c. ( ) Friendly Forces

(1) ( ) Supported Unit COAs. State the COAs under consideration and the PSYOP specific requirements needed to support each COA.

(2) ( ) Current Status of Organic Personnel and Resources. State availability of organic personnel and resources needed to support each COA under consideration. Consider PSYOP specific personnel, other personnel specialties, availability of PSYOP specific equipment.

(3) ( ) Current Status of Non-organic Personnel and Resources. State availability of non-organic resources needed to support each COA. Consider linguistic support, COMMANDO SOLO, leaflet dropping aircraft, reserve PSYOP forces.

(4) ( ) Comparison of Requirements Versus Capabilities and Recommended Solutions. Compare PSYOP requirements for each COA with current PSYOP capabilities. List recommended solutions for any shortfall in capabilities.

(5) ( ) Key Considerations (evaluation criteria) for COA Supportability. List evaluation criteria to be used in COA analysis and COA comparison.

d. ( ) Assumptions. State assumptions about the PSYOP situation made for this estimate. For instance, "Assumption: adversary propaganda broadcast facilities will be destroyed by friendly forces not later than the day on which operations commence or are scheduled to commence plus two days."

3. ( ) ANALYSIS OF COAs

a. ( ) Analyze each COA from the PSYOP point of view to determine its advantages and disadvantages for conducting PSYOP. The level of command, scope of contemplated operations, and urgency of need determine the detail in which the analysis is made.

b. ( ) The evaluation criteria listed in paragraph 2 (c, 5) above establish the elements to be analyzed for each COA under consideration. Examine these factors realistically and include appropriate considerations that may have an impact on the PSYOP situation as it affects the COAs. Throughout the analysis, the staff officer must keep PSYOP considerations foremost in mind. The analysis is not intended to produce a decision, but to ensure that all applicable PSYOP factors have been considered and are the basis of paragraphs 4 and 5.

4. ( ) COMPARISON OF COAs

a. ( ) Compare the proposed COAs to determine the one that offers the best chance of success from the PSYOP point of view. List the advantages and disadvantages of each COA affecting PSYOP. Comparison should be visually supported by a decision matrix.

b. ( ) Develop and compare methods of overcoming disadvantages, if any, in each COA.

c. ( ) State a general conclusion on the COA that offers the best chance of success from a PSYOP perspective.

5. ( ) RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS

a. ( ) Recommended COA based on comparison (most supportable from the PSYOP perspective). Rank COAs from best to worst.

b. ( ) Issues, deficiencies, and risks, for each COA, with recommendations to reduce their impact.

(signed)_____
G-3/PSYOP Staff Officer

ANNEXES:

DISTRIBUTION:

APPENDIX G
HEALTH SERVICE SUPPORT

1. General

a. The use of HSS resources has historically proven to be a valuable low-risk asset to support FID programs. HSS is generally a non-controversial and cost-effective means of using the military element to support US national interests in another country. The focus of HSS initiatives are not curative, but rather long-term developmental programs that are sustainable by the HN. HSS activities are targeted toward the health problems facing the HN military and, in conjunction with other US agencies, civilian health initiatives through CA and FHA. This appendix is intended as an overview of HSS support to FID.

For further information on HSS, refer to JP 4-02, Doctrine for Health Service Support in Joint Operations.

b. In this environment, there are several appropriate HSS activities:

(1) Public health activities, to include preventive medicine and veterinary care, food hygiene, immunizations of humans and animals, child care, preventive dental hygiene, and paramedic procedures.

(2) Diagnostic and treatment training.

(3) Development of HSS logistic programs.

(4) Development of continuing HSS education programs.

(5) Development of HSS intelligence and threat analysis.

(6) Development of a HN military field HSS support system for treatment and evacuation.

(7) Assistance in the upgrade, staffing, and supplying of existing HSS facilities.

c. HSS activities enhance HN stability by:

(1) Developing HSS systems that are appropriate and affordable by the HN.

(2) Developing sustainable training and acquisition programs.

(3) Increasing the effectiveness of other USG agency programs such as USAID.

(4) Initiating and coordinating medical education opportunities for HN personnel through IMET.

(5) Improving the economic well-being through veterinary medicine and animal husbandry.

2. Health Service Support in Indirect Support

HSS indirect support to FID programs is generally accomplished by medical training teams and advisers. The focus is on identification of medical threats that affect the efficiency and effectiveness of the HN military forces and designing programs to train and equip those forces.

3. Health Service Support in Direct Support (Not Involving Combat Operations)

a. HSS direct support to FID programs includes training and direct medical, dental, and veterinary care for the military and, when authorized, for the civilian population. Direct HSS is provided when the HN lacks the capability to provide specific types of care. Concurrent with direct HSS support, mid- and long-term plans are developed to improve HN training and HSS systems. Direct HSS is also provided during disasters and to supplement HN programs.

b. **FHA.** FHA programs allow US military medical personnel to provide care during disasters or to support nonmilitary objectives. Activities include immunizations, refugee care, dental and veterinary screening programs, and rehabilitation support (prosthetic and orthopedic device manufacture).

c. **Humanitarian and Civic Action.** HCA delivers HSS support to the civilian population in conjunction with HN HSS personnel. Many countries' IDAD programs lack the resources to reach their entire population. HCA combines HN military, civilian, and international health agencies, and US military efforts to provide care and to enhance legitimacy and visibility of the HN government. Coordination is critical and the use of preplanning and pre-site surveys are imperative to effective use of all assets. HCA programs are generally wide in scope and are often long term.

4. Health Service Support in Combat Operations

HSS in combat operations in support of a FID program will be generally limited to support provided to US military forces, as in any joint operation.

5. Planning for Health Service Support

a. **General.** HSS support to FID programs must be an integral part of all US military planning as discussed in Chapter III, "Planning for Foreign Internal Defense."

b. **Planning Process**. HSS planning is driven by the situation and must consider the following requirements:

(1) Patient movement.

(2) Hospitalization.

(3) HSS logistics.

(4) Laboratory services.

(5) Blood management.

(6) Dental services.

(7) Veterinary services.

(8) Preventive medicine services.

(9) C4.

(10) HSS base development factors such as facilities, transportation, and maintenance.

c. **Pre-site Survey.** A pre-site survey is a critical component of the planning process. This activity is accomplished 60 to 90 days in advance of the beginning of HSS support to the FID program. The pre-site survey team affects coordination with the HN, USG, and international agencies and gathers information to complete a detailed HSS threat assessment. This assessment is the base document for HSS planning and subsequent employment to support the FID program.

d. **Legal Restrictions.** As in other military activities to support FID, HSS initiatives and programs are governed by numerous laws. Refer to Appendix A, "Commander's Legal Considerations," for guidance concerning legal considerations.

e. **Resources.** Budgeting for HSS is closely monitored and regulated. Funding from a variety of sources may be required and preplanned.

6. Health Service Support Employment

a. **General.** Employment of HSS in support of FID programs is most effective when HSS personnel are used to train or to assist the HN improve its HSS capabilities to provide care to its population. Even when providing direct care to the HN, HSS should continue to emphasize this aspect.

b. **RC and DOD Civilian Personnel.** Much of the US military HSS assets are resident in the RC. HSS activities in support of FID offer RC personnel and units opportunities to train and increase readiness. DOD civilian personnel with specific skills can assist in filling other voids as required.

Intentionally Blank

APPENDIX H
REFERENCES

The development of JP 3-07.1 is based upon the following primary references.

1. Public Laws

a. Omnibus Diplomatic Security and Antiterrorism Act of 1986 (PL-99-399).

b. Nunn-Cohen Amendment to the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1987 (PL-99-661).

c. Antidrug Abuse Act of 1988 (PL-100-690).

d. Foreign Assistance Act of 1981, as amended (PL 87-195).

e. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1990, Title XI.

f. Drug Interdiction and Law Enforcement Support (PL-101-456).

g. Arms Export Control Act of 1976, as amended (PL 90-629).

h. National Defense Authorization Act for FY 1990 and FY 1991 (PL 101-89).

i. National Defense Authorization Act for FY 1991 (PL 101-510).

j. International Narcotics Control Act of 1990 (PL 101-623).

2. Presidential Documents

a. NSPD 1, Organization of the National Security Council System.

b. NSPD 8, United States Policy on Combatting Terrorism.

c. NSPD 17, National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction.

d. National Security Decision Directive 277.

e. National Security Review 27.

f. National Security Directive 18.

3. DOD

a. DOD Directive 2000.12, *DOD Antiterrorism Protection.*

b. DOD Directive 5100.46, *Foreign Disaster Relief.*

c. DOD Directive 5132.3, *DOD Policy and Responsibilities Relating to Security Assistance*.

d. DOD Directive 5240.2, *DOD Counterintelligence.*

e. DOD Manual 5105.38M, *Security Assistance Management Manual*.

4. Joint

a. JP 0-2, *Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF).*

b. JP 1, *Joint Warfare of the Armed Force of the United States.*

c. JP 1-01, *Joint Doctrine Development System*. (Until replaced by CJCSI 5120.02, *Joint Doctrine Development System*).

d. JP 1-02, *DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*.

e. JP 2-0, *Doctrine for Intelligence Support to Joint Operations*.

f. JP 2-01.2, *Counterintelligence Support to Military Operations.*

g. JP 3-0, *Doctrine for Joint Operations*.

h. JP 3-05, *Doctrine for Joint Special Operations.*

i. JP 3-05.1, *Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Joint Special Operations Task Forces*.

j. JP 3-05.2, *Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Special Operations Targeting and Mission Planning*.

k. JP 3-07, *Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War*.

l. JP 3-07.4, *Joint Counterdrug Operations.*

m. JP 3-08, *Interagency Coordination During Joint Operations, Volume I.*

n. JP 3-13, *Joint Doctrine for Information Operations.*

o. JP 3-34, *Engineer Doctrine for Joint Operations.*

p. JP 3-53, *Doctrine for Joint Psychological Operations*.

q. JP 3-54, *Joint Doctrine for Operations Security*.

r. JP 3-57, Joint *Doctrine for Civil-Military Operations*.

s. JP 3-57.1, *Joint Doctrine for Civil Affairs*.

t. JP 4-0, *Doctrine for Logistic Support of Joint Operations*.

u. JP 4-02, *Doctrine for Health Service Support in Joint Operations*.

v. JP 5-0, *Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations*.

w. JP 5-00.2, *Joint Task Force Planning Guidance and Procedures*.

x. JP 6-0, *Doctrine for C4 Systems Support to Joint Operations.*

y. CJCSI 3110.12, Annex L (Civil Affairs) the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan.

z. CJCSI 3214.01A, Military Support to Foreign Consequence Management Operations.

aa. CJCSI 5810.01B, Implementation of the DOD Law of War Program.

bb. CJCSM 3122.03A, Joint Operation Planning and Execution System, Vol II (Planning Formats and Guidance.

cc. CJCS Handbook 5260, Commander's Handbook for Antiterrorism Readiness.

5. Multi-Service

a. Field Manual (FM) 100-20/AFP 3-20, *Military Operations in Low Intensity Conflict.*

b. FC 100-37-1/Operational Handbook 7-14.1, *Unit Terrorism Counteraction.*

c. Naval Warfare Publication (NWP) 9/FMFM 1-10, *Law of Naval Warfare.*

d. Army Regulation 12-15, Secretary of the Navy Instruction (SECNAVINST) 4950.4, Air Force Instruction (AFI) 16-105, *Joint Security Assistance Training (JSAT) Regulation.*

6. US Army

a. FM 3-0, *Operations*.

b. FM 3-05.30, *Psychological Operations*.

c. FM 4-0, *Combat Service Support*.

d. FM 3-07, *Stability Operations and Support Operations*.

e. FM 8-42, *Combat Health Support in Stability Operations*.

f. FM 31-20-3, *Special Forces Foreign Internal Defense Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures*

g. FM 41-10, *Civil Affairs Operations*.

h. FM 46-1, *Public Affairs Operations*.

i. FM 90-8, *Counterguerrilla Operations*.

j. FM 100-25, *Doctrine for Army Special Operations Forces*.

7. US Navy

a. NWP 1, *Strategic Concepts of the US Navy*.

b. NWP-11, *Naval Operational Planning*.

c. NWP-13-1, *Navy Riverine and Coastal Operations*.

d. NWP-15, *Naval Special Warfare*.

e. NWP-15-2, *Special Boat Squadrons in Naval Special Warfare*.

f. Chief of Naval Operations Instruction (OPNAVINST) 3070.1, *Operations Security*.

g. OPNAVINST 3490.1, *Operations Against Command (Draft)*.

h. SECNAVINST 3070.1, *Operations Security*.

8. US Marine Corps

a. Navy, Marine Corps 2890, *Small Wars Manual*.

b. Fleet Marine Force Manual 8-2, *Counterinsurgency Operations*.

c. Marine Corps Order 3410.2A, *Marine Corps Doctrine for Psychological Operations*.

9. US Air Force

a. Air Force Doctrine Document (AFDD 1), *Air Force Basic Doctrine*.

b. AFDD 2-7.1, *Foreign Internal Defense*.

c. AFI 31-210, *The Air Force Antiterrorism/Force Protection (AT/FD) Programs Standards*.

10. US Coast Guard

a. Commandant, United States Coast Guard Instruction M3501.38/NWP 3-10, *Naval Coastal Warfare*.

b. *United States Coast Guard Model Maritime Service Code, 1995 Edition*.

c. *Model Maritime Operations Guide*, 2003 Edition.

11. Other

The Management of Security Assistance, The Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management.

Intentionally Blank

APPENDIX J
ADMINISTRATIVE INSTRUCTIONS

1. User Comments

Users in the field are highly encouraged to submit comments on this publication to: Commander, United States Joint Forces Command, Joint Warfighting Center Code JW100, 116 Lake View Parkway, Suffolk, VA 23435-2697. These comments should address content (accuracy, usefulness, consistency, and organization), writing, and appearance.

2. Authorship

The lead agent for this publication is the USSOCOM. The Joint Staff doctrine sponsor for this publication is the Director for Strategic Plans and Policy (J-5).

3. Supersession

This publication supersedes JP 3-07.1, 26 June 1996, *Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Foreign Internal Defense (FID).*

4. Change Recommendations

a. Recommendations for urgent changes to this publication should be submitted:

TO: CDRUSSOCOM MACDILL AFB FL//SOOP-JD//
INFO: JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC//J7-JDETD//
CDRUSJFCOM NORFOLK VA//JW100//

Routine changes should be submitted to the Director for Operational Plans and Joint Force Development (J-7), JDETD, 7000 Joint Staff Pentagon, Washington, DC 20318-7000, with info copies to the USJFCOM JWFC.

b. When a Joint Staff directorate submits a proposal to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that would change source document information reflected in this publication, that directorate will include a proposed change to this publication as an enclosure to its proposal. The Military Services and other organizations are requested to notify the Director, J-7, Joint Staff, when changes to source documents reflected in this publication are initiated.

c. Record of Changes:

CHANGE NUMBER	COPY NUMBER	DATE OF CHANGE	DATE ENTERED	POSTED BY	REMARKS

5. Distribution

a. Additional copies of this publication can be obtained through Service publication centers listed below (initial contact) or the USJFCOM JWFC in the event that the joint publication is not available from the Service.

b. Only approved joint publications and joint test publications are releasable outside the combatant commands, Services, and Joint Staff. Release of any classified joint publication to foreign governments or foreign nationals must be requested through the local embassy (Defense Attaché Office) to DIA Foreign Liaison Office, PO-FL, Room 1E811, 7400 Defense Pentagon, Washington, DC 20301-7400.

c. Additional copies should be obtained from the Military Service assigned administrative support responsibility by DOD Directive 5100.3, 15 November 1999, *Support of the Headquarters of Unified, Specified, and Subordinate Joint Commands*.

Army:	US Army AG Publication Center SL 1655 Woodson Road Attn: Joint Publications St. Louis, MO 63114-6181
Air Force:	Air Force Publications Distribution Center 2800 Eastern Boulevard Baltimore, MD 21220-2896
Navy:	CO, Naval Inventory Control Point 700 Robbins Avenue Bldg 1, Customer Service Philadelphia, PA 19111-5099
Marine Corps:	Commander (Attn: Publications) 814 Radford Blvd, Suite 20321 Albany, GA 31704-0321
Coast Guard:	Commandant Coast Guard (G-OPD), US Coast Guard 2100 2nd Street, SW Washington, DC 20593-0001
	Commander USJFCOM JWFC Code JW2102 Doctrine Division (Publication Distribution) 116 Lake View Parkway Suffolk, VA 23435-2697

d. Local reproduction is authorized and access to unclassified publications is unrestricted. However, access to and reproduction authorization for classified joint publications must be in accordance with DOD Regulation 5200.1-R, *Information Security Program*.

Intentionally Blank

GLOSSARY

PART I — ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

AC	Active Component
ACC	area coordination center
AECA	Arms Export Control Act
AFDD	Air Force doctrine document
AFI	Air Force instruction
AOR	area of responsibility
ASD(SO/LIC)	Assistant Secretary of Defense (Special Operations/Low-Intensity Conflict)
ASPA	American Service-Members' Protection Act
AT	antiterrorism
C2	command and control
C4	command, control, communications, and computers
CA	civil affairs
CD	counterdrug
CDRUSSOCOM	Commander, United States Special Operations Command
CG	Comptroller General
CI	counterintelligence
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CISO	counterintelligence staff officer
CJCSI	Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff instruction
CJCSM	Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff manual
CMO	civil-military operations
COA	course of action
CONPLAN	operation plan in concept format
DATT	defense attaché
DM	detection and monitoring
DOD	Department of Defense
DOS	Department of State
DSCA	Defense Security Cooperation Agency
DZ	drop zone
ESF	Economic Support Fund
ETSS	extended training service specialist
FAA	Foreign Assistance Act
FHA	foreign humanitarian assistance
FID	foreign internal defense
FM	field manual

FMFP	foreign military financing program
FMS	foreign military sales
HCA	humanitarian and civic assistance
HN	host nation
HNS	host-nation support
HSS	health service support
HUMINT	human intelligence
IDAD	internal defense and development
IMET	international military education and training
IO	information operations
J-2	intelligence directorate of a joint staff
J-3	operations directorate of a joint staff
J-4	logistics directorate of a joint staff
J-5	plans directorate of a joint staff
JFC	joint force commander
JIPB	joint intelligence preparation of the battlespace
JOA	joint operations area
JOPES	Joint Operation Planning and Execution System
JP	joint publication
JPOTF	joint psychological operations task force
JSCP	Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan
JSPS	Joint Strategic Planning System
JTF	joint task force
LOC	line of communications
LOS	line of sight
LZ	landing zone
MCA	military civic action
MILCON	military construction
MOE	measure of effectiveness
MTT	mobile training team
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NMS	national military strategy
NSC	National Security Council
NSCS	National Security Council System
NSPD	national security Presidential directive
NWP	naval warfare publication
O&M	operation and maintenance
OAE	operational area evaluation

OFDA	Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance
ONDCP	Office of National Drug Control Policy
OPCON	operational control
OPLAN	operation plan
OPNAVINST	Chief of Naval Operations instruction
OPSEC	operations security
ORBAT	order of battle
OSD	Office of the Secretary of Defense
PA	public affairs
PAO	public affairs officer
PCS	permanent change of station
PDD	Presidential decision directive
PEP	personnel exchange program
PKO	peacekeeping operations
PO	peace operations
POB	psychological operations battalion
POG	psychological operations group
POLAD	political advisor
PSYOP	psychological operations
QAT	quality assurance team
RC	Reserve Component
RDCFP	Regional Defense Counterterrorism Fellowship Program
ROE	rules of engagement
SA	security assistance
SAO	security assistance organization
SECNAVINST	Secretary of the Navy instruction
SOC	special operations command
SOF	special operations forces
SOFA	status-of-forces agreement
SROE	standing rules of engagement
TAFT	technical assistance field team
TAT	technical assistance team
TDY	temporary duty
TPB	tactical psychological operations battalion
TSC	theater security cooperation
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
USC	United States Code
USDAO	United States defense attaché office
USD(P)	Under Secretary of Defense for Policy

USDR	United States defense representative
USG	United States Government
USNORTHCOM	United States Northern Command
USSOCOM	United States Special Operations Command
USSOUTHCOM	United States Southern Command
WMD	weapons of mass destruction

PART II — TERMS AND DEFINITIONS

antiterrorism. Defensive measures used to reduce the vulnerability of individuals and property to terrorist acts to include limited response and containment by local military forces. Also called AT. (JP 1-02)

campaign plan. A plan for a series of related military operations aimed at accomplishing a strategic or operational objective within a given time and space. (JP 1-02)

civil administration. An administration established by a foreign government in (1) friendly territory, under an agreement with the government of the area concerned, to exercise certain authority normally the function of the local government; or (2) hostile territory, occupied by United States forces, where a foreign government exercises executive, legislative, and judicial authority until an indigenous civil government can be established. Also called CA administration. (JP 1-02)

civil affairs. Designated Active and Reserve component forces and units organized, trained, and equipped specifically to conduct civil affairs activities and to support civil-military operations. Also called CA. (JP 1-02)

civil affairs activities. Activities performed or supported by civil affairs that (1) enhance the relationship between military forces and civil authorities in areas where military forces are present; and (2) involve application of civil affairs functional specialty skills, in areas normally the responsibility of civil government, to enhance conduct of civil-military operations. (JP 1-02)

civil-military operations. The activities of a commander that establish, maintain, influence, or exploit relations between military forces, governmental and nongovernmental civilian organizations and authorities, and the civilian populace in a friendly, neutral, or hostile operational area in order to facilitate military operations, to consolidate and achieve operational US objectives. Civil-military operations may include performance by military forces of activities and functions normally the responsibility of the local, regional, or national government. These activities may occur prior to, during, or subsequent to other military actions. They may also occur, if directed, in the absence of other military operations. Civil-military operations may be performed by designated civil affairs, by other military forces, or by a combination of civil affairs and other forces. Also called CMO. (JP 1-02)

combatant command. A unified or specified command with a broad continuing mission under a single commander established and so designated by the President, through the Secretary of Defense and with the advice and assistance of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Combatant commands typically have geographic or functional responsibilities. (JP 1-02)

combatant commander. A commander of one of the unified or specified combatant commands established by the President. (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

combat service support. The essential capabilities, functions, activities, and tasks necessary to sustain all elements of operating forces in theater at all levels of war. Within the national and theater logistic systems, it includes but is not limited to that support rendered by service forces in ensuring the aspects of supply, maintenance, transportation, health services, and other services required by aviation and ground combat troops to permit those units to accomplish their missions in combat. Combat service support encompasses those activities at all levels of war that produce sustainment to all operating forces on the battlefield. Also called CSS. (JP 1-02)

combatting terrorism. Actions, including antiterrorism (defensive measures taken to reduce vulnerability to terrorist acts) and counterterrorism (offensive measures taken to prevent, deter, and respond to terrorism) taken to oppose terrorism throughout the entire threat spectrum. Also called CBT. (JP 1-02)

conventional forces. 1. Those forces capable of conducting operations using nonnuclear weapons. 2. Those forces other than designated special operations forces. (JP 1-02)

counterdrug. Those active measures taken to detect, monitor, and counter the production, trafficking, and use of illegal drugs. Also called CD. (JP 1-02)

counterinsurgency. Those military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological, and civic actions taken by a government to defeat insurgency. Also called COIN. (JP 1-02)

counterintelligence. Information gathered and activities conducted to protect against espionage, other intelligence activities, sabotage, or assassinations conducted by or on behalf of foreign governments or elements thereof, foreign organizations, or foreign persons, or international terrorists activities. Also called CI. (JP 1-02)

counterterrorism. Operations that include the offensive measures taken to prevent, deter, preempt, and respond to terrorism. Also called CT. (JP 1-02)

country team. The senior, in-country, US coordinating and supervising body, headed by the chief of the US diplomatic mission, and composed of the senior member of each represented US department or agency, as desired by the chief of the US diplomatic mission. (JP 1-02)

force protection. Actions taken to prevent or mitigate hostile actions against Department of Defense personnel (to include family members), resources, facilities, and critical information. These actions conserve the force's fighting potential so it can be applied at the decisive time and place and incorporate the coordinated and synchronized offensive and defensive measures to enable the effective employment of the joint force while degrading opportunities for the

enemy. Force protection does not include actions to defeat the enemy or protect against accidents, weather, or disease. Also called FP. (JP 1-02)

foreign humanitarian assistance. Programs conducted to relieve or reduce the results of natural or manmade disasters or other endemic conditions such as human pain, disease, hunger, or privation that might present a serious threat to life or that can result in great damage to or loss of property. Foreign humanitarian assistance (FHA) provided by US forces is limited in scope and duration. The foreign assistance provided is designed to supplement or complement the efforts of the host nation civil authorities or agencies that may have the primary responsibility for providing FHA. FHA operations are those conducted outside the United States, its territories, and possessions. Also called FHA. (JP 1-02)

foreign internal defense. Participation by civilian and military agencies of a government in any of the action programs taken by another government or other designated organization to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency. Also called FID. (JP 1-02)

host nation. A nation that receives the forces and/or supplies of allied nations, coalition partners, and/or NATO organizations to be located on, to operate in, or to transit through its territory. Also called HN. (JP 1-02)

host-nation support. Civil and/or military assistance rendered by a nation to foreign forces within its territory during peacetime, crises or emergencies, or war based upon agreements mutually concluded between nations. Also called HNS. (JP 1-02)

humanitarian and civic assistance. Assistance to the local populace provided by predominantly US forces in conjunction with military operations and exercises. This assistance is specifically authorized by title 10, United States Code, section 401, and funded under separate authorities. Assistance provided under these provisions is limited to (1) medical, dental, and veterinary care provided in rural areas of the country; (2) construction of rudimentary surface transportation systems; (3) well drilling and construction of basic sanitation facilities; and (4) rudimentary construction and repair of public facilities. Assistance must fulfill unit training requirements that incidentally create humanitarian benefit to the local populace. Also called HCA. (JP 1-02)

insurgency. An organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through use of subversion and armed conflict. (JP 1-02)

interagency coordination. Within the context of Department of Defense involvement, the coordination that occurs between elements of Department of Defense, and engaged US Government agencies, nongovernmental organizations, and regional and international organizations for the purpose of accomplishing an objective. (JP 1-02)

internal defense and development. The full range of measures taken by a nation to promote its growth and to protect itself from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency. It focuses on

building viable institutions (political, economic, social, and military) that respond to the needs of society. Also called IDAD. (JP 1-02)

joint intelligence preparation of the battlespace. The analytical process used by joint intelligence organizations to produce intelligence assessments, estimates and other intelligence products in support of the joint force commander's decisionmaking process. It is a continuous process that includes defining the total battlespace environment; describing the battlespace's effects; evaluating the adversary; and determining and describing adversary potential courses of action. The process is used to analyze the air, land, sea, space, electromagnetic, cyberspace, and human dimensions of the environment and to determine an opponent's capabilities to operate in each. Joint intelligence preparation of the battlespace products are used by the joint force and component command staffs in preparing their estimates and are also applied during the analysis and selection of friendly courses of action. Also called JIPB. (JP 1-02)

joint task force. A joint force that is constituted and so designated by the Secretary of Defense, a combatant commander, a subordinate unified command commander, or an existing joint task force commander. Also called JTF. (JP 1-02)

military assistance advisory group. A joint Service group, normally under the military command of a commander of a unified command and representing the Secretary of Defense, which primarily administers the US military assistance planning and programming in the host country. Also called MAAG. (JP 1-02)

military civic action. The use of preponderantly indigenous military forces on projects useful to the local population at all levels in such fields as education, training, public works, agriculture, transportation, communications, health, sanitation, and others contributing to economic and social development, which would also serve to improve the standing of the military forces with the population. (US forces may at times advise or engage in military civic actions in overseas areas.) (JP 1-02)

multinational operations. A collective term to describe military actions conducted by forces of two or more nations, usually undertaken within the structure of a coalition or alliance. (JP 1-02)

nation assistance. Civil and/or military assistance rendered to a nation by foreign forces within that nation's territory during peacetime, crises or emergencies, or war based on agreements mutually concluded between nations. Nation assistance programs include, but are not limited to, security assistance, foreign internal defense, other US Code title 10 (DOD) programs, and activities performed on a reimbursable basis by Federal agencies or international organizations. (JP 1-02)

paramilitary forces. Forces or groups distinct from the regular armed forces of any country, but resembling them in organization, equipment, training, or mission. (JP 1-02)

peacekeeping. Military operations undertaken with the consent of all major parties to a dispute, designed to monitor and facilitate implementation of an agreement (ceasefire, truce, or other such agreement) and support diplomatic efforts to reach a long-term political settlement. (JP 1-02)

peace operations. A broad term that encompasses peacekeeping operations and peace enforcement operations conducted in support of diplomatic efforts to establish and maintain peace. Also called PO. (JP 1-02)

propaganda. Any form of communication in support of national objectives designed to influence the opinions, emotions, attitudes, or behavior of any group in order to benefit the sponsor, either directly or indirectly. (JP 1-02)

psychological operations. Planned operations to convey selected information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately the behavior of foreign governments, organizations, groups, and individuals. The purpose of psychological operations is to induce or reinforce foreign attitudes and behavior favorable to the originator's objectives. Also called PSYOP. (JP 1-02)

public diplomacy. Those overt international public information activities of the United States Government designed to promote United States foreign policy objectives by seeking to understand, inform, and influence foreign audiences and opinion makers, and by broadening the dialogue between American citizens and institutions and their counterparts abroad. (JP 1-02)

public information. Information of a military nature, the dissemination of which through public news media is not inconsistent with security, and the release of which is considered desirable or nonobjectionable to the responsible releasing agency. (JP 1-02)

security assistance. Group of programs authorized by the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, and the Arms Export Control Act of 1976, as amended, or other related statutes by which the United States provides defense articles, military training, and other defense-related services, by grant, loan, credit, or cash sales in furtherance of national policies and objectives. Also called SA. (JP 1-02)

security assistance organization. All Department of Defense elements located in a foreign country with assigned responsibilities for carrying out security assistance management functions. It includes military assistance advisory groups, military missions and groups, offices of defense and military cooperation, liaison groups, and defense attaché personnel designated to perform security assistance functions. Also called SAO. (JP 1-02)

security cooperation. All Department of Defense interactions with foreign defense establishments to build defense relationships that promote specific US security interests, develop allied and friendly military capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations,

and provide US forces with peacetime and contingency access to a host nation. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

special operations forces. Those Active and Reserve Component forces of the Military Services designated by the Secretary of Defense and specifically organized, trained, and equipped to conduct and support special operations. Also called SOF. (JP 1-02)

status-of-forces agreement. An agreement that defines the legal position of a visiting military force deployed in the territory of a friendly state. Agreements delineating the status of visiting military forces may be bilateral or multilateral. Provisions pertaining to the status of visiting forces may be set forth in a separate agreement, or they may form a part of a more comprehensive agreement. These provisions describe how the authorities of a visiting force may control members of that force and the amenability of the force or its members to the local law or to the authority of local officials. To the extent that agreements delineate matters affecting the relations between a military force and civilian authorities and population, they may be considered as civil affairs agreements. Also called SOFA. (JP 1-02)

subversion. Action designed to undermine the military, economic, psychological, or political strength or morale of a regime. See also unconventional warfare. (JP 1-02)

terrorism. The calculated use of unlawful violence or threat of unlawful violence to inculcate fear; intended to coerce or to intimidate governments or societies in the pursuit of goals that are generally political, religious, or ideological. (JP 1-02)

unconventional warfare. A broad spectrum of military and paramilitary operations, normally of long duration, predominantly conducted through, with, or by indigenous or surrogate forces who are organized, trained, equipped, supported, and directed in varying degrees by an external source. It includes, but is not limited to, guerrilla warfare, subversion, sabotage, intelligence activities, and unconventional assisted recovery. Also called UW. (JP 1-02)

JOINT DOCTRINE PUBLICATIONS HIERARCHY



All joint doctrine and tactics, techniques, and procedures are organized into a comprehensive hierarchy as shown in the chart above. **Joint Publication (JP) 3-07.1** is in the **Operations** series of joint doctrine publications. The diagram below illustrates an overview of the development process:



JOINT
CHIEFS OF STAFF